avenue for ascertaining subscribers’ identities
without scrutiny, the potential for misuse of these
subpoenas can instill a fear of improper discovery in subscribers that leads to self-censorship.
These chilling effects have been well documented, 42 and while they are indirect rather than direct
state-mandated filtering, they do constitute real
censorship of online speech. 43
National security, computer security
Security concerns drive many of the state-mandated limitations on the speech and privacy interests of citizens. These security concerns in the
United States and Canada take two forms:
national security and computer security.
Concerns related to national security have
led more to online surveillance by the state than
to content filtering. The Bush Administration’s
warrantless wiretaps are reported to have included taps on major Internet interconnect points and
data-mining of Internet communications. 44
Tapping these interconnect points would give the
government the ability to intercept all overseas
and many domestic communications. At press
time, the U.S. government has moved to dismiss
lawsuits filed against it and against AT&T by
asserting the state secrets privilege; district
courts in California and Michigan have refused to
dismiss the lawsuits. If the allegations prove to be
true, they show that the United States maintains
the world’s most sophisticated Internet surveillance regime. The Bush Administration is pushing to expand the Communications Assistance to
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) to force providers
to give law enforcement wiretap access to electronic communications networks. Attorney
General Gonzales has called for data retention
laws to force ISPs to keep and potentially produce data that could link Internet subscribers to
their otherwise-anonymous communications. 45
Canadian electronic surveillance, primarily
undertaken by the National Defense’s secretive
Communications Security Establishment (CSE),
operates in close cooperation with U.S. and other
allied intelligence networks. Although bound by
Canadian laws and prohibited from eavesdropping on solely domestic Canadian communications without explicit ministerial approval, the
CSE’s activities are highly secret and oversight is
minimal.
Computer security has led to certain content
restrictions in the United States and Canada.
Concerns about unwanted messages reaching
computers, in various flavors of spam, have
prompted content-based restrictions such as the
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 in the United States. In
Canada a National Task Force on Spam was convened in 2005 to study the spam problem. While
some laws, such as the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, were
found to at least tangentially apply to spam, the
Task Force found a need for legislation directly
limiting spam, which has yet to be passed. 46 The
U.S. Congress has considered a range of options
for limiting the free flow of bits across the Internet
to address the problem of bad applications
infecting computers, though most of the efforts to
filter information based upon content deemed to
be a computing security risk are carried out by
private firms or individuals on a voluntary basis. 47
Calls are also being made to consider ISP liability in order to contain the worst of “zombie” computers sending spam and distributing badware,
in the interest of preserving network safety for
other connected PCs. In sum, there is still an
active, ongoing discussion about how and why
regulation of the flow of obviously malicious code
over the Internet might take place. 48
Conclusion
Although the United States and Canadian
Internet are often thought to be relatively free
from technical Internet filtering, Internet activity is
far from “unregulated.” With respect to online
surveillance, the United States may be among
the most aggressive states in the world in terms
of monitoring online conversations. Lawmakers
in both countries have imposed Internet-specific
232
Regional Overviews
without scrutiny, the potential for misuse of these
subpoenas can instill a fear of improper discovery in subscribers that leads to self-censorship.
These chilling effects have been well documented, 42 and while they are indirect rather than direct
state-mandated filtering, they do constitute real
censorship of online speech. 43
National security, computer security
Security concerns drive many of the state-mandated limitations on the speech and privacy interests of citizens. These security concerns in the
United States and Canada take two forms:
national security and computer security.
Concerns related to national security have
led more to online surveillance by the state than
to content filtering. The Bush Administration’s
warrantless wiretaps are reported to have included taps on major Internet interconnect points and
data-mining of Internet communications. 44
Tapping these interconnect points would give the
government the ability to intercept all overseas
and many domestic communications. At press
time, the U.S. government has moved to dismiss
lawsuits filed against it and against AT&T by
asserting the state secrets privilege; district
courts in California and Michigan have refused to
dismiss the lawsuits. If the allegations prove to be
true, they show that the United States maintains
the world’s most sophisticated Internet surveillance regime. The Bush Administration is pushing to expand the Communications Assistance to
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) to force providers
to give law enforcement wiretap access to electronic communications networks. Attorney
General Gonzales has called for data retention
laws to force ISPs to keep and potentially produce data that could link Internet subscribers to
their otherwise-anonymous communications. 45
Canadian electronic surveillance, primarily
undertaken by the National Defense’s secretive
Communications Security Establishment (CSE),
operates in close cooperation with U.S. and other
allied intelligence networks. Although bound by
Canadian laws and prohibited from eavesdropping on solely domestic Canadian communications without explicit ministerial approval, the
CSE’s activities are highly secret and oversight is
minimal.
Computer security has led to certain content
restrictions in the United States and Canada.
Concerns about unwanted messages reaching
computers, in various flavors of spam, have
prompted content-based restrictions such as the
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 in the United States. In
Canada a National Task Force on Spam was convened in 2005 to study the spam problem. While
some laws, such as the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, were
found to at least tangentially apply to spam, the
Task Force found a need for legislation directly
limiting spam, which has yet to be passed. 46 The
U.S. Congress has considered a range of options
for limiting the free flow of bits across the Internet
to address the problem of bad applications
infecting computers, though most of the efforts to
filter information based upon content deemed to
be a computing security risk are carried out by
private firms or individuals on a voluntary basis. 47
Calls are also being made to consider ISP liability in order to contain the worst of “zombie” computers sending spam and distributing badware,
in the interest of preserving network safety for
other connected PCs. In sum, there is still an
active, ongoing discussion about how and why
regulation of the flow of obviously malicious code
over the Internet might take place. 48
Conclusion
Although the United States and Canadian
Internet are often thought to be relatively free
from technical Internet filtering, Internet activity is
far from “unregulated.” With respect to online
surveillance, the United States may be among
the most aggressive states in the world in terms
of monitoring online conversations. Lawmakers
in both countries have imposed Internet-specific
232
Regional Overviews