when content is provided solely in English,
and much more substantial and complete across
ISPs for sites relating to Iran or in Farsi. For
example, while no independent media sites or
newspapers available only in English were
filtered across all ISPs tested, a large majority
of similar sites relating to Iran or composed
in Farsi were consistently blocked, such
as www.iranvajahan.net and the publisher
www.kayhanpublishing.uk.com.
All seven ISPs tested blocked access to
almost the same list of human rights, political
reform, and opposition sites. All ISPs kept access
to international watchdogs such as Amnesty
International and FIDH open, but unilaterally
blocked Iran-focused groups such as the Society
for the Defense of Human Rights in Iran
(www.polpiran.com) and the online magazine
Siah Sepid (www.siahsepid.com).
For remaining content categories, the considerable variation among the sites blocked by
the ISPs suggests that they are exercising some
control over the implementation of filtering. There
is no discernible pattern in the content of sites
blocked only by one ISP. For example, Pars
Online, the largest private provider of Internet
services in Iran, is the only ISP to block such disparate sites as www.boingboing.net, the
International Herald Tribune, and the teen sexual
health site www.teenhealthfx.com. Tarashe is the
only ISP that blocked the e-mail service Hushmail
and the Times of India newspaper.
Overall, the greatest overlap in filtering
occurred with Jahan Nama, Pars Online, Datak,
and Shatel. Together, these ISPs filtered a
range of Web sites in common, including a
substantial number of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) rights organizations
(including www.gmhc.org and www.iglhrc.org),
NGOs focusing on free expression and access to
information, dating services, and alcohol and
drug sites.
Conclusion
Iran continues to maintain the most extensive filtering regime of any country ONI has studied. As
filtering and censorship policies evolve, government officials and citizens have pushed back
against many of the more extreme measures,
including the ban on high-speed Internet in 2006.
New developments may provide opportunities to
contest these policies further. The draft Cyber
Crimes Bill prohibits any blocking or investigation
of data without a warrant issued by a court after
evidence of suspicious activity. When this provision becomes law, it could potentially be used to
impede the arbitrary closures and blocking of
Web sites.
NOTES
1. Human Rights Watch Report, False Freedom: Online
Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa: Iran,
November 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/
mena1105/5.htm#_Toc119125727.
2. Ibid.
3. Article 44(2), Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, amended July 28, 1989, http://www.oefre.
unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html.
4. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime,
http://www.unodc.org/iran/en/crime_prevention.html
(accessed April 30, 2007); Telecommunications
Company of Iran, Annual Report 2005, http://iran
telecom.ir/eng.asp?sm=3&page=17&code=5.
5. BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Iran press
Iranian activists oppose regulation of websites,
weblogs,” January 2, 2007 (citing text of report by
E’temad-e Melli).
6. Interview with Esma’il Radkani, Iranian
Communication and Information Technology News
Agency, September 11, 2006, http://citna.ir/435.html.
7. The Guardian, “Iran bans fast internet to cut west’s
influence: Service providers told to restrict online
speeds Opponents say move will hamper country’s
progress,” October 18, 2006.
8. See the Information Technology Company Web site,
http://www.dci.ir/english/moarefi.htm.
9. BBC Persian, “Speed reduced for high speed
Internet in Iran,” October 20, 2006,
http://www.bbc.net.uk/persian/science/story/2006/10/
061020_fb_rsh_adsl.shtml.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
Country Summaries
297
and much more substantial and complete across
ISPs for sites relating to Iran or in Farsi. For
example, while no independent media sites or
newspapers available only in English were
filtered across all ISPs tested, a large majority
of similar sites relating to Iran or composed
in Farsi were consistently blocked, such
as www.iranvajahan.net and the publisher
www.kayhanpublishing.uk.com.
All seven ISPs tested blocked access to
almost the same list of human rights, political
reform, and opposition sites. All ISPs kept access
to international watchdogs such as Amnesty
International and FIDH open, but unilaterally
blocked Iran-focused groups such as the Society
for the Defense of Human Rights in Iran
(www.polpiran.com) and the online magazine
Siah Sepid (www.siahsepid.com).
For remaining content categories, the considerable variation among the sites blocked by
the ISPs suggests that they are exercising some
control over the implementation of filtering. There
is no discernible pattern in the content of sites
blocked only by one ISP. For example, Pars
Online, the largest private provider of Internet
services in Iran, is the only ISP to block such disparate sites as www.boingboing.net, the
International Herald Tribune, and the teen sexual
health site www.teenhealthfx.com. Tarashe is the
only ISP that blocked the e-mail service Hushmail
and the Times of India newspaper.
Overall, the greatest overlap in filtering
occurred with Jahan Nama, Pars Online, Datak,
and Shatel. Together, these ISPs filtered a
range of Web sites in common, including a
substantial number of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) rights organizations
(including www.gmhc.org and www.iglhrc.org),
NGOs focusing on free expression and access to
information, dating services, and alcohol and
drug sites.
Conclusion
Iran continues to maintain the most extensive filtering regime of any country ONI has studied. As
filtering and censorship policies evolve, government officials and citizens have pushed back
against many of the more extreme measures,
including the ban on high-speed Internet in 2006.
New developments may provide opportunities to
contest these policies further. The draft Cyber
Crimes Bill prohibits any blocking or investigation
of data without a warrant issued by a court after
evidence of suspicious activity. When this provision becomes law, it could potentially be used to
impede the arbitrary closures and blocking of
Web sites.
NOTES
1. Human Rights Watch Report, False Freedom: Online
Censorship in the Middle East and North Africa: Iran,
November 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/
mena1105/5.htm#_Toc119125727.
2. Ibid.
3. Article 44(2), Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, amended July 28, 1989, http://www.oefre.
unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html.
4. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime,
http://www.unodc.org/iran/en/crime_prevention.html
(accessed April 30, 2007); Telecommunications
Company of Iran, Annual Report 2005, http://iran
telecom.ir/eng.asp?sm=3&page=17&code=5.
5. BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Iran press
Iranian activists oppose regulation of websites,
weblogs,” January 2, 2007 (citing text of report by
E’temad-e Melli).
6. Interview with Esma’il Radkani, Iranian
Communication and Information Technology News
Agency, September 11, 2006, http://citna.ir/435.html.
7. The Guardian, “Iran bans fast internet to cut west’s
influence: Service providers told to restrict online
speeds Opponents say move will hamper country’s
progress,” October 18, 2006.
8. See the Information Technology Company Web site,
http://www.dci.ir/english/moarefi.htm.
9. BBC Persian, “Speed reduced for high speed
Internet in Iran,” October 20, 2006,
http://www.bbc.net.uk/persian/science/story/2006/10/
061020_fb_rsh_adsl.shtml.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
Country Summaries
297