porary storage of information” that is carried for
the exclusive purpose of making onward transmission more efficient. Article 14 addresses the
liability associated with hosting content, stating
that ISPs “will not be liable for hosting information, provided they do not have actual knowledge
that the activity is illegal and, upon obtaining
such knowledge, act quickly to remove it.” 6
Finally, Article 15 precludes ISPs from any general obligation to monitor content or data transmitted or stored through their services. Further, ISPs
are not required to actively seek facts that might
indicate illegal activity. 7 These provisions granting ISPs substantial immunity from liability over
illegal content are consistent with the law and
practice of many other countries around the
world that seek to expand Internet use and promote freedom of expression.
Social filtering
Action to regulate obscene content started with
individual countries and the implementation of
voluntary ISP-level filtering programs. The landmark model of large-scale voluntary ISP filtering
in Europe originated in the UK. 8 BT, Britain’s
largest ISP, serving about a third of the country’s
home Internet users, launched Project Cleanfeed
in June 2004 9 in consultation with the British
Home Office. Under the auspices of this project,
BT filters Internet content based on a blacklist of
Web sites hosted anywhere in the world that contain images of child abuse as defined by the
amended Protection of Children Act, 1978. 10 The
list is compiled by the Internet Watch Foundation
(IWF), a not-for-profit organization, in consultation
with government, industry, the police, and the
public. IWF provides the list to its members,
which today include ISPs, mobile network operators, content providers, and search engines such
as Google and Yahoo! 11 Those attempting to
access the illegal content hosted abroad receive
an error message as if the particular page were
unavailable as a result of other connectivity problems. 12 Illegal content that is hosted within the
UK, including child abuse images and content
that is criminally obscene or incites racial hatred,
is required to be taken down by ISPs and content
providers under a notice-and-takedown regime. 13
Although this form of filtering is termed “voluntary,” by the end of 2007 all broadband consumer
ISPs in Britain are expected to have implemented
a similar system, failing which, regulatory
enforcement might be considered. 14, 15 Other
countries, such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
and Italy, have implemented similar programs,
while Finland is currently considering doing so. 16
Filtering also takes place through “voluntary
self-regulation” by search engines. As of early
2005 all major search engines in Germany —
Google, Lycos Europe, MSN Deutschland, AOL
Deutschland, Yahoo, T-Online, and t-info — have
formed an organization that coordinates filtering
of search results that are harmful to minors,
based on a list provided by a government agency
in charge of media classification. The move is
seen as a response to pressure for voluntary selfregulation by industry at the EU level, and
arguably to the fear among industry that a failure
to comply will result in increased legislation. The
system has been criticized, however, for a lack of
transparency, 17 since the search engines cannot
disclose the list of Web sites to the public, as per
a codex signed by them. 18 In addition, disclosure
would defeat the purpose of filtering search
results, as the sites are removed only from the
search results, not from the Internet.
Internet content is also monitored through
online surveillance by authorities in the UK. The
Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre
(launched in April 2006) made thirteen arrests in
July 2006 after beginning investigations into payper-view Internet services. 19 The police in Britain
have also been vested with the power to pass on
to banks the personal details of those who
access illegal content online using credit cards,
based on an amendment to the Data Protection
Act (1998). 20 Banks will then cancel the cards as
a breach of their terms of service.
188
Regional Overviews
the exclusive purpose of making onward transmission more efficient. Article 14 addresses the
liability associated with hosting content, stating
that ISPs “will not be liable for hosting information, provided they do not have actual knowledge
that the activity is illegal and, upon obtaining
such knowledge, act quickly to remove it.” 6
Finally, Article 15 precludes ISPs from any general obligation to monitor content or data transmitted or stored through their services. Further, ISPs
are not required to actively seek facts that might
indicate illegal activity. 7 These provisions granting ISPs substantial immunity from liability over
illegal content are consistent with the law and
practice of many other countries around the
world that seek to expand Internet use and promote freedom of expression.
Social filtering
Action to regulate obscene content started with
individual countries and the implementation of
voluntary ISP-level filtering programs. The landmark model of large-scale voluntary ISP filtering
in Europe originated in the UK. 8 BT, Britain’s
largest ISP, serving about a third of the country’s
home Internet users, launched Project Cleanfeed
in June 2004 9 in consultation with the British
Home Office. Under the auspices of this project,
BT filters Internet content based on a blacklist of
Web sites hosted anywhere in the world that contain images of child abuse as defined by the
amended Protection of Children Act, 1978. 10 The
list is compiled by the Internet Watch Foundation
(IWF), a not-for-profit organization, in consultation
with government, industry, the police, and the
public. IWF provides the list to its members,
which today include ISPs, mobile network operators, content providers, and search engines such
as Google and Yahoo! 11 Those attempting to
access the illegal content hosted abroad receive
an error message as if the particular page were
unavailable as a result of other connectivity problems. 12 Illegal content that is hosted within the
UK, including child abuse images and content
that is criminally obscene or incites racial hatred,
is required to be taken down by ISPs and content
providers under a notice-and-takedown regime. 13
Although this form of filtering is termed “voluntary,” by the end of 2007 all broadband consumer
ISPs in Britain are expected to have implemented
a similar system, failing which, regulatory
enforcement might be considered. 14, 15 Other
countries, such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
and Italy, have implemented similar programs,
while Finland is currently considering doing so. 16
Filtering also takes place through “voluntary
self-regulation” by search engines. As of early
2005 all major search engines in Germany —
Google, Lycos Europe, MSN Deutschland, AOL
Deutschland, Yahoo, T-Online, and t-info — have
formed an organization that coordinates filtering
of search results that are harmful to minors,
based on a list provided by a government agency
in charge of media classification. The move is
seen as a response to pressure for voluntary selfregulation by industry at the EU level, and
arguably to the fear among industry that a failure
to comply will result in increased legislation. The
system has been criticized, however, for a lack of
transparency, 17 since the search engines cannot
disclose the list of Web sites to the public, as per
a codex signed by them. 18 In addition, disclosure
would defeat the purpose of filtering search
results, as the sites are removed only from the
search results, not from the Internet.
Internet content is also monitored through
online surveillance by authorities in the UK. The
Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre
(launched in April 2006) made thirteen arrests in
July 2006 after beginning investigations into payper-view Internet services. 19 The police in Britain
have also been vested with the power to pass on
to banks the personal details of those who
access illegal content online using credit cards,
based on an amendment to the Data Protection
Act (1998). 20 Banks will then cancel the cards as
a breach of their terms of service.
188
Regional Overviews