States in fulfilling their ILBI obligations, developing their capacities by using, for
instance, existing funding sources. As regards the institutional aspects of the future
instrument, the EU could support the creation of a conference of the parties, but
would prefer to use existing bodies and mechanisms, keeping a cautious approach.
However, the Union would foster the creation of a clearing house mechanism, in
order to promote transparency, exchange information and facilitate access to scientific data, especially in the field of marine genetic resources.
59
To conclude, so far, the EU’s position on the foregoing issues has been underdeveloped, due to the difficulty to reaching an agreement in advance among the
Union’s member States. However, the EU has emphasized its desire of an “early
entry into force” and “universality”,
60 showing at least its strong support to the
adoption of the new instrument. Other issues that may be of interest are the concrete
consequences of Brexit on the discussions, as the UK remains part of the EU for
those negotiations and has an influence in the definition of the EU’s position. Indeed,
the UK has often expressed strong antagonist positions concerning the content of the
future instrument, leading to difficulties in reaching a common position. As a
consequence, the Union does not have yet a strong role in the global discussions.
61
3.2 Potential Consequences of the Future Instrument
as Regards European Union’s Maritime Policy
Finally, the future international legally binding instrument appears in total coherence
with the EU’s maritime policy and would then strengthen and complement it. The
EU and its member States, according to their competences, have indeed been
implementing, for about ten years, an “integrated maritime policy”
62 which “seeks
to provide a more coherent approach to maritime issues, with increased coordination
between different policy areas”
63 and then to coordinate policies on specific sectors.
This integrated maritime policy, based on an “ecosystem approach”, aims at
59 Id. at pp. 15–16.
60 Id. at p. 18. Resolution 42/279 recalls indeed that “the conference shall exhaust every effort in
good faith to reach agreement on substantive matters by consensus”, stating the “need to ensure the
widest possible and effective participation in the conference”. UNGA Res 72/249 (2017), §17.
Some States, like Russia, are indeed not convinced yet of the necessity of such a legally binding
instrument.
61 For a general study of the consequences of Brexit on the law of the sea, see Beslier (2016),
pp. 15–24.
62 See the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 10 October 2007
on an Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union [COM(2007) 575 final—Not published
in the Official Journal].
63 Definition available on the website of the Commission, maritime affairs: https://ec.europa.eu/
maritimeaffairs/policy_en.
20 The European Union and the Future International Legally Binding Instrument on. . .
395
instance, existing funding sources. As regards the institutional aspects of the future
instrument, the EU could support the creation of a conference of the parties, but
would prefer to use existing bodies and mechanisms, keeping a cautious approach.
However, the Union would foster the creation of a clearing house mechanism, in
order to promote transparency, exchange information and facilitate access to scientific data, especially in the field of marine genetic resources.
59
To conclude, so far, the EU’s position on the foregoing issues has been underdeveloped, due to the difficulty to reaching an agreement in advance among the
Union’s member States. However, the EU has emphasized its desire of an “early
entry into force” and “universality”,
60 showing at least its strong support to the
adoption of the new instrument. Other issues that may be of interest are the concrete
consequences of Brexit on the discussions, as the UK remains part of the EU for
those negotiations and has an influence in the definition of the EU’s position. Indeed,
the UK has often expressed strong antagonist positions concerning the content of the
future instrument, leading to difficulties in reaching a common position. As a
consequence, the Union does not have yet a strong role in the global discussions.
61
3.2 Potential Consequences of the Future Instrument
as Regards European Union’s Maritime Policy
Finally, the future international legally binding instrument appears in total coherence
with the EU’s maritime policy and would then strengthen and complement it. The
EU and its member States, according to their competences, have indeed been
implementing, for about ten years, an “integrated maritime policy”
62 which “seeks
to provide a more coherent approach to maritime issues, with increased coordination
between different policy areas”
63 and then to coordinate policies on specific sectors.
This integrated maritime policy, based on an “ecosystem approach”, aims at
59 Id. at pp. 15–16.
60 Id. at p. 18. Resolution 42/279 recalls indeed that “the conference shall exhaust every effort in
good faith to reach agreement on substantive matters by consensus”, stating the “need to ensure the
widest possible and effective participation in the conference”. UNGA Res 72/249 (2017), §17.
Some States, like Russia, are indeed not convinced yet of the necessity of such a legally binding
instrument.
61 For a general study of the consequences of Brexit on the law of the sea, see Beslier (2016),
pp. 15–24.
62 See the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 10 October 2007
on an Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union [COM(2007) 575 final—Not published
in the Official Journal].
63 Definition available on the website of the Commission, maritime affairs: https://ec.europa.eu/
maritimeaffairs/policy_en.
20 The European Union and the Future International Legally Binding Instrument on. . .
395