select which disputes to bring according to overall political or economic importance for their
economy. Indeed, if states ceased to play this intermediary role, WTO agreements would
result in a very extensive regulatory framework for the Information Society.
43
Viewing this scenario as a matter of using international trade law to enforce human rights,
one might ask if the concern were for freedom of expression, or for market access. If it were
for market access but the effect were that freedom of expression enjoyed protection, would
that be sufficient for those people desiring to see enforcement of human rights by the international system? No doubt privacy advocates would be chagrined at the prospect of the same
logic requiring a striking down of limitations designed to protect privacy, with market access in
that case hurting the cause of civil liberties.
All in all, dispute settlement in the trade context appears a rather blunt and indirect instrument for enforcing freedom of expression among states. Although the WTO offers an interesting example of enforcement capabilities at the international level, the system has been
designed for promoting commerce rather than for protecting human rights. A liberalized trading system may promote the exercise of freedom of expression, but relying on trade policy to
protect this fundamental human right could send a message that freedoms are subordinate to
trade.
More systemically, integration may eventually bring such issues to a head as value systems
are forced to reconcile. By making it possible for people in different places to interact with one
another and spurring common institutional approaches, the Internet is causing integration to
occur at a pace more rapid than ever experienced. As the distinction between cyberspace
and the real world fades with technology’s incorporation into nearly all facets of life, this integration arguably will be a fact. In this sense, institutions at the center of interactions over the
Internet—including the WTO—may experience a sort of triumph as states become dependent
on them instead of granting them piecemeal authority.
44
The Need for a Different Approach
Reinforcing human rights by targeting states is often unsuccessful because the international
system lacks effective enforcement mechanisms.
45 Meanwhile, with respect to freedom of expression in particular, empirical studies by the OpenNet Initiative have shown that the practice
of government filtering is on the rise globally, and, as discussed earlier, it is questionable
whether such filtering comports with the requirements of the ICCPR. As more and more
governments adopt such practices, it seems that countries may be legitimizing these substandard (and arguably unlawful) measures and letting them become part of accepted international practice. Should the international system instead move toward penalizing filtering
practices that do not fit within the permissible limitations of the ICCPR?
Fundamentally, states’ commitments to enforce protections for human rights are weak because there are still relatively few economic drivers and other factors of state interest. States
see little reason to raise state-to-state conflict over the issue of freedom of expression. When it
90
Mary Rundle and Malcolm Birdling
economy. Indeed, if states ceased to play this intermediary role, WTO agreements would
result in a very extensive regulatory framework for the Information Society.
43
Viewing this scenario as a matter of using international trade law to enforce human rights,
one might ask if the concern were for freedom of expression, or for market access. If it were
for market access but the effect were that freedom of expression enjoyed protection, would
that be sufficient for those people desiring to see enforcement of human rights by the international system? No doubt privacy advocates would be chagrined at the prospect of the same
logic requiring a striking down of limitations designed to protect privacy, with market access in
that case hurting the cause of civil liberties.
All in all, dispute settlement in the trade context appears a rather blunt and indirect instrument for enforcing freedom of expression among states. Although the WTO offers an interesting example of enforcement capabilities at the international level, the system has been
designed for promoting commerce rather than for protecting human rights. A liberalized trading system may promote the exercise of freedom of expression, but relying on trade policy to
protect this fundamental human right could send a message that freedoms are subordinate to
trade.
More systemically, integration may eventually bring such issues to a head as value systems
are forced to reconcile. By making it possible for people in different places to interact with one
another and spurring common institutional approaches, the Internet is causing integration to
occur at a pace more rapid than ever experienced. As the distinction between cyberspace
and the real world fades with technology’s incorporation into nearly all facets of life, this integration arguably will be a fact. In this sense, institutions at the center of interactions over the
Internet—including the WTO—may experience a sort of triumph as states become dependent
on them instead of granting them piecemeal authority.
44
The Need for a Different Approach
Reinforcing human rights by targeting states is often unsuccessful because the international
system lacks effective enforcement mechanisms.
45 Meanwhile, with respect to freedom of expression in particular, empirical studies by the OpenNet Initiative have shown that the practice
of government filtering is on the rise globally, and, as discussed earlier, it is questionable
whether such filtering comports with the requirements of the ICCPR. As more and more
governments adopt such practices, it seems that countries may be legitimizing these substandard (and arguably unlawful) measures and letting them become part of accepted international practice. Should the international system instead move toward penalizing filtering
practices that do not fit within the permissible limitations of the ICCPR?
Fundamentally, states’ commitments to enforce protections for human rights are weak because there are still relatively few economic drivers and other factors of state interest. States
see little reason to raise state-to-state conflict over the issue of freedom of expression. When it
90
Mary Rundle and Malcolm Birdling