was exerted on the IWC to have its member states alter the Schedule in a way that
allowed for a temporary, 10-year zero-catch quota for all whaling that is being
conducted for commercial purposes. While not directly mentioning it, this proposal
did not account for aboriginal whalers whose subsistence whaling activities did and
do not fall under the category of ‘commercial’ whaling.
In order for a Schedule amendment to occur, the Commission’s member states
need to provide for a three-quarter majority. Any proposed amendment that does not
meet this criteria is not adopted and thus does not become binding upon member
states. In the post-Stockholm 1970s, this majority could not be reached and it was
particularly whaling states such as Japan, Norway and Iceland that strongly opposed
such a moratorium. Since the IWC is an organisation which is open to all states, the
shift towards a pro-moratorium three-quarter majority was reached upon the joining
of an increasing number of states opposing whaling on normative grounds, which
occurred towards the early 1980s. By 1982, a sufficient numbers of states within the
IWC supported a moratorium and the IWC amended the catch quotas in the Schedule
to be zero for 10 years. In this sense, the IWC did not explicitly outlaw whaling as
such, but rather established a (temporary) zero-catch-quota for all whale species
listed in the Schedule.
The IWC does not ‘police’ its own rules, however. Consequently, if a state does
not conform to IWC rules, there is no way of enforcing the Commission’s decisions
or its Schedule. The only way to monitor whether or not rules are being followed is
through self-reporting to the Infractions Committee which records infractions and
suggests how to proceed in a particular case. However, it is then the Commission
itself which decides upon certain sanctions on member states that do not comply
with IWC rules. What the nature of these sanctions in relation to illegal hunting of
whales are is difficult to assess. It is mostly the government of the infracting state
which is to take punitive action against those having committed the infraction. In
case of the government sanctioning the infraction, the IWC becomes powerless,
which has ascribed many to label it as an organisation with ‘no teeth’. Indeed, in case
of the Soviet Union, in the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet whalers reported wrong data to
the Scientific Committee, which was unable to independently verify this data. The
IWC in turn was unable to sanction the Soviet Union, making the organisation an
incapable bystander in watching whale populations drop.
The most commonly found non-compliance with IWC rules occurs with regard to
financial contributions. If a member state does not pay its dues to the Commission, it
can be sanctioned. These sanctions have direct effect and may occur in the form of
suspensions of voting rights or the non-provision of specific services from the IWC.
The IWC is not able to expel a member due to unpaid fees or non-compliance with
other provisions.
5.3 The International Whaling Commission, Whaling and Whales
93
allowed for a temporary, 10-year zero-catch quota for all whaling that is being
conducted for commercial purposes. While not directly mentioning it, this proposal
did not account for aboriginal whalers whose subsistence whaling activities did and
do not fall under the category of ‘commercial’ whaling.
In order for a Schedule amendment to occur, the Commission’s member states
need to provide for a three-quarter majority. Any proposed amendment that does not
meet this criteria is not adopted and thus does not become binding upon member
states. In the post-Stockholm 1970s, this majority could not be reached and it was
particularly whaling states such as Japan, Norway and Iceland that strongly opposed
such a moratorium. Since the IWC is an organisation which is open to all states, the
shift towards a pro-moratorium three-quarter majority was reached upon the joining
of an increasing number of states opposing whaling on normative grounds, which
occurred towards the early 1980s. By 1982, a sufficient numbers of states within the
IWC supported a moratorium and the IWC amended the catch quotas in the Schedule
to be zero for 10 years. In this sense, the IWC did not explicitly outlaw whaling as
such, but rather established a (temporary) zero-catch-quota for all whale species
listed in the Schedule.
The IWC does not ‘police’ its own rules, however. Consequently, if a state does
not conform to IWC rules, there is no way of enforcing the Commission’s decisions
or its Schedule. The only way to monitor whether or not rules are being followed is
through self-reporting to the Infractions Committee which records infractions and
suggests how to proceed in a particular case. However, it is then the Commission
itself which decides upon certain sanctions on member states that do not comply
with IWC rules. What the nature of these sanctions in relation to illegal hunting of
whales are is difficult to assess. It is mostly the government of the infracting state
which is to take punitive action against those having committed the infraction. In
case of the government sanctioning the infraction, the IWC becomes powerless,
which has ascribed many to label it as an organisation with ‘no teeth’. Indeed, in case
of the Soviet Union, in the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet whalers reported wrong data to
the Scientific Committee, which was unable to independently verify this data. The
IWC in turn was unable to sanction the Soviet Union, making the organisation an
incapable bystander in watching whale populations drop.
The most commonly found non-compliance with IWC rules occurs with regard to
financial contributions. If a member state does not pay its dues to the Commission, it
can be sanctioned. These sanctions have direct effect and may occur in the form of
suspensions of voting rights or the non-provision of specific services from the IWC.
The IWC is not able to expel a member due to unpaid fees or non-compliance with
other provisions.
5.3 The International Whaling Commission, Whaling and Whales
93