turing of materials for military uses in an illegitimate manner.”
27
Café patrons under thirteen
years of age must be accompanied by a parent, 28 and managers cannot be younger than
twenty-five.
29
Although the Regulations state that
personal data should remain confidential,
30
a
café must disclose such information when the
government requests it. 31
The Telecommunications Law instructs ISPs
to withhold access from users who have “violated public morals” 32 or who use the Internet in a
way that “endangers the national good,”
33
but
leaves these stipulations undefined. The Law
also stipulates that “Any person who originates or
forwards, by any telecommunications means …
messages contrary to public morals, or forwards
false information with the intent to spread panic,
shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than one month or more than one year, or a fine
… or by both penalties.” 34
Article 5 of Jordan’s Press and Publications
Law (1998) prohibits journalists from publishing
material that goes against “national obligation …
and Arab-Islamic values.” 35 Article 7(e) is equally
broad, forbidding the publication of anything that
is “bound to stir violence or inflame discord of
any form among the citizens.” 36
In January 2007, Jordan’s Lower House
National Guidance Committee began consultations with media experts and officials about a
2006 Press and Publications Draft Law. 37
Publishers and proponents of press freedom
hope lawmakers will scrap provisions that set jail
terms for journalists and amend articles they say
restrict free expression.
ONI testing results
Testing conducted on three Jordanian ISPs—
Batelco, Wanadoo, and Linkdotnet—showed no
definitive blocking, though some filtering of political content is suspected given inconsistencies in
the accessibility of certain sites.
Arab Times (www.arabtimes.com), a politically oriented news site that is sometimes critical
of Arab leaders, was found to be inaccessible on
Batelco and Wanadoo but was accessible via
Linkdotnet. Though this finding does not constitute proof of filtering, it is worth noting, as the
Web site was reportedly blocked in 2004. 38
Conclusion
Jordanians appear to enjoy essentially unfiltered
access to Internet content. However, the Press
and Publications Law’s broad provisions may
lead some writers to engage in self-censorship.
Although Jordan’s government continues to
develop initiatives to expand access to the
Internet, laws restricting freedom of speech preserve an intimidating atmosphere that discourages free discourse on political and social
issues.
NOTES
1. Reporters Without Borders, Internet Under
Surveillance 2004: Jordan, http://www.rsf.org/article.
php3?id_article=10737.
2. The Initiative for an Open Arab Internet, Implacable
Adversaries: Arab Government and the Internet
(2006): “Jordan,” http://www.openarab.net/en/
reports/net2006/jordan.shtml; Human Rights Watch,
“Jordan: Rise in arrests restricting free speech,” June
17, 2006, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/
2006/06/17/jordan13574.htm.
3. Ibid.
4. National Centre for Human Rights, The State of
Human Rights in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
May 31, 2005, http://www.nchr.org.jo/uploads/nchrreport.pdf.
5. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices 2005: Jordan,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61691.htm.
6. See “Jordan MPs face Zarqawi charges,” BBC News,
June 13, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5075422.stm.
7. In 2004, Ali Hattar was tried and sentenced to jail
time for giving an “incendiary” anti-U.S. lecture at a
conference. See Foreign Ministry of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, “Hattar presents defense statement,” January 19, 2005, http://www.mfa.gov.jo/
events_details.php?id=8981.
310
Country Summaries
27
Café patrons under thirteen
years of age must be accompanied by a parent, 28 and managers cannot be younger than
twenty-five.
29
Although the Regulations state that
personal data should remain confidential,
30
a
café must disclose such information when the
government requests it. 31
The Telecommunications Law instructs ISPs
to withhold access from users who have “violated public morals” 32 or who use the Internet in a
way that “endangers the national good,”
33
but
leaves these stipulations undefined. The Law
also stipulates that “Any person who originates or
forwards, by any telecommunications means …
messages contrary to public morals, or forwards
false information with the intent to spread panic,
shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than one month or more than one year, or a fine
… or by both penalties.” 34
Article 5 of Jordan’s Press and Publications
Law (1998) prohibits journalists from publishing
material that goes against “national obligation …
and Arab-Islamic values.” 35 Article 7(e) is equally
broad, forbidding the publication of anything that
is “bound to stir violence or inflame discord of
any form among the citizens.” 36
In January 2007, Jordan’s Lower House
National Guidance Committee began consultations with media experts and officials about a
2006 Press and Publications Draft Law. 37
Publishers and proponents of press freedom
hope lawmakers will scrap provisions that set jail
terms for journalists and amend articles they say
restrict free expression.
ONI testing results
Testing conducted on three Jordanian ISPs—
Batelco, Wanadoo, and Linkdotnet—showed no
definitive blocking, though some filtering of political content is suspected given inconsistencies in
the accessibility of certain sites.
Arab Times (www.arabtimes.com), a politically oriented news site that is sometimes critical
of Arab leaders, was found to be inaccessible on
Batelco and Wanadoo but was accessible via
Linkdotnet. Though this finding does not constitute proof of filtering, it is worth noting, as the
Web site was reportedly blocked in 2004. 38
Conclusion
Jordanians appear to enjoy essentially unfiltered
access to Internet content. However, the Press
and Publications Law’s broad provisions may
lead some writers to engage in self-censorship.
Although Jordan’s government continues to
develop initiatives to expand access to the
Internet, laws restricting freedom of speech preserve an intimidating atmosphere that discourages free discourse on political and social
issues.
NOTES
1. Reporters Without Borders, Internet Under
Surveillance 2004: Jordan, http://www.rsf.org/article.
php3?id_article=10737.
2. The Initiative for an Open Arab Internet, Implacable
Adversaries: Arab Government and the Internet
(2006): “Jordan,” http://www.openarab.net/en/
reports/net2006/jordan.shtml; Human Rights Watch,
“Jordan: Rise in arrests restricting free speech,” June
17, 2006, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/
2006/06/17/jordan13574.htm.
3. Ibid.
4. National Centre for Human Rights, The State of
Human Rights in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
May 31, 2005, http://www.nchr.org.jo/uploads/nchrreport.pdf.
5. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices 2005: Jordan,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61691.htm.
6. See “Jordan MPs face Zarqawi charges,” BBC News,
June 13, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5075422.stm.
7. In 2004, Ali Hattar was tried and sentenced to jail
time for giving an “incendiary” anti-U.S. lecture at a
conference. See Foreign Ministry of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, “Hattar presents defense statement,” January 19, 2005, http://www.mfa.gov.jo/
events_details.php?id=8981.
310
Country Summaries