32. Li Qian, ‘‘Chinese Weblogs Thriving,’’ China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-01/11/content
_781602.htm.
33. Blogs by Iranians, http://blogsbyiranians.com/.
34. ‘‘Election Monitoring in Kyrgyzstan,’’ Special Report: Kyrgyzstan, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/special/kg/.
35. Ibid.
36. ‘‘Tajikistan Blocks Access to Web Sites in the Run-Up to Presidential Election,’’ New Eurasia, http://tajikistan
.neweurasia.net/?p=116.
37. ‘‘Internet Filtering in Uganda,’’ Internet Censorship Explorer, http://ice.citizenlab.org/?p=190, infra p. 209.
38. http://tajikistan.neweurasia.net/?p=116.
39. http://ice.citizenlab.org/?p=190.
40. In mid-2006, the U.S. Department of Defense was well underway in preparing the country’s first National Military
Strategy for Operations in Cyberspace. While the details of the strategy are expected to remain classified, the identification of cyberspace as distinct ‘‘domains of operations’’ equal to land, air, sea, and space, mark an acknowledgment of its importance to national military capabilities and national security. The strategy is expected to unify
and expand the Computer Network Operations that are presently distributed among several separate commands
(Joint Task Force—Computer Network Operations, 67th Network Warfare Wing, as well as dedicated resources of
the National Security Agency and elsewhere). In December 2006, the U.S. Air Force announced the establishment
of the U.S. Cyberspace Command (formally becoming the 8th Air Force), which is expected to become the global
force provider for all U.S. cyberspace operations and will include both offensive and defensive Computer Network
Operations. The formal announcement of this capability is expected to accelerate the emergence of similar capabilities among other military powers. Already, both China and the Russian Federation have declared doctrines
for pursuing cyberspace operations. China’s doctrine of ‘‘Integrated Network Electronic Warfare,’’ for example, considers computer network attacks as essential to developing a first strike capability. Special units consisting of
reservists drawn from among China’s research and computational elite have been formed within the PLA, and
since 2006, these units have reportedly participated in large-scale exercises. The entry of the United States and
major regional superpowers into cyberspace operations is likely to spur an arms race as military establishments
worldwide seek to develop both offensive and defensive capabilities. The militarization of cyberspace will create
further means for states to regulate and control national cyberspace and will likely lead to further restriction on
both civil and dark networks. For an extended discussion, see Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, The Global
Politics of Internet Securitization (forthcoming, 2008).
Global Civil Society and the Securitization of the Internet
149
_781602.htm.
33. Blogs by Iranians, http://blogsbyiranians.com/.
34. ‘‘Election Monitoring in Kyrgyzstan,’’ Special Report: Kyrgyzstan, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/special/kg/.
35. Ibid.
36. ‘‘Tajikistan Blocks Access to Web Sites in the Run-Up to Presidential Election,’’ New Eurasia, http://tajikistan
.neweurasia.net/?p=116.
37. ‘‘Internet Filtering in Uganda,’’ Internet Censorship Explorer, http://ice.citizenlab.org/?p=190, infra p. 209.
38. http://tajikistan.neweurasia.net/?p=116.
39. http://ice.citizenlab.org/?p=190.
40. In mid-2006, the U.S. Department of Defense was well underway in preparing the country’s first National Military
Strategy for Operations in Cyberspace. While the details of the strategy are expected to remain classified, the identification of cyberspace as distinct ‘‘domains of operations’’ equal to land, air, sea, and space, mark an acknowledgment of its importance to national military capabilities and national security. The strategy is expected to unify
and expand the Computer Network Operations that are presently distributed among several separate commands
(Joint Task Force—Computer Network Operations, 67th Network Warfare Wing, as well as dedicated resources of
the National Security Agency and elsewhere). In December 2006, the U.S. Air Force announced the establishment
of the U.S. Cyberspace Command (formally becoming the 8th Air Force), which is expected to become the global
force provider for all U.S. cyberspace operations and will include both offensive and defensive Computer Network
Operations. The formal announcement of this capability is expected to accelerate the emergence of similar capabilities among other military powers. Already, both China and the Russian Federation have declared doctrines
for pursuing cyberspace operations. China’s doctrine of ‘‘Integrated Network Electronic Warfare,’’ for example, considers computer network attacks as essential to developing a first strike capability. Special units consisting of
reservists drawn from among China’s research and computational elite have been formed within the PLA, and
since 2006, these units have reportedly participated in large-scale exercises. The entry of the United States and
major regional superpowers into cyberspace operations is likely to spur an arms race as military establishments
worldwide seek to develop both offensive and defensive capabilities. The militarization of cyberspace will create
further means for states to regulate and control national cyberspace and will likely lead to further restriction on
both civil and dark networks. For an extended discussion, see Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, The Global
Politics of Internet Securitization (forthcoming, 2008).
Global Civil Society and the Securitization of the Internet
149