47. See Beth Stevens and Michael Ratner, International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts (New York: Transnational
Publishers, 1996).
48. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
49. Professor Dinah Shelton of the George Washington University Law School has surveyed the cases taken to
date under the ATCA and concluded that, where successful, awards in the $1–10-million range were usually
made. Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
2005).
50. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3rd 232 (2nd Cir. 1995); John Doe v. Unocal Corporation, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
51. This is due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity—see Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co, 488 U.S.
428 (1989).
52. See Neil J. Conley, ‘‘The Chinese Communist Party’s New Comrade,’’ 111 Penn St. L. Rev. 171 (2006); Jill R. Newbold, ‘‘Aiding the Enemy: Imposing Liability on U.S. Corporations for Selling China Internet Tools to Restrict Human
Rights,’’ U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 503 (2003).
53. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
54. Conley, ‘‘The Chinese Communist Party’s New Comrade,’’ 200–201.
55. See Olivia De Schutter, ed., Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2006), 59ff.
56. John Doe v. Unocal Corporation, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
57. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 266.
58. Jill R. Newbold, ‘‘Aiding the Enemy: Imposing Liability on U.S. Corporations for Selling China Internet Tools to Restrict Human Rights,’’ U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 503 (2003).
59. Conley, ‘‘The Chinese Communist Party’s New Comrade.’’
60. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 172–173.
61. See Olivia De Schutter, ed., Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2006).
62. See UN Economic and Social Council, Report of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (E/CN.4/2005/91), February 15, 2005,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/2005/0215untncreport.pdf.
63. Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak Republic joined the thirty OECD members in this effort. (For a list
of OECD members, see http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html.)
64. See ‘‘OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,’’
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,’’ http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,2340,en_2649
_201185_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html.
65. See ‘‘1997 Reused Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions,’’
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,’’ http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,2340,en_2649
_201185_2048160_1_1_1_1,00.html.
66. See ‘‘United Nations Convention against Corruption,’’ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc
.org/unodc/crime_convention_corruption.html.
67. Do companies’ motivations matter when the community opposed to illegal filtering practices is considering what
approach to take? It could be that the distinction in motivations is not so important, and that what matters is simply
the result—that is, that decision-makers for the company ensure that company policies support freedom of expression. Still, true convictions would seem to matter for the sake of maintaining social values in favor of freedom of
expression.
68. Geneva Declaration of Principles, paras. 48 and 49.
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101
Publishers, 1996).
48. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
49. Professor Dinah Shelton of the George Washington University Law School has surveyed the cases taken to
date under the ATCA and concluded that, where successful, awards in the $1–10-million range were usually
made. Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
2005).
50. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3rd 232 (2nd Cir. 1995); John Doe v. Unocal Corporation, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
51. This is due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity—see Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co, 488 U.S.
428 (1989).
52. See Neil J. Conley, ‘‘The Chinese Communist Party’s New Comrade,’’ 111 Penn St. L. Rev. 171 (2006); Jill R. Newbold, ‘‘Aiding the Enemy: Imposing Liability on U.S. Corporations for Selling China Internet Tools to Restrict Human
Rights,’’ U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 503 (2003).
53. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
54. Conley, ‘‘The Chinese Communist Party’s New Comrade,’’ 200–201.
55. See Olivia De Schutter, ed., Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2006), 59ff.
56. John Doe v. Unocal Corporation, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
57. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 266.
58. Jill R. Newbold, ‘‘Aiding the Enemy: Imposing Liability on U.S. Corporations for Selling China Internet Tools to Restrict Human Rights,’’ U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 503 (2003).
59. Conley, ‘‘The Chinese Communist Party’s New Comrade.’’
60. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 172–173.
61. See Olivia De Schutter, ed., Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2006).
62. See UN Economic and Social Council, Report of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (E/CN.4/2005/91), February 15, 2005,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/2005/0215untncreport.pdf.
63. Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak Republic joined the thirty OECD members in this effort. (For a list
of OECD members, see http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html.)
64. See ‘‘OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,’’
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,’’ http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,2340,en_2649
_201185_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html.
65. See ‘‘1997 Reused Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions,’’
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,’’ http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,2340,en_2649
_201185_2048160_1_1_1_1,00.html.
66. See ‘‘United Nations Convention against Corruption,’’ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc
.org/unodc/crime_convention_corruption.html.
67. Do companies’ motivations matter when the community opposed to illegal filtering practices is considering what
approach to take? It could be that the distinction in motivations is not so important, and that what matters is simply
the result—that is, that decision-makers for the company ensure that company policies support freedom of expression. Still, true convictions would seem to matter for the sake of maintaining social values in favor of freedom of
expression.
68. Geneva Declaration of Principles, paras. 48 and 49.
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