The more useful taxonomy considers the nature and level of involvement of the firms in the
online censorship and surveillance regimes. The second taxonomy points the way forward
more clearly toward a solution by identifying the various ways in which firms are implicated in
these regimes and offering means of distinguishing the different types of ethical obligations
they may bear.
Types of Firms
Several types of corporations might find themselves called upon to act as gatekeepers. The
first corporations to find themselves involved in the censorship and surveillance controversy
were technology hardware providers that sold the switches and routers involved in these
regimes. In many parts of the world, Internet security firms sell the services and products
used in the censorship and surveillance regimes. More recently, content and online service
providers, whose customers are typically end-users, have been implicated. Looking ahead,
other telecommunications service providers may well find themselves in a similar position as
technologies and forms of digital content converge.
Hardware Providers First, technology hardware manufacturers face scrutiny for their sales
of routers, switches, and related services to the regimes that carry out online censorship and
surveillance practices. According to the critique of human rights activists, companies like
Cisco and Nortel that profit from the sale of the hardware that blocks the flow of packets
online or enables states to trap and trace online communications are acting unethically. The
problem, the critique goes, is akin to the Oppenheimer problem in the context of nuclear technologies. While nuclear technologies can provide energy efficiently to those who need it, the
same means can also power weapons of mass destruction of unprecedented power. The
hardware manufacturers respond that the technologies sold to regimes that censor and practice surveillance are precisely the same as those technologies sold to firms and governments
in states that do not carry out such regimes. This issue is not new, these firms respond. Dualuse technologies present this issue in an untold number of contexts. And the blame should be
placed on those who implement the dual-use technologies in the suspect manner, not on
those who produce the ‘‘neutral’’ technologies.
Software Providers The second class of firms implicated in this matter includes those corporations that sell the software and services that determine what gets blocked, recorded, or
otherwise impeded. Internet security firms—such as Secure Computing, Websense, Fortinet,
and others—often serve states, corporations, and other institutions that seek to impede the
free flow of packets for one reason or another. A library, for instance, might wish to block
underage patrons from accessing pornography online. A similar software package could
enable a state to configure a proxy server between a citizen and the wider Internet to block
or track certain packets. Many of the states in the Middle East and North Africa that have filtering regimes in place rely upon software packages, and corresponding lists of banned sites,
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online censorship and surveillance regimes. The second taxonomy points the way forward
more clearly toward a solution by identifying the various ways in which firms are implicated in
these regimes and offering means of distinguishing the different types of ethical obligations
they may bear.
Types of Firms
Several types of corporations might find themselves called upon to act as gatekeepers. The
first corporations to find themselves involved in the censorship and surveillance controversy
were technology hardware providers that sold the switches and routers involved in these
regimes. In many parts of the world, Internet security firms sell the services and products
used in the censorship and surveillance regimes. More recently, content and online service
providers, whose customers are typically end-users, have been implicated. Looking ahead,
other telecommunications service providers may well find themselves in a similar position as
technologies and forms of digital content converge.
Hardware Providers First, technology hardware manufacturers face scrutiny for their sales
of routers, switches, and related services to the regimes that carry out online censorship and
surveillance practices. According to the critique of human rights activists, companies like
Cisco and Nortel that profit from the sale of the hardware that blocks the flow of packets
online or enables states to trap and trace online communications are acting unethically. The
problem, the critique goes, is akin to the Oppenheimer problem in the context of nuclear technologies. While nuclear technologies can provide energy efficiently to those who need it, the
same means can also power weapons of mass destruction of unprecedented power. The
hardware manufacturers respond that the technologies sold to regimes that censor and practice surveillance are precisely the same as those technologies sold to firms and governments
in states that do not carry out such regimes. This issue is not new, these firms respond. Dualuse technologies present this issue in an untold number of contexts. And the blame should be
placed on those who implement the dual-use technologies in the suspect manner, not on
those who produce the ‘‘neutral’’ technologies.
Software Providers The second class of firms implicated in this matter includes those corporations that sell the software and services that determine what gets blocked, recorded, or
otherwise impeded. Internet security firms—such as Secure Computing, Websense, Fortinet,
and others—often serve states, corporations, and other institutions that seek to impede the
free flow of packets for one reason or another. A library, for instance, might wish to block
underage patrons from accessing pornography online. A similar software package could
enable a state to configure a proxy server between a citizen and the wider Internet to block
or track certain packets. Many of the states in the Middle East and North Africa that have filtering regimes in place rely upon software packages, and corresponding lists of banned sites,
110
Jonathan Zittrain and John Palfrey