Significantly, it was these groups, rather than First World militaries, that were the first to leverage the Internet as a means to wage information operations that redefined the main field of
battle away from the military and toward the political sphere.
22 Beginning with the first Chechen war, the videotaping of attacks on the Russian military became more important than
the military significance of the attacks themselves. When shown to supporters, as well as the
Russian public (via rebroadcast on Russian television, and later on the Internet), their shock
value was enough to convey the impression that the Russian military was being defeated.
Similar tactics were adopted and further refined by Hezbollah in its resistance against Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon prior to their withdrawal in 2001. Hezbollah produced reports
in the form of music videos that were both broadcast across Hezbollah’s terrestrial television
station (al Manar), as well as made available for download from Web sites the movement had
established as part of its strategic communications and information warfare strategy.
These video shorts proved highly effective, and have since undergone several significant
evolutions, paralleling the spread and popularity of such online resources as YouTube and
Indymedia that are used regularly by global civic networks and resistance groups. They are
now one of the key instruments used by these movements to attract interest in their causes
and are a significant feature of the more than 4,500 active jihad Web sites, chat rooms, and
forums. As the resources necessary for producing multimedia technologies continue to fall,
and access to inexpensive digital cameras and editing software increases, the threshold and
number of video and other multimedia products in circulation has grown exponentially. Meanwhile, the age of the producers has sharply declined. During the early months of the second
Intifada, for example, several of the more compelling PowerPoint slides circulating on the
Internet depicting the brutality of the Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank were produced by
a fourteen-year-old living in a refugee camp in Lebanon.
23
In addition to changing the nature of the conflicts, the video clips have also served to
change the nature of the movements themselves. They have eliminated the need for strict
command and control, especially for smaller and more marginal movements which can now
claim legitimacy for their actions by virtually piggybacking on the perceived effectiveness and
success of others. They also give the impression of a unity and scale among groups that in
reality simply does not exist. As a result, much as the discourse of human rights and other
universal values provides a moral center that binds many of the civic networks together, the
depictions of resistance, wrapped in religious undertones, provide a means for smaller, more
local struggles to identify with and benefit from a broader ideological pool. When networked in
this way, this ideological pool serves to demonstrate that resistance is not only possible, but
also positively effective.
The Internet is only one of the tools used by armed social movements in the pursuit of their
cause, but it is certainly the one that, because of its largely unregulated character and relative
freedom of access, causes the greatest concern for states under threat from such actors. It is
seen, at least in part, as the sea in which global militants find sanctuary of the kind that Mao
130
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
battle away from the military and toward the political sphere.
22 Beginning with the first Chechen war, the videotaping of attacks on the Russian military became more important than
the military significance of the attacks themselves. When shown to supporters, as well as the
Russian public (via rebroadcast on Russian television, and later on the Internet), their shock
value was enough to convey the impression that the Russian military was being defeated.
Similar tactics were adopted and further refined by Hezbollah in its resistance against Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon prior to their withdrawal in 2001. Hezbollah produced reports
in the form of music videos that were both broadcast across Hezbollah’s terrestrial television
station (al Manar), as well as made available for download from Web sites the movement had
established as part of its strategic communications and information warfare strategy.
These video shorts proved highly effective, and have since undergone several significant
evolutions, paralleling the spread and popularity of such online resources as YouTube and
Indymedia that are used regularly by global civic networks and resistance groups. They are
now one of the key instruments used by these movements to attract interest in their causes
and are a significant feature of the more than 4,500 active jihad Web sites, chat rooms, and
forums. As the resources necessary for producing multimedia technologies continue to fall,
and access to inexpensive digital cameras and editing software increases, the threshold and
number of video and other multimedia products in circulation has grown exponentially. Meanwhile, the age of the producers has sharply declined. During the early months of the second
Intifada, for example, several of the more compelling PowerPoint slides circulating on the
Internet depicting the brutality of the Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank were produced by
a fourteen-year-old living in a refugee camp in Lebanon.
23
In addition to changing the nature of the conflicts, the video clips have also served to
change the nature of the movements themselves. They have eliminated the need for strict
command and control, especially for smaller and more marginal movements which can now
claim legitimacy for their actions by virtually piggybacking on the perceived effectiveness and
success of others. They also give the impression of a unity and scale among groups that in
reality simply does not exist. As a result, much as the discourse of human rights and other
universal values provides a moral center that binds many of the civic networks together, the
depictions of resistance, wrapped in religious undertones, provide a means for smaller, more
local struggles to identify with and benefit from a broader ideological pool. When networked in
this way, this ideological pool serves to demonstrate that resistance is not only possible, but
also positively effective.
The Internet is only one of the tools used by armed social movements in the pursuit of their
cause, but it is certainly the one that, because of its largely unregulated character and relative
freedom of access, causes the greatest concern for states under threat from such actors. It is
seen, at least in part, as the sea in which global militants find sanctuary of the kind that Mao
130
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski