about what sites a particular user has visited after the fact, such as the requirement that a user
provide passport information to set up an account with an ISP and tighter controls of users at
cybercafe ´s, as in Vietnam. The on-again, off-again blocking of Wikipedia in China might well
be explained, in part, by this mode of sending a message that the state is watching in order to
prompt self-censorship online.
While our research can tell us what Web sites a regime has targeted for filtering, the real
extent to which the information environment is ‘‘free’’ and ‘‘open’’ is sharply limited. It is not
as easy to determine, for instance, the extent of citizens’ attempts to reach blocked sites, the
degree to which citizens are deterred by the threat of arrest or detection, and how much the
invisibility of specific content actually affects the regime’s internal dialogue. Our research provides the data to draw conclusions about the choices made by states as to the content to be
filtered, how these decisions are affected by the mechanisms for filtering they have employed,
and how these governments attempt to balance the overblocking or underblocking that is
today inherent in any filtering regime.
Types of Content Filtered
As Faris and Villeneuve describe in chapter 1, states around the world are blocking access to
Internet content for its political, religious, and social connotations. Sensitivities related to specific content within these broad categories vary greatly from state to state, tracking, to large
extent, local conflicts. The Internet content blocked for social reasons—commonly pornography, information about gay and lesbian issues, and information about sex education—is more
likely to be the same across countries than the political and religious information to which access is blocked.
Web content is constantly changing, of course, and no state we have studied in the past
five years seems able to carry out its Web filtering in a comprehensive manner—at least not
through technical means. In other words, no state has been able to consistently block access
to a range of sites meeting specified criteria. The most thorough job of blocking might be the
high rate of blocking online pornography in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states—a fairly
stunning achievement given the amount of pornographic material available online—and one
managed with the ongoing help of a U.S. firm, Secure Computing, that also assists schools
in keeping children away from such Web sites. China has the most consistent record of
responding to the shifting content of the Web, likely reflecting a devotion of the most resources to the filtering enterprise. Our research shows changes among sites blocked over
time in some states, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China. As we repeat this global survey
in future years, we expect to be able to describe changes over time with greater certainty.
The Reality and Perception of Internet Surveillance and Other Soft Controls
Just as these several dozen states use technical means to block citizens from accessing content on the Internet, each state also employs legal and other ‘‘soft’’ means of control. Most
Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control
35
provide passport information to set up an account with an ISP and tighter controls of users at
cybercafe ´s, as in Vietnam. The on-again, off-again blocking of Wikipedia in China might well
be explained, in part, by this mode of sending a message that the state is watching in order to
prompt self-censorship online.
While our research can tell us what Web sites a regime has targeted for filtering, the real
extent to which the information environment is ‘‘free’’ and ‘‘open’’ is sharply limited. It is not
as easy to determine, for instance, the extent of citizens’ attempts to reach blocked sites, the
degree to which citizens are deterred by the threat of arrest or detection, and how much the
invisibility of specific content actually affects the regime’s internal dialogue. Our research provides the data to draw conclusions about the choices made by states as to the content to be
filtered, how these decisions are affected by the mechanisms for filtering they have employed,
and how these governments attempt to balance the overblocking or underblocking that is
today inherent in any filtering regime.
Types of Content Filtered
As Faris and Villeneuve describe in chapter 1, states around the world are blocking access to
Internet content for its political, religious, and social connotations. Sensitivities related to specific content within these broad categories vary greatly from state to state, tracking, to large
extent, local conflicts. The Internet content blocked for social reasons—commonly pornography, information about gay and lesbian issues, and information about sex education—is more
likely to be the same across countries than the political and religious information to which access is blocked.
Web content is constantly changing, of course, and no state we have studied in the past
five years seems able to carry out its Web filtering in a comprehensive manner—at least not
through technical means. In other words, no state has been able to consistently block access
to a range of sites meeting specified criteria. The most thorough job of blocking might be the
high rate of blocking online pornography in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states—a fairly
stunning achievement given the amount of pornographic material available online—and one
managed with the ongoing help of a U.S. firm, Secure Computing, that also assists schools
in keeping children away from such Web sites. China has the most consistent record of
responding to the shifting content of the Web, likely reflecting a devotion of the most resources to the filtering enterprise. Our research shows changes among sites blocked over
time in some states, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China. As we repeat this global survey
in future years, we expect to be able to describe changes over time with greater certainty.
The Reality and Perception of Internet Surveillance and Other Soft Controls
Just as these several dozen states use technical means to block citizens from accessing content on the Internet, each state also employs legal and other ‘‘soft’’ means of control. Most
Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control
35