1. As the ILBI is to be developed as an agreement under the UNCLOS, the first
working group focused on the relationship between these two treaties.
2. The second group looked at biodiversity itself, through the relationship between
the CBD and the ILBI, notably on how the instruments could complement one
another in relation to ABNJ.
3. The third group assessed the character of the institutional arrangements
established by the new ILBI, to see whether institutional arrangements should
be rooted in a global, region/sectoral and/or hybrid approach.
These three issues form, in our view, three pillars of the structural development
and practical significance of the ILBI, on which this chapter elaborates.
Considering the wide range of issues that arise when discussing the new ILBI,
from science to law and including governance, institutions and economic interests, it
is important to mention that this chapter does not provide an exhaustive review of the
current developments impacting the future ILBI. It aims at providing a glance at
some issues, which, we believe, shape the ILBI’s content and structure, and are at the
heart of its development.
2 Relationship Between the ILBI and the Law of the Sea
Convention
This section analyses the relationship between the ILBI and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The PrepCom proposed that the new
ILBI should not “prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the
[UNCLOS]”; and that it “shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a
manner consistent with” the UNCLOS; similar statements one finds at all stages of
the BBNJ process.
18
Things get trickier once we enter into the details and technicalities of this special
relationship. For example, the President of the IGC openly wondered whether the
relationship between the ILBI and the UNCLOS should be dealt with in a single
generally applicable provision, or whether different elements of the package deal
required specific provisions regulating the relationship between that specfic part of
the ILBI and the UNCLOS.
19 And an agreement needed to be reached on what to do
with those States not party to the UNCLOS.
20 Many of them actively participate in
the negotiations leading to the new ILBI. At the first session of the conference, the
delegations from Colombia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Iran, and Turkey emphasized that
18 PrepCom (2017), para 4. See also DOALOS (2017b), para 18, IGC (2018b), para 3, and IGC
(2018c).
19 IGC (2018b), para 3.4.2.
20 States not party to the UNCLOS include Colombia, Libya, Turkey, the United States, and
Venezuela.
354
C. Blanchard et al.
working group focused on the relationship between these two treaties.
2. The second group looked at biodiversity itself, through the relationship between
the CBD and the ILBI, notably on how the instruments could complement one
another in relation to ABNJ.
3. The third group assessed the character of the institutional arrangements
established by the new ILBI, to see whether institutional arrangements should
be rooted in a global, region/sectoral and/or hybrid approach.
These three issues form, in our view, three pillars of the structural development
and practical significance of the ILBI, on which this chapter elaborates.
Considering the wide range of issues that arise when discussing the new ILBI,
from science to law and including governance, institutions and economic interests, it
is important to mention that this chapter does not provide an exhaustive review of the
current developments impacting the future ILBI. It aims at providing a glance at
some issues, which, we believe, shape the ILBI’s content and structure, and are at the
heart of its development.
2 Relationship Between the ILBI and the Law of the Sea
Convention
This section analyses the relationship between the ILBI and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The PrepCom proposed that the new
ILBI should not “prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the
[UNCLOS]”; and that it “shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a
manner consistent with” the UNCLOS; similar statements one finds at all stages of
the BBNJ process.
18
Things get trickier once we enter into the details and technicalities of this special
relationship. For example, the President of the IGC openly wondered whether the
relationship between the ILBI and the UNCLOS should be dealt with in a single
generally applicable provision, or whether different elements of the package deal
required specific provisions regulating the relationship between that specfic part of
the ILBI and the UNCLOS.
19 And an agreement needed to be reached on what to do
with those States not party to the UNCLOS.
20 Many of them actively participate in
the negotiations leading to the new ILBI. At the first session of the conference, the
delegations from Colombia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Iran, and Turkey emphasized that
18 PrepCom (2017), para 4. See also DOALOS (2017b), para 18, IGC (2018b), para 3, and IGC
(2018c).
19 IGC (2018b), para 3.4.2.
20 States not party to the UNCLOS include Colombia, Libya, Turkey, the United States, and
Venezuela.
354
C. Blanchard et al.