conditions, the right of oral presentation of proposals and amendments. However,
the resolution excludes the exercise of all those prerogatives linked to full-member
status. In fact, the EU does not have either the right to vote or the possibility of
co-exercising the initiative for the adoption of deeds and of proposing candidacies,
of raising motions of order or procedure. In particular:
(a) About the participation in the general debate, it is important to highlight that the
resolution, by indicating the conditions for a possible intervention, does not refer to
the necessary existence of a specific interest of the intervener regarding the topic
discussed at the meeting. Therefore, the EU would have access even if it does not
demonstrate a specific interest in the subject matter of the UNGA;
(b) The EU can intervene among the main political groups, such as the Group of 77, before
the members of the UNGA and the other observers, and this is because the political
groups operating at the UN, including the EU, can speak first in the context of the work
assemblies;
(c) The EU has the possibility of submitting proposals or amendments.
26
This last provision represents the most relevant power among the new prerogatives granted to the EU. In this regard, the EU may introduce and represent proposals
or amendments subject to certain conditions, namely: the proposal has to be
subjected to the agreement between its Member States and the initiative has to be
in a verbal form.
However, some criticism remains. In fact, the resolution 65/276 does not guarantee the discussion of such proposals or amendments during the session.
In this context, it is important to observe that most UNGA resolutions are
prepared in informal consultations, in which the EU may also take an active
part.
27 This is the specific case of the work of certain sub-bodies under the
UNGA, such as the OICP. In here, the EU’s participation covers, inter alia, all
parties of the UNCLOS. Furthermore, this may give the EU an effective instrument
to attempt to bridge the traditional division between the UN full-member and
observer status.
28
3 The Legal Gaps in the UNCLOS
It is important to observe that the UNCLOS does not sufficiently address all issues
relevant to viably conserve biological diversity and, most of all, the access to and the
protection of the MGRs.
29
26 For an overview of the new prerogatives of the EU in the UNGA, cf., inter alia, Serrano De Haro
(2012), p. 1; Guimãres (2015), p. 91; Brewer (2012), p. 201.
27 Cf., inter alia, Paasivirta and Porter (2006), p. 35.
28 Cf., Paasivirta (2015), p. 1053.
29 For an overview of MGRs, cf., inter alia, Korn (2003), p. 6; Leary et al. (2009), p. 183; De La
Fayette (2009), p. 221.
21 The EU and the UN Legally-Binding Instrument on the Areas Beyond National. . .
407
the resolution excludes the exercise of all those prerogatives linked to full-member
status. In fact, the EU does not have either the right to vote or the possibility of
co-exercising the initiative for the adoption of deeds and of proposing candidacies,
of raising motions of order or procedure. In particular:
(a) About the participation in the general debate, it is important to highlight that the
resolution, by indicating the conditions for a possible intervention, does not refer to
the necessary existence of a specific interest of the intervener regarding the topic
discussed at the meeting. Therefore, the EU would have access even if it does not
demonstrate a specific interest in the subject matter of the UNGA;
(b) The EU can intervene among the main political groups, such as the Group of 77, before
the members of the UNGA and the other observers, and this is because the political
groups operating at the UN, including the EU, can speak first in the context of the work
assemblies;
(c) The EU has the possibility of submitting proposals or amendments.
26
This last provision represents the most relevant power among the new prerogatives granted to the EU. In this regard, the EU may introduce and represent proposals
or amendments subject to certain conditions, namely: the proposal has to be
subjected to the agreement between its Member States and the initiative has to be
in a verbal form.
However, some criticism remains. In fact, the resolution 65/276 does not guarantee the discussion of such proposals or amendments during the session.
In this context, it is important to observe that most UNGA resolutions are
prepared in informal consultations, in which the EU may also take an active
part.
27 This is the specific case of the work of certain sub-bodies under the
UNGA, such as the OICP. In here, the EU’s participation covers, inter alia, all
parties of the UNCLOS. Furthermore, this may give the EU an effective instrument
to attempt to bridge the traditional division between the UN full-member and
observer status.
28
3 The Legal Gaps in the UNCLOS
It is important to observe that the UNCLOS does not sufficiently address all issues
relevant to viably conserve biological diversity and, most of all, the access to and the
protection of the MGRs.
29
26 For an overview of the new prerogatives of the EU in the UNGA, cf., inter alia, Serrano De Haro
(2012), p. 1; Guimãres (2015), p. 91; Brewer (2012), p. 201.
27 Cf., inter alia, Paasivirta and Porter (2006), p. 35.
28 Cf., Paasivirta (2015), p. 1053.
29 For an overview of MGRs, cf., inter alia, Korn (2003), p. 6; Leary et al. (2009), p. 183; De La
Fayette (2009), p. 221.
21 The EU and the UN Legally-Binding Instrument on the Areas Beyond National. . .
407