belonged to the NGO Human Rights Watch
(www.hrw.org).
Certain religious content, such as pages on
religious freedom, Buddhism, and Caodai
(www.caodai.net) are blocked to a limited
degree. Some topics, such as the Montagnard
people who assisted the United States during the
war with Vietnam and who are commonly
Christians, overlap multiple categories (such as
the Montagnard Human Rights Organization
Web site www.mhro.org) and are filtered accordingly.
Surprisingly, Vietnam does not block any
pornographic content (though it does filter one
site ONI tested with links to adult material),
despite the state’s putative focus on preventing
access to sexually explicit material. The state’s filtering practices are thus in obvious tension with
the purported justification for these actions.
ONI has concluded that commercial filtering
lists are not being used in Vietnam for several
reasons: the pattern of blocking does not conform to any software product that ONI has studied, the observed pattern of deleting DNS
records for prohibited sites is inconsistent with
using Web filtering software, and the greater filtering of Vietnamese-language sites on a given
topic compared with English-language sites.
However, VNPT may be using a commercial
product for filtering. Through multiple rounds of
testing, inconsistencies in filtering persisted and
evolved, also indicating that the Vietnamese
state or Vietnamese ISPs are compiling their own
block lists. For example, the news site
www.saigonbao.com, blocked earlier in 2006 by
both FPT and VNPT, was inaccessible only on
VNPT when tested at the end of the year. VNPT
also filtered a range of sites that were accessible
on FPT, primarily independent media, human
rights (from the Vietnam Human Rights Network
to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Web sites), and overseas community (the
Vietnam American National Gala awards) and
political content.
Conclusion
Vietnam’s filtering regime is multilayered, relying
not only on computing technology but also on
threats of legal liability, state-based and private
monitoring of users’ online activities, and informal
pressures such as supervision by employees or
other users in cybercafés. Over time, the state’s
online filtering has expanded, both in the content
blocked for a given topic and the number of content categories that are targeted. Although purporting to protect national security and block
obscene content, Vietnam actually focuses on
blocking access to sites within an expansive definition of political “opposition” that includes the
activities of Vietnamese communities overseas.
Although the Vietnamese state’s blocking of
access to certain content on the Internet can be
circumvented by users with technical knowledge,
ordinary users will likely continue to find that filtering distorts their information environment.
NOTES
1. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Vietnam youths arrested
over internet chats released after 9 months,” August
16, 2006.
2. Thai Press Reports, “E-commerce services extended
in 2006,” January 4, 2007.
3. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., 2006, Vietnam:
Internet, 10, July 30, 2006. See also John Boudreau,
“Bay Area entrepreneur leads way in online gaming
in Vietnam,” The Mercury News, January 17, 2007,
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/busi
ness/16475618.htm.
4. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., 2006, Vietnam:
Internet, 15, July 30, 2006.
5. See Articles 27–38, decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP of
the Government on the management, provision and
use of the Internet services, issued on August 23,
2001.
6. Article 27, decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. See Article 3, decision no. 27/2005/QD-BBCVT;
IANA, .vn – Vietnam, http://www.iana.org/root-whois/
vn.htm.
10. See Article 7, decision no. 27/2005/QD-BBCVT.
Country Summaries
423
(www.hrw.org).
Certain religious content, such as pages on
religious freedom, Buddhism, and Caodai
(www.caodai.net) are blocked to a limited
degree. Some topics, such as the Montagnard
people who assisted the United States during the
war with Vietnam and who are commonly
Christians, overlap multiple categories (such as
the Montagnard Human Rights Organization
Web site www.mhro.org) and are filtered accordingly.
Surprisingly, Vietnam does not block any
pornographic content (though it does filter one
site ONI tested with links to adult material),
despite the state’s putative focus on preventing
access to sexually explicit material. The state’s filtering practices are thus in obvious tension with
the purported justification for these actions.
ONI has concluded that commercial filtering
lists are not being used in Vietnam for several
reasons: the pattern of blocking does not conform to any software product that ONI has studied, the observed pattern of deleting DNS
records for prohibited sites is inconsistent with
using Web filtering software, and the greater filtering of Vietnamese-language sites on a given
topic compared with English-language sites.
However, VNPT may be using a commercial
product for filtering. Through multiple rounds of
testing, inconsistencies in filtering persisted and
evolved, also indicating that the Vietnamese
state or Vietnamese ISPs are compiling their own
block lists. For example, the news site
www.saigonbao.com, blocked earlier in 2006 by
both FPT and VNPT, was inaccessible only on
VNPT when tested at the end of the year. VNPT
also filtered a range of sites that were accessible
on FPT, primarily independent media, human
rights (from the Vietnam Human Rights Network
to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Web sites), and overseas community (the
Vietnam American National Gala awards) and
political content.
Conclusion
Vietnam’s filtering regime is multilayered, relying
not only on computing technology but also on
threats of legal liability, state-based and private
monitoring of users’ online activities, and informal
pressures such as supervision by employees or
other users in cybercafés. Over time, the state’s
online filtering has expanded, both in the content
blocked for a given topic and the number of content categories that are targeted. Although purporting to protect national security and block
obscene content, Vietnam actually focuses on
blocking access to sites within an expansive definition of political “opposition” that includes the
activities of Vietnamese communities overseas.
Although the Vietnamese state’s blocking of
access to certain content on the Internet can be
circumvented by users with technical knowledge,
ordinary users will likely continue to find that filtering distorts their information environment.
NOTES
1. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Vietnam youths arrested
over internet chats released after 9 months,” August
16, 2006.
2. Thai Press Reports, “E-commerce services extended
in 2006,” January 4, 2007.
3. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., 2006, Vietnam:
Internet, 10, July 30, 2006. See also John Boudreau,
“Bay Area entrepreneur leads way in online gaming
in Vietnam,” The Mercury News, January 17, 2007,
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/busi
ness/16475618.htm.
4. Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., 2006, Vietnam:
Internet, 15, July 30, 2006.
5. See Articles 27–38, decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP of
the Government on the management, provision and
use of the Internet services, issued on August 23,
2001.
6. Article 27, decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. See Article 3, decision no. 27/2005/QD-BBCVT;
IANA, .vn – Vietnam, http://www.iana.org/root-whois/
vn.htm.
10. See Article 7, decision no. 27/2005/QD-BBCVT.
Country Summaries
423