of juveniles,” for making inappropriate content
inaccessible on their networks.
38
The 2001 ordinance also classified homosexual Internet content as “harmful and obscene”
under the Youth Protection Act. 39 The Ministry of
Information and Communications formally adopted this classification and immediately ordered a
large South Korean Web site devoted to issues of
homosexuality to classify itself in ICEC’s content
rating system as harmful and block minors from
accessing the site or face fines and imprisonment. 40 Homosexual rights advocates challenged the order in court as an illegal restriction
on free speech. Although the court ruled in favor
of the ICEC, it seriously questioned the constitutionality of ICEC’s ordinance classifying homosexual content as harmful to minors. 41 In 2003,
the Korean National Youth Protection Committee
removed homosexuality from the categories of
“harmful and obscene.” The reversal came in
response to a Korean National Human Rights
Protection Committee resolution finding that classifying homosexual content as harmful and
obscene is an unconstitutional restriction on
individuals’ rights of expression and pursuit of
happiness. 42
ONI testing results
In 2001, South Korea reportedly required its ISPs
to block as many as 120,000 sites on an official
list. 43 When ONI conducted its testing at the end
of 2006, however, the evidence indicated that
Internet filtering in South Korea, although present, is not as extensive as reports have suggested. Testing was conducted through residential
Internet access inside South Korea on the two of
the largest South Korean ISPs—KorNet and
HanaNet—between October 2006 and January
2007. The testing revealed that South Korea
filters political and social content, specifically
targeting sites containing North Korean propaganda or promoting the reunification of North
and South Korea, as well as a handful of sites
devoted to gambling and two sites devoted to
pirated software (www.mscracks.com and
www.kickme.to/fosi).
ONI determined that a large majority of proNorth Korea or pro-unification Web sites on ONI’s
testing list were blocked, 44 along with a selected
number of gambling-related sites. The blocking
was extremely consistent across the two ISPs
tested, as in virtually every instance a Web site
that registered as blocked on HanaNet registered
as blocked on KorNet as well. On each ISP, ONI
detected two methods of blocking: IP (Internet
Protocol) blocking and domain name server
(DNS) tampering. IP blocking occurs at the router
level, between the South Korean ISP and the
Internet. The routers are programmed to stop
information coming from certain IP addresses.
DNS tampering prevents Internet domain names
from resolving to their proper IP addresses. Sites
blocked by KorNet through DNS tampering
resolve to a blockpage hosted by the police at
http://211.253.9.250/, which states that the page
has been lawfully blocked and lists the user’s
own IP address.
ONI’s tests suggested there is little blocking
of sensitive social content in South Korea,
despite KISCOM’s focus on cleansing the Web of
“harmful” social content. Besides two sites
devoted to pirated software, ONI’s testing registered no blocks in other social categories, including pornography and gay and lesbian content.
South Korea does, however, attempt to restrict
minors’ access to pornography by requiring age
identification for entry to Korean porn sites.
Conclusion
Although South Korea is the world leader in
Internet and broadband penetration, its citizens
do not have access to a free and unfiltered
Internet. The state imposes a substantial level of
filtering for a free and democratic society. It
requires ISPs to block sites on government lists
and fosters a culture of self-censorship through
broadly worded laws that make individuals criminally liable for posting “antistate” content. The
372
Country Summaries
inaccessible on their networks.
38
The 2001 ordinance also classified homosexual Internet content as “harmful and obscene”
under the Youth Protection Act. 39 The Ministry of
Information and Communications formally adopted this classification and immediately ordered a
large South Korean Web site devoted to issues of
homosexuality to classify itself in ICEC’s content
rating system as harmful and block minors from
accessing the site or face fines and imprisonment. 40 Homosexual rights advocates challenged the order in court as an illegal restriction
on free speech. Although the court ruled in favor
of the ICEC, it seriously questioned the constitutionality of ICEC’s ordinance classifying homosexual content as harmful to minors. 41 In 2003,
the Korean National Youth Protection Committee
removed homosexuality from the categories of
“harmful and obscene.” The reversal came in
response to a Korean National Human Rights
Protection Committee resolution finding that classifying homosexual content as harmful and
obscene is an unconstitutional restriction on
individuals’ rights of expression and pursuit of
happiness. 42
ONI testing results
In 2001, South Korea reportedly required its ISPs
to block as many as 120,000 sites on an official
list. 43 When ONI conducted its testing at the end
of 2006, however, the evidence indicated that
Internet filtering in South Korea, although present, is not as extensive as reports have suggested. Testing was conducted through residential
Internet access inside South Korea on the two of
the largest South Korean ISPs—KorNet and
HanaNet—between October 2006 and January
2007. The testing revealed that South Korea
filters political and social content, specifically
targeting sites containing North Korean propaganda or promoting the reunification of North
and South Korea, as well as a handful of sites
devoted to gambling and two sites devoted to
pirated software (www.mscracks.com and
www.kickme.to/fosi).
ONI determined that a large majority of proNorth Korea or pro-unification Web sites on ONI’s
testing list were blocked, 44 along with a selected
number of gambling-related sites. The blocking
was extremely consistent across the two ISPs
tested, as in virtually every instance a Web site
that registered as blocked on HanaNet registered
as blocked on KorNet as well. On each ISP, ONI
detected two methods of blocking: IP (Internet
Protocol) blocking and domain name server
(DNS) tampering. IP blocking occurs at the router
level, between the South Korean ISP and the
Internet. The routers are programmed to stop
information coming from certain IP addresses.
DNS tampering prevents Internet domain names
from resolving to their proper IP addresses. Sites
blocked by KorNet through DNS tampering
resolve to a blockpage hosted by the police at
http://211.253.9.250/, which states that the page
has been lawfully blocked and lists the user’s
own IP address.
ONI’s tests suggested there is little blocking
of sensitive social content in South Korea,
despite KISCOM’s focus on cleansing the Web of
“harmful” social content. Besides two sites
devoted to pirated software, ONI’s testing registered no blocks in other social categories, including pornography and gay and lesbian content.
South Korea does, however, attempt to restrict
minors’ access to pornography by requiring age
identification for entry to Korean porn sites.
Conclusion
Although South Korea is the world leader in
Internet and broadband penetration, its citizens
do not have access to a free and unfiltered
Internet. The state imposes a substantial level of
filtering for a free and democratic society. It
requires ISPs to block sites on government lists
and fosters a culture of self-censorship through
broadly worded laws that make individuals criminally liable for posting “antistate” content. The
372
Country Summaries