that they add 1,000 Web sites to the blacklist
every month.
8
However, even where a state
admits some filtering, it may not admit targeting
political opposition, dissidents, or critical human
rights reports.
Some ISPs acknowledge filtering by serving
blockpages when users try to access banned
content. A blockpage usually alerts users that
they tried to access illegal Web sites; some invite
users to suggest the removal of the block on the
Web sites if they think they were erroneously
blocked. Some ISPs also ask users to volunteer
suggestions for the blacklists.
Countries such as Syria and Tunisia attempt
to hide their filtering regimes by returning blockpages disguised to look like error messages.
Users in Libya receive time-out messages when
they try to access banned content.
Overblocking
Internet filtering will inherently lead to either
overblocking or underblocking of targeted content. Many countries in the region are reasonably
successful at blocking what they openly declare
to be the target of their filtering system, without
excessively high rates of overblocking. Others,
however—such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates—not only extensively block
targeted content but they also unnecessarily
overblock unrelated content. For instance, Iran
and the United Arab Emirates block www
.flickr.com entirely because they have deemed
some of the photographs posted on the site
objectionable. Also most of ISPs in countries
such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United
Arab Emirates, and Yemen prevent Internet users
from legitimately using privacy and anonymizing
tools and online translation services because
they can be used to bypass the filtering systems.
Filtering tools
The majority of the ISPs in the region rely on commercial filtering software, primarily applications
produced by U.S.-based companies Secure
Computing and Websense. This software allows
ISPs, often acting on the behest of governments,
to filter by category based on lists of pages
updated by the company. The categories that
ISPs choose to filter can differ widely between
countries. In some cases ISPs block individual
Web sites’ URLs or entire top-level domains, as
in the case of Syria and the United Arab
Emirates, both of which block access to the
Israeli top-level domain. In addition, some ISPs
block search strings that contain objectionable
keywords. For example, the Yemeni ISP Ynet
blocks the use of the word sex in search strings,
and the Emirati ISP Etisalat bans the use of several keywords that could return erotic images.
In addition, some ISPs block access to
cached copies of certain Web sites as an extra
measure to prevent access to their content. Most
notably, the U.S.-based, Arab-language online
newspaper www.arabtimes.com is blocked in
several Arab countries, as is access to the
cached copy of the page in Google.
Iran, in addition to blocking Web sites,
restricts users’ ability to access online content by
limiting their Internet speed. In October 2006 the
Ministry of Communications and Information
Technology ordered ISPs to limit the connection
speed they offer to 128 Kb/s in order to hinder
users’ ability to download foreign cultural products (such as music and films) and to organize
political opposition. 9
Physical restrictions and filtering
An additional mode of control is to regulate the
places where users access the Internet. In many
countries in the Middle East and North Africa,
users primarily go online at Internet cafés. Some
governments require these cafés to maintain lists
of their patrons and keep an eye on their activities. Yemen and Oman require that computer
screens be visible to café managers at all times;
indeed, Oman requires that prospective café
owners submit a floor plan in their application
package. The authorities give specific instruc210
Regional Overviews
every month.
8
However, even where a state
admits some filtering, it may not admit targeting
political opposition, dissidents, or critical human
rights reports.
Some ISPs acknowledge filtering by serving
blockpages when users try to access banned
content. A blockpage usually alerts users that
they tried to access illegal Web sites; some invite
users to suggest the removal of the block on the
Web sites if they think they were erroneously
blocked. Some ISPs also ask users to volunteer
suggestions for the blacklists.
Countries such as Syria and Tunisia attempt
to hide their filtering regimes by returning blockpages disguised to look like error messages.
Users in Libya receive time-out messages when
they try to access banned content.
Overblocking
Internet filtering will inherently lead to either
overblocking or underblocking of targeted content. Many countries in the region are reasonably
successful at blocking what they openly declare
to be the target of their filtering system, without
excessively high rates of overblocking. Others,
however—such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates—not only extensively block
targeted content but they also unnecessarily
overblock unrelated content. For instance, Iran
and the United Arab Emirates block www
.flickr.com entirely because they have deemed
some of the photographs posted on the site
objectionable. Also most of ISPs in countries
such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United
Arab Emirates, and Yemen prevent Internet users
from legitimately using privacy and anonymizing
tools and online translation services because
they can be used to bypass the filtering systems.
Filtering tools
The majority of the ISPs in the region rely on commercial filtering software, primarily applications
produced by U.S.-based companies Secure
Computing and Websense. This software allows
ISPs, often acting on the behest of governments,
to filter by category based on lists of pages
updated by the company. The categories that
ISPs choose to filter can differ widely between
countries. In some cases ISPs block individual
Web sites’ URLs or entire top-level domains, as
in the case of Syria and the United Arab
Emirates, both of which block access to the
Israeli top-level domain. In addition, some ISPs
block search strings that contain objectionable
keywords. For example, the Yemeni ISP Ynet
blocks the use of the word sex in search strings,
and the Emirati ISP Etisalat bans the use of several keywords that could return erotic images.
In addition, some ISPs block access to
cached copies of certain Web sites as an extra
measure to prevent access to their content. Most
notably, the U.S.-based, Arab-language online
newspaper www.arabtimes.com is blocked in
several Arab countries, as is access to the
cached copy of the page in Google.
Iran, in addition to blocking Web sites,
restricts users’ ability to access online content by
limiting their Internet speed. In October 2006 the
Ministry of Communications and Information
Technology ordered ISPs to limit the connection
speed they offer to 128 Kb/s in order to hinder
users’ ability to download foreign cultural products (such as music and films) and to organize
political opposition. 9
Physical restrictions and filtering
An additional mode of control is to regulate the
places where users access the Internet. In many
countries in the Middle East and North Africa,
users primarily go online at Internet cafés. Some
governments require these cafés to maintain lists
of their patrons and keep an eye on their activities. Yemen and Oman require that computer
screens be visible to café managers at all times;
indeed, Oman requires that prospective café
owners submit a floor plan in their application
package. The authorities give specific instruc210
Regional Overviews