data with Web site operators in order to open a
blog or make comments on bulletin boards, a
change from current requirements where individuals must register real names with Web sites but
not blog-hosting services. 28 State media reported that 83.5 percent of respondents in a survey
conducted by China Youth Daily opposed the
proposed real-name registration system. 29
Underlying all regulation of the Internet is a
pantheon of proscribed content. Citizens are prohibited from disseminating between nine and
eleven categories of content that appear consistently in most regulations; 30 all can be considered subversive and trigger fines, content
removal, and criminal liability. 31 Illegal content,
although broadly and vaguely defined, provides
a blueprint of topics the government considers
sensitive, from endangering national security to
contradicting officially accepted political theory;
more recently illegal content includes conducting
activities in the name of an illegal civil organization inciting illegal assemblies or gatherings that
disturb social order. One prominent application
of these rules was the July 2006 shutdown of the
online forum Century China (Shiji Zhongguo), a
site with over 30,000 registered members and
hundreds of thousands of readers co-sponsored
by the Chinese University of Hong Kong’s
Institute of Chinese Studies. 32
Technical filtering associated with the “Great
Firewall of China” is only one tool of information
control among more blunt and frequently applied
methods such as job dismissals; Web site and
blog closures and deletions; and the detention of
journalists, writers, and activists. In 2006, fifty-two
individuals were known to be imprisoned for
online activities, among them several writers and
journalists who were convicted in part because of
the disclosure of their personal e-mail accounts
by Yahoo’s Chinese partner. 33 Web sites can be
closed not only for a broad array of taboo topics,
but also from asking the wrong questions in opinion polls. 34 In June 2006, the Information Office
under the State Council and the MII embarked on
a period of “strict supervision” of search engines,
chat rooms, and blog service providers to curb
the circulation of “harmful” information online. 35
According to the South China Morning Post, official statistics show that in 2006 authorities had
shut down hundreds of liberal Web sites and
forums and ordered eight search engines to filter
“subversive and sensitive” content based on
about 1,000 keywords. 36
Because many of the laws defining illegal
content are vaguely worded and have been
inconsistently enforced, they provide the government with almost endless authority to control and
censor content while discouraging citizens from
testing the boundaries of these areas. Further, for
a wide range of reasons—from economic incentives and demographic factors of the online community to the dragnet of legal liability—the impact
of self-censorship is likely enormous and increasingly public, if difficult to measure. On April 9,
2006, fourteen major Web portals including
www.sina.com, www.sohu.com, www.baidu.com,
www.tom.com, and Yahoo’s Chinese Web site
issued a joint declaration calling for the Internet
industry to censor “unhealthy” and “indecent”
information that is “severely harmful to society,”
voluntarily accept supervision, and strengthen
“ethical” self-regulation. 37 Their proposal sparked
a flurry of similar pledges across China, from
legal Web sites to blog hosting services, and with
targeted content extended to include Party
secrets and information affecting national
security. 38
ONI testing results
China employs targeted yet extensive filtering of
information that could have a potential impact on
social stability and the Party’s control over society, and is therefore predominantly focused on
Chinese-language content relating to domestic
issues. For the government, information constituting a threat to public order extends well
beyond well-publicized sensitive topics, such as
the June 1989 crackdown and the Falun Gong
266
Country Summaries
blog or make comments on bulletin boards, a
change from current requirements where individuals must register real names with Web sites but
not blog-hosting services. 28 State media reported that 83.5 percent of respondents in a survey
conducted by China Youth Daily opposed the
proposed real-name registration system. 29
Underlying all regulation of the Internet is a
pantheon of proscribed content. Citizens are prohibited from disseminating between nine and
eleven categories of content that appear consistently in most regulations; 30 all can be considered subversive and trigger fines, content
removal, and criminal liability. 31 Illegal content,
although broadly and vaguely defined, provides
a blueprint of topics the government considers
sensitive, from endangering national security to
contradicting officially accepted political theory;
more recently illegal content includes conducting
activities in the name of an illegal civil organization inciting illegal assemblies or gatherings that
disturb social order. One prominent application
of these rules was the July 2006 shutdown of the
online forum Century China (Shiji Zhongguo), a
site with over 30,000 registered members and
hundreds of thousands of readers co-sponsored
by the Chinese University of Hong Kong’s
Institute of Chinese Studies. 32
Technical filtering associated with the “Great
Firewall of China” is only one tool of information
control among more blunt and frequently applied
methods such as job dismissals; Web site and
blog closures and deletions; and the detention of
journalists, writers, and activists. In 2006, fifty-two
individuals were known to be imprisoned for
online activities, among them several writers and
journalists who were convicted in part because of
the disclosure of their personal e-mail accounts
by Yahoo’s Chinese partner. 33 Web sites can be
closed not only for a broad array of taboo topics,
but also from asking the wrong questions in opinion polls. 34 In June 2006, the Information Office
under the State Council and the MII embarked on
a period of “strict supervision” of search engines,
chat rooms, and blog service providers to curb
the circulation of “harmful” information online. 35
According to the South China Morning Post, official statistics show that in 2006 authorities had
shut down hundreds of liberal Web sites and
forums and ordered eight search engines to filter
“subversive and sensitive” content based on
about 1,000 keywords. 36
Because many of the laws defining illegal
content are vaguely worded and have been
inconsistently enforced, they provide the government with almost endless authority to control and
censor content while discouraging citizens from
testing the boundaries of these areas. Further, for
a wide range of reasons—from economic incentives and demographic factors of the online community to the dragnet of legal liability—the impact
of self-censorship is likely enormous and increasingly public, if difficult to measure. On April 9,
2006, fourteen major Web portals including
www.sina.com, www.sohu.com, www.baidu.com,
www.tom.com, and Yahoo’s Chinese Web site
issued a joint declaration calling for the Internet
industry to censor “unhealthy” and “indecent”
information that is “severely harmful to society,”
voluntarily accept supervision, and strengthen
“ethical” self-regulation. 37 Their proposal sparked
a flurry of similar pledges across China, from
legal Web sites to blog hosting services, and with
targeted content extended to include Party
secrets and information affecting national
security. 38
ONI testing results
China employs targeted yet extensive filtering of
information that could have a potential impact on
social stability and the Party’s control over society, and is therefore predominantly focused on
Chinese-language content relating to domestic
issues. For the government, information constituting a threat to public order extends well
beyond well-publicized sensitive topics, such as
the June 1989 crackdown and the Falun Gong
266
Country Summaries