field its ‘conservative option’.
196 Thus, it appears very likely that Russia determined,
in late 2017, to cease Chernomorneftegaz’s operations at some point in 2018.
At time of writing, this halt has not yet been put into effect. On 3 September 2018,
Ukrainian media reported that the Crimean Ministry of Fuel and Energy had
‘suspended’ the stop order: this move followed the Ministry’s failure to reach
agreement with local authorities,
197 and the resignation in March 2018 of
Chernomorneftegaz’s General Director, the stop order’s signatory.
198 However,
analysts suggest that production in the Odessa field continues to decline, and that
the company’s actions—including plans to liquidate wells in 2018–2020—are
consistent with an intention to halt production in the medium-term.
199
In the context of the dispute between Russia and Ukraine, such a stop order—
whether finally effected or not—is a highly significant, and perhaps surprising,
decision. It would appear to render nugatory the core of Ukraine’s claim against
Russia for unlawful economic activities in the Black Sea, as this very behaviour has
ceased. This is because the extent of Russia’s alleged breach is geographically
limited to the Odessa field, which is located closer to mainland Ukraine than it is
to Crimea (155 km from the closest point on the Crimean coast, and only 100 km
from the Ukrainian coast).
200 As such, it is the only exploited field that would fall on
the Ukrainian side of a putative equidistance line drawn between Ukraine and
Crimea, and thus within Ukraine’s EEZ.
201 More specifically, Ukraine’s EEZ and
continental shelf overlap with any zone potentially extending from Crimea.
202
Delimitation has not occurred following the 2014 annexation, as Ukraine maintains
that Crimea remains Ukrainian territory.
203 Although UNCLOS merely requires an
196 Ministry for Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea, ‘Pojasnitel'naja zapiska po
osnovnym parametram prognoza social'no-jekonomicheskogo razvitija na 2018 god i planovyj
period 2019 i 2020 godov v Respublike Krym’, 12 October 2017: http://budget.rk.ifinmon.ru/
dokumenty/prochie-dokumenty, p. 10.
197 Alina Fadeeva, ‘Pochemu Rossija prodolzhaet dobychu na spornom Odesskom mestorozhdenii
v Krymu’ RBK Group (online), 3 September 2018: https://www.rbc.ru/business/03/09/2018/
5b7c0ac89a794735ea890564; ‘RF peredumala ostanavlivat’ dobychu gaza v okkupirovannom
Krymu’ LIGA.net (online), 3 September 2018: https://biz.liga.net/ekonomika/tek/novosti/rfperedumala-ostanavlivat-dobychu-gaza-v-okkupirovannom-krymu.
198 Lyudmila Podobedova, Alina Fadeeva and Ivan Tkachev, ‘“Chernomorneftegaz” otvetil za
zaderzhku’ RBK Group (online) 26 March 2018: https://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2018/03/27/
5ab8cb709a794742788767a5; ‘Rukovodstvo “Chernomorneftegaza” podalo v otstavku’ RIA
Novosti (online), 27 March 2018: https://ria.ru/economy/20180327/1517344227.html.
199 Fadeeva, ‘Pochemu Rossija prodolzhaet dobychu’, supra note 197.
200 Chernomorneftegaz, ‘Nasha operacionnaja dejatel'nost’ onlajn’ (2018): http://gas.crimea.ru/
map/23-novosti/69-karta.
201 ‘Kiev taking Moscow to court: Who will get Black Sea gas?’ Eurasia Daily (online), 1 September
2016: https://eadaily.com/en/news/2016/09/01/kiev-taking-moscow-to-court-who-will-get-blacksea-gas.
202 UNCLOS, Art. 74.
203 Menkiszak (2016), p. 89.
310
G. Kynaston and R. Brown
196 Thus, it appears very likely that Russia determined,
in late 2017, to cease Chernomorneftegaz’s operations at some point in 2018.
At time of writing, this halt has not yet been put into effect. On 3 September 2018,
Ukrainian media reported that the Crimean Ministry of Fuel and Energy had
‘suspended’ the stop order: this move followed the Ministry’s failure to reach
agreement with local authorities,
197 and the resignation in March 2018 of
Chernomorneftegaz’s General Director, the stop order’s signatory.
198 However,
analysts suggest that production in the Odessa field continues to decline, and that
the company’s actions—including plans to liquidate wells in 2018–2020—are
consistent with an intention to halt production in the medium-term.
199
In the context of the dispute between Russia and Ukraine, such a stop order—
whether finally effected or not—is a highly significant, and perhaps surprising,
decision. It would appear to render nugatory the core of Ukraine’s claim against
Russia for unlawful economic activities in the Black Sea, as this very behaviour has
ceased. This is because the extent of Russia’s alleged breach is geographically
limited to the Odessa field, which is located closer to mainland Ukraine than it is
to Crimea (155 km from the closest point on the Crimean coast, and only 100 km
from the Ukrainian coast).
200 As such, it is the only exploited field that would fall on
the Ukrainian side of a putative equidistance line drawn between Ukraine and
Crimea, and thus within Ukraine’s EEZ.
201 More specifically, Ukraine’s EEZ and
continental shelf overlap with any zone potentially extending from Crimea.
202
Delimitation has not occurred following the 2014 annexation, as Ukraine maintains
that Crimea remains Ukrainian territory.
203 Although UNCLOS merely requires an
196 Ministry for Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea, ‘Pojasnitel'naja zapiska po
osnovnym parametram prognoza social'no-jekonomicheskogo razvitija na 2018 god i planovyj
period 2019 i 2020 godov v Respublike Krym’, 12 October 2017: http://budget.rk.ifinmon.ru/
dokumenty/prochie-dokumenty, p. 10.
197 Alina Fadeeva, ‘Pochemu Rossija prodolzhaet dobychu na spornom Odesskom mestorozhdenii
v Krymu’ RBK Group (online), 3 September 2018: https://www.rbc.ru/business/03/09/2018/
5b7c0ac89a794735ea890564; ‘RF peredumala ostanavlivat’ dobychu gaza v okkupirovannom
Krymu’ LIGA.net (online), 3 September 2018: https://biz.liga.net/ekonomika/tek/novosti/rfperedumala-ostanavlivat-dobychu-gaza-v-okkupirovannom-krymu.
198 Lyudmila Podobedova, Alina Fadeeva and Ivan Tkachev, ‘“Chernomorneftegaz” otvetil za
zaderzhku’ RBK Group (online) 26 March 2018: https://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2018/03/27/
5ab8cb709a794742788767a5; ‘Rukovodstvo “Chernomorneftegaza” podalo v otstavku’ RIA
Novosti (online), 27 March 2018: https://ria.ru/economy/20180327/1517344227.html.
199 Fadeeva, ‘Pochemu Rossija prodolzhaet dobychu’, supra note 197.
200 Chernomorneftegaz, ‘Nasha operacionnaja dejatel'nost’ onlajn’ (2018): http://gas.crimea.ru/
map/23-novosti/69-karta.
201 ‘Kiev taking Moscow to court: Who will get Black Sea gas?’ Eurasia Daily (online), 1 September
2016: https://eadaily.com/en/news/2016/09/01/kiev-taking-moscow-to-court-who-will-get-blacksea-gas.
202 UNCLOS, Art. 74.
203 Menkiszak (2016), p. 89.
310
G. Kynaston and R. Brown