The general picture is that censors—and wiretappers—perpetually lag behind the wave of
innovation. In the 1960s, computer companies fought with telephone companies for less
restricted access to the network, and the telephone companies called government agencies
to their aid so as to protect their business models (which involved owning all network-attached
devices). By the mid-1980s only a few authoritarian states banned the private ownership of
modems, and the security agencies of developed countries had acquired the capability to intercept data communications. The explosion in popularity of fax machines in the mid-1980s
put the agencies on the back foot again; a handwritten fax still gives reasonable protection
against automated surveillance. When e-mail and the Web took off in the mid-1990s, the
agencies scrambled to catch up, with proposals for laws restricting cryptography, which
turned out to be irrelevant to the real problems that emerged, and more recent proposals for
the retention of communications data. Modern Google users may be largely unaffected by
all this—their searches, e-mails, word processing, and group communications may all be
cohosted.
It will be interesting, to say the least, to see how states deal with the move to edge-based
computing. Developed countries tend to observe a distinction between wiretapping that gives
access to content, and traffic analysis that gives access merely to traffic data. Most countries
require a higher level of warrantry for access to the former. However, the move to the edge
blurs the distinction between traffic and content, and there must eventually be a question as
to whether this might undermine the existing controls on state interference with communications. Other countries may be less limited by legal scruples than by technical capability and
by access. Application service providers such as Google and Yahoo! have to cooperate with
the authorities in countries like China where they maintain a physical presence, but may not
make all applications available. Small authoritarian states, that enjoy neither the physical presence of the main service providers nor the technological capability, may find their ability to
exert technical control over information flows seriously compromised, and may have to rely
largely on legal and social mechanisms.
To sum up, the Internet has borders—just like meatspace—and the quality of the borders
depends on the situation of the country that erects them.
Conclusion
Ten years ago, Internet utopians like John Perry Barlow held out the prospect that statesponsored barriers to communication would be swept away, leading to a significant improvement in the human condition. Some less-developed countries denounced this as ‘‘U.S.
Information Imperialism.’’
The Internet is more complex than previous mechanisms (such as the postal system and
telephones). Control is not impossible, but it requires more sophistication, and the censors are
continually playing catch-up as technological innovation changes the game. The migration of
Tools and Technology of Internet Filtering
71
innovation. In the 1960s, computer companies fought with telephone companies for less
restricted access to the network, and the telephone companies called government agencies
to their aid so as to protect their business models (which involved owning all network-attached
devices). By the mid-1980s only a few authoritarian states banned the private ownership of
modems, and the security agencies of developed countries had acquired the capability to intercept data communications. The explosion in popularity of fax machines in the mid-1980s
put the agencies on the back foot again; a handwritten fax still gives reasonable protection
against automated surveillance. When e-mail and the Web took off in the mid-1990s, the
agencies scrambled to catch up, with proposals for laws restricting cryptography, which
turned out to be irrelevant to the real problems that emerged, and more recent proposals for
the retention of communications data. Modern Google users may be largely unaffected by
all this—their searches, e-mails, word processing, and group communications may all be
cohosted.
It will be interesting, to say the least, to see how states deal with the move to edge-based
computing. Developed countries tend to observe a distinction between wiretapping that gives
access to content, and traffic analysis that gives access merely to traffic data. Most countries
require a higher level of warrantry for access to the former. However, the move to the edge
blurs the distinction between traffic and content, and there must eventually be a question as
to whether this might undermine the existing controls on state interference with communications. Other countries may be less limited by legal scruples than by technical capability and
by access. Application service providers such as Google and Yahoo! have to cooperate with
the authorities in countries like China where they maintain a physical presence, but may not
make all applications available. Small authoritarian states, that enjoy neither the physical presence of the main service providers nor the technological capability, may find their ability to
exert technical control over information flows seriously compromised, and may have to rely
largely on legal and social mechanisms.
To sum up, the Internet has borders—just like meatspace—and the quality of the borders
depends on the situation of the country that erects them.
Conclusion
Ten years ago, Internet utopians like John Perry Barlow held out the prospect that statesponsored barriers to communication would be swept away, leading to a significant improvement in the human condition. Some less-developed countries denounced this as ‘‘U.S.
Information Imperialism.’’
The Internet is more complex than previous mechanisms (such as the postal system and
telephones). Control is not impossible, but it requires more sophistication, and the censors are
continually playing catch-up as technological innovation changes the game. The migration of
Tools and Technology of Internet Filtering
71