future. In the same manner, provisions protecting suckling whales, immature whales
or female whales which are accompanied by calves must be considered.
The longevity of the whaling industry is furthermore at the heart of provisions of
a more administrative character. For example, provisions for proper renumeration of
whaling crews or the notification of national governments before engaging in
whaling identify human and whale wellbeing merely as a ‘side product.’
This being said, one might argue that the convention was rather progressive at
that time, particularly with regard to the considerations of the local, indigenous
populations. While the convention did establish certain regulations for the conduct
of whaling, these did not apply to the ‘aborigines dwelling on the coasts of the
territories of the High Contracting Parties.’ This meant that indigenous populations
that hunted whales within the national boundaries of the parties to the convention
were not subject to the restrictions and rules outlined in the convention. This was,
however, only the case if they used only traditional boating propelled by oars or sail;
if they did not carry firearms; if they were not employed by persons other than
indigenous persons; and if they were not contractually bound to deliver whale
products to third persons. If any of these conditions did not apply, they would
have to be bound by the provisions of the convention.
Here we already see a manifestation of a discourse that has lasted throughout the
twentieth and well into the twenty-first century: the dichotomy of commercial and
subsistence use of marine mammals. The convention did not aim to regulate whaling
as such, but rather industrial or commercial whaling—meaning whaling for profit.
Since indeed profit was the guiding principle of the whaling industry at that time, this
meant that the more whales could be killed and used, the more profit could be made,
proving disastrous to whale populations and ultimately for the commercial whaling
industry. Consequently, some kind of regulations were necessary to ensure the
sustainability of whaling as an industry. This did not account for the subsistence
hunts for whales, which was, for example in the Arctic, conducted by indigenous
inhabitants, using indigenous technologies, and using the whale products directly
within their communities without a chain of commerce involved in it. This type of
whaling was of a fundamentally different character than the commercial whale hunt
and was furthermore still actively ongoing during that time. After all, the
colonisation of the Arctic and associated assimilation of the local indigenous
population into the societal and economic constructs of the colonising states
occurred slower than in other regions of the world. However, as I argue throughout
this book, the consideration of indigenous whaling still being significantly different
to other whaling is still an important factor in contemporary marine mammal law.
It would appear reasonable to assume that the 1931 whaling convention was
applicable to states only that were actively engaged in whaling activities. This,
however, was not the case and the convention was open for all states. This led to
the joining of states with no immediate whaling interest, such as Poland, Serbia or
Switzerland. This, in turn, led to an imbalance in the focal points of the convention’s
parties, particularly as regards conservation efforts: while there were many parties to
the convention, only a few had a genuine interest in conserving whale stocks and it
was left to them to implement conservation efforts. Moreover, many parties
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5 The International Legal Framework for Whales
or female whales which are accompanied by calves must be considered.
The longevity of the whaling industry is furthermore at the heart of provisions of
a more administrative character. For example, provisions for proper renumeration of
whaling crews or the notification of national governments before engaging in
whaling identify human and whale wellbeing merely as a ‘side product.’
This being said, one might argue that the convention was rather progressive at
that time, particularly with regard to the considerations of the local, indigenous
populations. While the convention did establish certain regulations for the conduct
of whaling, these did not apply to the ‘aborigines dwelling on the coasts of the
territories of the High Contracting Parties.’ This meant that indigenous populations
that hunted whales within the national boundaries of the parties to the convention
were not subject to the restrictions and rules outlined in the convention. This was,
however, only the case if they used only traditional boating propelled by oars or sail;
if they did not carry firearms; if they were not employed by persons other than
indigenous persons; and if they were not contractually bound to deliver whale
products to third persons. If any of these conditions did not apply, they would
have to be bound by the provisions of the convention.
Here we already see a manifestation of a discourse that has lasted throughout the
twentieth and well into the twenty-first century: the dichotomy of commercial and
subsistence use of marine mammals. The convention did not aim to regulate whaling
as such, but rather industrial or commercial whaling—meaning whaling for profit.
Since indeed profit was the guiding principle of the whaling industry at that time, this
meant that the more whales could be killed and used, the more profit could be made,
proving disastrous to whale populations and ultimately for the commercial whaling
industry. Consequently, some kind of regulations were necessary to ensure the
sustainability of whaling as an industry. This did not account for the subsistence
hunts for whales, which was, for example in the Arctic, conducted by indigenous
inhabitants, using indigenous technologies, and using the whale products directly
within their communities without a chain of commerce involved in it. This type of
whaling was of a fundamentally different character than the commercial whale hunt
and was furthermore still actively ongoing during that time. After all, the
colonisation of the Arctic and associated assimilation of the local indigenous
population into the societal and economic constructs of the colonising states
occurred slower than in other regions of the world. However, as I argue throughout
this book, the consideration of indigenous whaling still being significantly different
to other whaling is still an important factor in contemporary marine mammal law.
It would appear reasonable to assume that the 1931 whaling convention was
applicable to states only that were actively engaged in whaling activities. This,
however, was not the case and the convention was open for all states. This led to
the joining of states with no immediate whaling interest, such as Poland, Serbia or
Switzerland. This, in turn, led to an imbalance in the focal points of the convention’s
parties, particularly as regards conservation efforts: while there were many parties to
the convention, only a few had a genuine interest in conserving whale stocks and it
was left to them to implement conservation efforts. Moreover, many parties
84
5 The International Legal Framework for Whales