unofficially requested that all user logins be kept
for up to one month and be turned over to the
security services on demand.
Extensive governmental regulation, a strict
licensing regime, and the state-owned
Beltelecom monopoly are major impediments to
the development of Internet services in Belarus.
Beltelecom is under the direct supervision of the
Ministry of Communications and Informatization.
This may change in 2007 because of the World
Trade Organization (WTO)’s accession requirements, which demand that Beltelecom be privatized and end its monopoly on external communication channels. The ministry has agreed to privatize Beltelecom, but it is likely that the government will become the controlling shareholder.
The ministry has also declared that Beltelecom’s
control over external communication channels
will remain after privatization, with licenses given
only to those operators that have built their own
external communication infrastructure.
E-commerce is regulated by the state. All
Internet retailers are legally obliged to register
domain names with the State Center of
Information Security, as well as to obtain a
license for retail trade by e-commerce activities.
International electronic payment systems are
seriously limited in Belarus. All international monetary transfers must occur through banks that
notify the tax authorities of all fund transfers from
abroad.
ONI testing results
ONI tested five leading ISPs: Aichyna, Belinfonet,
Beltelecom, BN, and Solo. The testing could not
ascertain blocking, although filtering of content is
suspected, given the government’s declared policy of blocking selected Web sites. The filtering of
gay and lesbian Web sites has been an official
policy since the beginning of 2005, on the basis
that they contain pornographic material.
Interestingly, these Web sites were inaccessible
on all ISPs except for the state-owned
Beltelecom.
ONI suspects that Internet filtering in Belarus
has a deliberate but episodic character.
Beltelecom’s control over external connection
channels allows for the creation of an effective
system for regulating Internet traffic. During
presidential elections, access to opposition and
independent media sites appear to have been
temporarily blocked. In 2006 ONI documented
just-in-time tampering (indirect filtering) of opposition sites. Some specialists have suggested
that, during presidential elections, Beltelecom
established so-called shaping practices—that is,
deliberately slowing down access to specific IP
addresses. Beltelecom allegedly received special “requests” by authorities to block certain
Web sites for a limited period.
Self-censorship by Internet users has
become a pervasive phenomenon. In 2005 the
popular Belarusian portal www.tut.by refused to
put up banners advertising opposition Web sites.
It is unknown whether this activity was a result of
pressure by the authorities or merely an attempt
to protect its own business.
ONI researchers confirmed that most cybercafés restrict access to sites containing pornography, terrorist material, and proxy-related material. Cybercafés install software that either blocks
URLs within the list of forbidden sites or alerts the
administrator if such a URL is visited. The restricted URL list includes Web sites forbidden for distribution by the Republic Committee on
Prevention of Pornography, Violence, and Cruelty
Propaganda. Administrators often require passport identification of customers. Some cybercafés also limit the volume of Internet traffic and
decrease the download speed when exceeded.
On the request of state security services, administrators keep the logs of users’ network activity.
Conclusion
As Internet use in Belarus has risen significantly
in recent years, the government seems intent to
extend its firm control over all forms of information flows within the country. All ISPs in Belarus
Country Summaries
261
for up to one month and be turned over to the
security services on demand.
Extensive governmental regulation, a strict
licensing regime, and the state-owned
Beltelecom monopoly are major impediments to
the development of Internet services in Belarus.
Beltelecom is under the direct supervision of the
Ministry of Communications and Informatization.
This may change in 2007 because of the World
Trade Organization (WTO)’s accession requirements, which demand that Beltelecom be privatized and end its monopoly on external communication channels. The ministry has agreed to privatize Beltelecom, but it is likely that the government will become the controlling shareholder.
The ministry has also declared that Beltelecom’s
control over external communication channels
will remain after privatization, with licenses given
only to those operators that have built their own
external communication infrastructure.
E-commerce is regulated by the state. All
Internet retailers are legally obliged to register
domain names with the State Center of
Information Security, as well as to obtain a
license for retail trade by e-commerce activities.
International electronic payment systems are
seriously limited in Belarus. All international monetary transfers must occur through banks that
notify the tax authorities of all fund transfers from
abroad.
ONI testing results
ONI tested five leading ISPs: Aichyna, Belinfonet,
Beltelecom, BN, and Solo. The testing could not
ascertain blocking, although filtering of content is
suspected, given the government’s declared policy of blocking selected Web sites. The filtering of
gay and lesbian Web sites has been an official
policy since the beginning of 2005, on the basis
that they contain pornographic material.
Interestingly, these Web sites were inaccessible
on all ISPs except for the state-owned
Beltelecom.
ONI suspects that Internet filtering in Belarus
has a deliberate but episodic character.
Beltelecom’s control over external connection
channels allows for the creation of an effective
system for regulating Internet traffic. During
presidential elections, access to opposition and
independent media sites appear to have been
temporarily blocked. In 2006 ONI documented
just-in-time tampering (indirect filtering) of opposition sites. Some specialists have suggested
that, during presidential elections, Beltelecom
established so-called shaping practices—that is,
deliberately slowing down access to specific IP
addresses. Beltelecom allegedly received special “requests” by authorities to block certain
Web sites for a limited period.
Self-censorship by Internet users has
become a pervasive phenomenon. In 2005 the
popular Belarusian portal www.tut.by refused to
put up banners advertising opposition Web sites.
It is unknown whether this activity was a result of
pressure by the authorities or merely an attempt
to protect its own business.
ONI researchers confirmed that most cybercafés restrict access to sites containing pornography, terrorist material, and proxy-related material. Cybercafés install software that either blocks
URLs within the list of forbidden sites or alerts the
administrator if such a URL is visited. The restricted URL list includes Web sites forbidden for distribution by the Republic Committee on
Prevention of Pornography, Violence, and Cruelty
Propaganda. Administrators often require passport identification of customers. Some cybercafés also limit the volume of Internet traffic and
decrease the download speed when exceeded.
On the request of state security services, administrators keep the logs of users’ network activity.
Conclusion
As Internet use in Belarus has risen significantly
in recent years, the government seems intent to
extend its firm control over all forms of information flows within the country. All ISPs in Belarus
Country Summaries
261