personal blogs hosted on www.blogspot.com
were inadvertently filtered for most of 2006. Most
material relating to the Danish cartoon incident
was blocked by the ISPs; only one Web site containing the cartoons that was reportedly blocked
(www.danishcartoons.ytmnd.com) was found to
be fully accessible through the testing process.
By April 2006 the PTA extended their blocking to antistate Web sites as well as those
promoting Balochi human rights and political
autonomy. 24 ONI testing confirmed that internal
security conflicts were a strong focus for filtering:
all Web sites tested relating to independence (for
example, www.balochunitedfront.org) and human
rights (for example, www.balochestan.com) in the
province of Balochistan were blocked, as well as
selected sites promoting Sindhi political autonomy and human rights. Notably, though Balochi
and Sindhi independence and human rights sites
have been filtered, the few existing Web sites pertaining to Pashtun secessionism were fully
accessible. This may be because the majority of
Pashtuns are illiterate in their local language, and
secessionist politics in the northwest frontier
province are significantly less potent than in
Balochistan and Sindh provinces. Therefore the
more politically organized Balochi and Sindhi
movements arguably pose a greater threat to the
central government than these selected proPashtunistan Web sites.
In addition to blasphemous, secessionist,
and human rights Web sites, a variety of blogs
and Web sites containing anti-Islamic and antiPakistani content were blacklisted, such as Indian
militant extremist sites (www.hinduunity.com)
and anti-Islamic blogs (www.jihadwatch.com). A
number of less polemical Web sites, including
personal blogs hosted on www.blogspot.com,
and Web sites dedicated to promoting religious
tolerance (www.faithfreedom.com) were also
blocked.
ONI testing showed that the majority of
newspapers and independent media, circumvention tools, international human rights groups,
VoIP services, civil society groups, minority religious sites, Indian and Hindu human rights
groups, Pakistani political parties, and sexual
content (including pornography and gay and lesbian content) were accessible on all three ISPs.
Pornographic content was largely accessible,
with only symbolic blocking of selected sites.
Civil society groups contend that all www.blog
spot.com sites have been blocked; however, ONI
testing found the site for the “Don’t Block the
Blog” campaign (www.help-pakistan.com) to be
accessible on all three ISPs.
The lack of technical sophistication of the
PTCL explains the comprehensive block on
Blogspot. The PTCL lacks the capacity to target
the specific URLs that contain offensive content
and simply blocks the entire IP address on which
the offending site was hosted. Although this
filtering system has resulted in the collateral
blocking of entire domains such as www.blog
spot.com, the rudimentary nature of the blocking
mechanism also makes it easier for users to circumvent the block using proxy servers or other
bypassing methods. 25 Not only is the PTCL
charged with blocking blacklisted URLs, but it
also hands down blocking directives directly to
the ISPs to implement. The ISPs then implement,
or attempt to implement, the blocking orders; the
results of the ONI testing show that this sometimes led to a redundancy in blocking at both the
ISP level and the central Internet exchange point.
Conclusion
Currently Pakistanis have unimpeded access to
most sexual, political, social, and religious content. However, the Pakistani government continues to use repressive measures against antimilitary, Balochi, and Sindhi political dissidents, and
it blocks Web sites highlighting this repression.
The government also filters high-risk antistate
materials and blasphemous content.
The Pakistani government does not currently employ a sophisticated blocking system, nor
does the government have a coherent policy on
358
Country Summaries
were inadvertently filtered for most of 2006. Most
material relating to the Danish cartoon incident
was blocked by the ISPs; only one Web site containing the cartoons that was reportedly blocked
(www.danishcartoons.ytmnd.com) was found to
be fully accessible through the testing process.
By April 2006 the PTA extended their blocking to antistate Web sites as well as those
promoting Balochi human rights and political
autonomy. 24 ONI testing confirmed that internal
security conflicts were a strong focus for filtering:
all Web sites tested relating to independence (for
example, www.balochunitedfront.org) and human
rights (for example, www.balochestan.com) in the
province of Balochistan were blocked, as well as
selected sites promoting Sindhi political autonomy and human rights. Notably, though Balochi
and Sindhi independence and human rights sites
have been filtered, the few existing Web sites pertaining to Pashtun secessionism were fully
accessible. This may be because the majority of
Pashtuns are illiterate in their local language, and
secessionist politics in the northwest frontier
province are significantly less potent than in
Balochistan and Sindh provinces. Therefore the
more politically organized Balochi and Sindhi
movements arguably pose a greater threat to the
central government than these selected proPashtunistan Web sites.
In addition to blasphemous, secessionist,
and human rights Web sites, a variety of blogs
and Web sites containing anti-Islamic and antiPakistani content were blacklisted, such as Indian
militant extremist sites (www.hinduunity.com)
and anti-Islamic blogs (www.jihadwatch.com). A
number of less polemical Web sites, including
personal blogs hosted on www.blogspot.com,
and Web sites dedicated to promoting religious
tolerance (www.faithfreedom.com) were also
blocked.
ONI testing showed that the majority of
newspapers and independent media, circumvention tools, international human rights groups,
VoIP services, civil society groups, minority religious sites, Indian and Hindu human rights
groups, Pakistani political parties, and sexual
content (including pornography and gay and lesbian content) were accessible on all three ISPs.
Pornographic content was largely accessible,
with only symbolic blocking of selected sites.
Civil society groups contend that all www.blog
spot.com sites have been blocked; however, ONI
testing found the site for the “Don’t Block the
Blog” campaign (www.help-pakistan.com) to be
accessible on all three ISPs.
The lack of technical sophistication of the
PTCL explains the comprehensive block on
Blogspot. The PTCL lacks the capacity to target
the specific URLs that contain offensive content
and simply blocks the entire IP address on which
the offending site was hosted. Although this
filtering system has resulted in the collateral
blocking of entire domains such as www.blog
spot.com, the rudimentary nature of the blocking
mechanism also makes it easier for users to circumvent the block using proxy servers or other
bypassing methods. 25 Not only is the PTCL
charged with blocking blacklisted URLs, but it
also hands down blocking directives directly to
the ISPs to implement. The ISPs then implement,
or attempt to implement, the blocking orders; the
results of the ONI testing show that this sometimes led to a redundancy in blocking at both the
ISP level and the central Internet exchange point.
Conclusion
Currently Pakistanis have unimpeded access to
most sexual, political, social, and religious content. However, the Pakistani government continues to use repressive measures against antimilitary, Balochi, and Sindhi political dissidents, and
it blocks Web sites highlighting this repression.
The government also filters high-risk antistate
materials and blasphemous content.
The Pakistani government does not currently employ a sophisticated blocking system, nor
does the government have a coherent policy on
358
Country Summaries