a common purpose for some measure of state control of bits online. Some would argue that
intellectual property protection represents yet another such example, though the merits of that
proposition are hotly contested.
One of the key findings of our research is the extent to which states cannot do the job of
content control alone, which in turn adds another layer of complexity to the analysis of Internet
filtering as a public policy matter. Where the state cannot effectively carry out its mandate in
these legitimate circumstances, the state reasonably turns to those best positioned to assert
control of bits. Often, though not always, the state turns to Internet service providers of one
flavor or another. The law enforcement officer, for instance, calls upon the lawyers representing ISPs to turn over information about users of the online service who are suspected of committing a common crime, such as online fraud. As criminals use the Internet in the course of
wrongdoing, states need to be able to access the increasingly useful store of evidence collected online.
The strongest form of this argument is that online censorship and surveillance is a legitimate expression of the sovereign authority of states. As we have described, Saudi Arabia,
which implements one of the most extensive and longest-running filtering regimes, did not introduce Internet access to its citizens until the state authorities were comfortable that they
could do so in a manner that would not be averse to local morals or norms. In particular, the
Saudi regime has concerned itself with blocking access to online pornography, which it has
done with a startlingly high degree of effectiveness over the past five years—though the
scope of its filtering has grown over time, now including more political information than when
we first began testing there in 2002.
A state has a right to protect the morality of its citizens, the argument goes, and unfettered
access to and use of the Internet undercuts public morality in myriad ways. Many regimes,
including those in Western states (including the United States), have justified online surveillance of various sorts on the grounds of ordinary law enforcement activities, such as the prevention and enforcement of domestic criminal activity. Most recently, states have begun to
justify online censorship and surveillance as a measure to counteract international terrorism.
Put more simply, Internet filtering and surveillance, in an environment where the Internet is
considered a form of territory alongside land or sea or air, are an expression of the unalterable
right of a state to ensure its national security.
Counterarguments: The Infirmities of Technical Filtering
One of the enduring facts of technical filtering of the Internet is that no state has managed to
implement a perfect system. The primary deficiency of any technical filtering system is that the
censor must choose between two shortcomings: either the system suffers from overbreadth,
that is, sites that are not meant to be filtered are filtered, or underbreadth, that is, not all
sites meant to be filtered are filtered. In most instances, the filtering regime suffers from a
Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control
45
intellectual property protection represents yet another such example, though the merits of that
proposition are hotly contested.
One of the key findings of our research is the extent to which states cannot do the job of
content control alone, which in turn adds another layer of complexity to the analysis of Internet
filtering as a public policy matter. Where the state cannot effectively carry out its mandate in
these legitimate circumstances, the state reasonably turns to those best positioned to assert
control of bits. Often, though not always, the state turns to Internet service providers of one
flavor or another. The law enforcement officer, for instance, calls upon the lawyers representing ISPs to turn over information about users of the online service who are suspected of committing a common crime, such as online fraud. As criminals use the Internet in the course of
wrongdoing, states need to be able to access the increasingly useful store of evidence collected online.
The strongest form of this argument is that online censorship and surveillance is a legitimate expression of the sovereign authority of states. As we have described, Saudi Arabia,
which implements one of the most extensive and longest-running filtering regimes, did not introduce Internet access to its citizens until the state authorities were comfortable that they
could do so in a manner that would not be averse to local morals or norms. In particular, the
Saudi regime has concerned itself with blocking access to online pornography, which it has
done with a startlingly high degree of effectiveness over the past five years—though the
scope of its filtering has grown over time, now including more political information than when
we first began testing there in 2002.
A state has a right to protect the morality of its citizens, the argument goes, and unfettered
access to and use of the Internet undercuts public morality in myriad ways. Many regimes,
including those in Western states (including the United States), have justified online surveillance of various sorts on the grounds of ordinary law enforcement activities, such as the prevention and enforcement of domestic criminal activity. Most recently, states have begun to
justify online censorship and surveillance as a measure to counteract international terrorism.
Put more simply, Internet filtering and surveillance, in an environment where the Internet is
considered a form of territory alongside land or sea or air, are an expression of the unalterable
right of a state to ensure its national security.
Counterarguments: The Infirmities of Technical Filtering
One of the enduring facts of technical filtering of the Internet is that no state has managed to
implement a perfect system. The primary deficiency of any technical filtering system is that the
censor must choose between two shortcomings: either the system suffers from overbreadth,
that is, sites that are not meant to be filtered are filtered, or underbreadth, that is, not all
sites meant to be filtered are filtered. In most instances, the filtering regime suffers from a
Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control
45