1949 with some significant amendments.
19
Despite the lack of full consent from all media, all
such organizations operating in Israel, including
foreign agencies, must agree to abide by the
censor’s rulings. 20
The Directorate of Military Intelligence of the
Israeli Defense Forces maintains the Military
Censor unit that holds the authority to prevent
reporting of information that may aid attacks on
Israeli citizens. News outlets are prohibited, for
instance, from revealing the exact location of
enemy missile strikes, or stating that a high-ranking official is entering a threatened area. 21 After
periods of more slack enforcement, the Censor
has recently scaled up its efforts. During the 2006
war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, for instance,
the government banned specific reports on troop
movements, the location of Hezbollah rocket
strikes, and other information that could be used
to coordinate attacks or aim weapons. 22
This regulatory structure has long been a
source of controversy. In another example, the
Military Censor blocked news about a National
Security Council report on the vulnerability of an
Israeli fuel depot. The censor was afraid the
report might give terrorists ideas, but critics
argue that such reports are necessary to spark
public debate about security precautions. 23 A
series of Supreme Court decisions limited the
ban on publishing to content where there is a
“tangible” and “near-certain” danger to the wellbeing of the public. 24 Over the decades, the
Knesset has debated the role of the censors and
the limits of free expression, especially in light of
a changing media environment fueled by the
growth of the Internet, but no legislation has been
enacted to replace the current system.
Israel has yet to establish any explicit legal
authority for filtering of the Internet. In 1998 the
Knesset’s Committee for Scientific and
Technological Research and Development met to
discuss the subject of Internet filtering. 25 Some
groups in Israel, particularly the Orthodox
community, were concerned over widespread
pornography on the Internet, though the legislature seemed more worried about the availability
of privileged information such as Israeli missile
deployments.
ONI testing results
ONI testing in 2006 found no evidence of Internet
filtering in Israel. In addition to the global list, ONI
tested sites with content critical of the Israeli government or reflecting sensitive national security
issues and state policies, from Palestinian
groups such as Hamas, human rights organizations, and militant organizations (Hezbollah).
Conclusion
After years of somewhat stagnant growth, the
Israeli Internet community is expanding rapidly.
The country is likely to remain a center for the
development of new Internet technologies, with
widespread Internet access and deep broadband penetration. Israel does not filter the
Internet, and in this respect maintains the freest
Internet community in the Middle East. However,
as proposed legislation to restrict access to
pornography and violent content online continues to be debated, and as the space for online
media increases, the Internet will likely challenge
the bounds of the specific historical tradition and
established practices of Israeli censorship.
NOTES
1. Matti Friedman, “Stop the press,” The Jerusalem
Report, April 4, 2005.
2. Israeli Ministry of Communications,
Telecommunications in Israel 2006, November 6,
2006, p. 10, http://www.moc.gov.il/new/
documents/broch_1.11.06.pdf.
3. Matthew Kalman, “Venture capital invests in Israeli
techs: Recovering from recession, country ranks
behind only Boston, Silicon Valley in attracting cash
for startups,” San Francisco Chronicle, April 2, 2004,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/
chronicle/archive/2004/04/02/BUG675V5L41.DTL.
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