agenda of communications security and privacy, freedom of expression, equal access, the
protection of an open public domain of knowledge, and the preservation of cultural diversity.
The participants in this social movement include local, regional, and global nongovernmental
organizations, activists, and policy networks including major international rights organizations
such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, as well as the OpenNet Initiative
(and its partner institutions) itself.
Critical to the constitution of this social movement has been the support provided by major
nonprofit research and advocacy foundations such as the Ford Foundation, Markle Foundation, Open Society Institute, and the MacArthur Foundation. The support of these nonprofit
foundations has included not only financial resources but also networking opportunities, venues for collaboration, and research and development coordination. To be sure, this type of
support has had an important impact. However, the resources provided by these donor
agencies do not rival the collective financial capacities that can be marshaled by states. Nor
do they always come without unintended consequences. Scholars have noticed funding of
this sort can promote the emergence of patron-client ties between donors and recipients,
rather than horizontal links among civic networks.
18 They may also create a hostile environment for civic networks due to the impression of outside ‘‘interference’’ and ‘‘meddling’’—
particularly if the NGOs are perceived as a thin vehicle for one state’s foreign policy within
the jurisdiction of another state. One recent study found that nineteen countries, concentrated
mostly in Africa, the Middle East, and the former Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
have enacted or proposed laws over the past five years that restrict the activities of civil
society.
19
One area where the asymmetric capacities of civic networks may be most tangibly felt is in
building code, software, and other tools explicitly designed with an Internet protection paradigm in mind. From the outset, the Internet’s character has been shaped not only by states
and corporations but also by the distributed base of users themselves. Skilled computer
geeks, hacktivists, and other individuals have been responsible for some of the most innovative Internet technologies, from open source/free software platforms to P2P networks and
encryption systems. Although ‘‘Internet protection’’ technologies go back decades, in recent
years there has been a more concerted and organized research and development effort,
working in tandem with the policy, governance, and awareness efforts described earlier.
These efforts include tools to support anonymous communications online, such as the Tor
system; tools that circumvent Internet censorship, such as psiphon or Peacefire; and tools
that support privacy online, such as PGP, ScatterChat, and others. These tools are, in turn,
increasingly localized to different country contexts, distributed via nongovernmental organizations and human rights networks, and built into training and advocacy workshops organized
by the Internet protection civic networks described above.
20 As we show in a later section,
however, state filtering efforts have deliberately targeted these Internet protection tools as a
way to control and limit networking activities of civic and resistance networks.
128
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski
protection of an open public domain of knowledge, and the preservation of cultural diversity.
The participants in this social movement include local, regional, and global nongovernmental
organizations, activists, and policy networks including major international rights organizations
such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, as well as the OpenNet Initiative
(and its partner institutions) itself.
Critical to the constitution of this social movement has been the support provided by major
nonprofit research and advocacy foundations such as the Ford Foundation, Markle Foundation, Open Society Institute, and the MacArthur Foundation. The support of these nonprofit
foundations has included not only financial resources but also networking opportunities, venues for collaboration, and research and development coordination. To be sure, this type of
support has had an important impact. However, the resources provided by these donor
agencies do not rival the collective financial capacities that can be marshaled by states. Nor
do they always come without unintended consequences. Scholars have noticed funding of
this sort can promote the emergence of patron-client ties between donors and recipients,
rather than horizontal links among civic networks.
18 They may also create a hostile environment for civic networks due to the impression of outside ‘‘interference’’ and ‘‘meddling’’—
particularly if the NGOs are perceived as a thin vehicle for one state’s foreign policy within
the jurisdiction of another state. One recent study found that nineteen countries, concentrated
mostly in Africa, the Middle East, and the former Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
have enacted or proposed laws over the past five years that restrict the activities of civil
society.
19
One area where the asymmetric capacities of civic networks may be most tangibly felt is in
building code, software, and other tools explicitly designed with an Internet protection paradigm in mind. From the outset, the Internet’s character has been shaped not only by states
and corporations but also by the distributed base of users themselves. Skilled computer
geeks, hacktivists, and other individuals have been responsible for some of the most innovative Internet technologies, from open source/free software platforms to P2P networks and
encryption systems. Although ‘‘Internet protection’’ technologies go back decades, in recent
years there has been a more concerted and organized research and development effort,
working in tandem with the policy, governance, and awareness efforts described earlier.
These efforts include tools to support anonymous communications online, such as the Tor
system; tools that circumvent Internet censorship, such as psiphon or Peacefire; and tools
that support privacy online, such as PGP, ScatterChat, and others. These tools are, in turn,
increasingly localized to different country contexts, distributed via nongovernmental organizations and human rights networks, and built into training and advocacy workshops organized
by the Internet protection civic networks described above.
20 As we show in a later section,
however, state filtering efforts have deliberately targeted these Internet protection tools as a
way to control and limit networking activities of civic and resistance networks.
128
Ronald Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski