Internet filtering, as well as surveillance activities. Liability placed on Internet service providers
and Internet content providers can ensure that intermediaries affirmatively carry out filtering
and surveillance without a license requirement. Registration requirements establish the need
to gather data about citizens accessing the Internet from a certain IP address, user account,
cybercafe ´ location, and so forth. And self-monitoring requirements—coupled with the perception, real or imagined, of online surveillance—prompt individual, corporate, and other users to
limit their own access and publication online. At the same time, some states are experiencing
international pressure to pass Internet-related laws, including omnibus cybercrime statutes
that include reference to eliminating access to certain types of banned sites.
7
The interplay among these types of regulations is a key aspect of this narrative. China, for
instance, bundles Internet content restrictions with its copyright laws. This set of regulations
sets a daunting web of requirements in front of anyone who might access the Internet or
provide a service to another Internet user. These rules create a pretext that can be used to
punish those who exchange undesirable content, even though the law may not be invoked in
many instances it might cover—including copyright infringement. Vietnam has taken a similar
approach, assigning a number of different relevant ministries and agencies a piece of the responsibility to limit what can be done and accessed online. Much of the legal regulation that
empowers state agencies to carry out filtering and surveillance tends to be very broadly and
vaguely stated, where it is stated at all.
A theme that runs through this book is that Internet regulation takes many forms—not just
technical, not just legal—and that regulation takes place not just in developing economies but
in some of the world’s most prosperous regimes as well. Vagueness as to what content
is banned exists not just in China, Vietnam, and Iran, but also in France and Germany, where
the requirement to limit Internet access to certain materials includes a ban on ‘‘propaganda
against the democratic constitutional order.’’
8 Often, these local legal requirements strike a
dissonant chord when set alongside international human rights standards, a topic covered in
greater detail, and from two different perspectives, in chapters 5 and 6 of this book.
As our global survey shows, and as Faris and Villeneuve set forth in chapter 1 of this volume, several dozen states have gone beyond a legal ban on citizen publication or access of
undesirable material online and have set up technical means of filtering its citizens’ access
to the Internet. In establishing a technical filtering regime, a state has several initial options:
domain name system (DNS) filtering, Internet protocol (IP) address filtering, or URL filtering.
9
Most states with advanced filtering regimes implement URL filtering, as this method can be
the most accurate (see ‘‘Filtering and Overbreadth’’ section later in this chapter).
10
To implement URL filtering, a state must first identify where to place the filters. If the state
directly controls the Internet service provider(s), the answer is clear. Otherwise, it may require
private or semiprivate ISPs to implement the blocking as part of their service. The technical
complexities presented by URL filtering become nontrivial as the number of users grows to millions rather than tens of thousands. Some states appear to have limited the number of people
Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control
33
and Internet content providers can ensure that intermediaries affirmatively carry out filtering
and surveillance without a license requirement. Registration requirements establish the need
to gather data about citizens accessing the Internet from a certain IP address, user account,
cybercafe ´ location, and so forth. And self-monitoring requirements—coupled with the perception, real or imagined, of online surveillance—prompt individual, corporate, and other users to
limit their own access and publication online. At the same time, some states are experiencing
international pressure to pass Internet-related laws, including omnibus cybercrime statutes
that include reference to eliminating access to certain types of banned sites.
7
The interplay among these types of regulations is a key aspect of this narrative. China, for
instance, bundles Internet content restrictions with its copyright laws. This set of regulations
sets a daunting web of requirements in front of anyone who might access the Internet or
provide a service to another Internet user. These rules create a pretext that can be used to
punish those who exchange undesirable content, even though the law may not be invoked in
many instances it might cover—including copyright infringement. Vietnam has taken a similar
approach, assigning a number of different relevant ministries and agencies a piece of the responsibility to limit what can be done and accessed online. Much of the legal regulation that
empowers state agencies to carry out filtering and surveillance tends to be very broadly and
vaguely stated, where it is stated at all.
A theme that runs through this book is that Internet regulation takes many forms—not just
technical, not just legal—and that regulation takes place not just in developing economies but
in some of the world’s most prosperous regimes as well. Vagueness as to what content
is banned exists not just in China, Vietnam, and Iran, but also in France and Germany, where
the requirement to limit Internet access to certain materials includes a ban on ‘‘propaganda
against the democratic constitutional order.’’
8 Often, these local legal requirements strike a
dissonant chord when set alongside international human rights standards, a topic covered in
greater detail, and from two different perspectives, in chapters 5 and 6 of this book.
As our global survey shows, and as Faris and Villeneuve set forth in chapter 1 of this volume, several dozen states have gone beyond a legal ban on citizen publication or access of
undesirable material online and have set up technical means of filtering its citizens’ access
to the Internet. In establishing a technical filtering regime, a state has several initial options:
domain name system (DNS) filtering, Internet protocol (IP) address filtering, or URL filtering.
9
Most states with advanced filtering regimes implement URL filtering, as this method can be
the most accurate (see ‘‘Filtering and Overbreadth’’ section later in this chapter).
10
To implement URL filtering, a state must first identify where to place the filters. If the state
directly controls the Internet service provider(s), the answer is clear. Otherwise, it may require
private or semiprivate ISPs to implement the blocking as part of their service. The technical
complexities presented by URL filtering become nontrivial as the number of users grows to millions rather than tens of thousands. Some states appear to have limited the number of people
Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control
33