optimization of food supply chains, generation of employment and elevated income
in various segments of society; (iv) and the development and concrete use of
technological know-how on system-building in inhospitable areas, as well as on
clean energy production and logistic support capacity for long distances.
24
Brazilian practice, in this sense, is not much different from that of other countries.
25 Due to islands’ general economic and geopolitical relevance, it can be
inferred that States, as rational actors,
26 are invariably expected to claim an EEZ
and continental shelves as a result of every offshore rocky formation under national
sovereignty which is uncovered during high tide. For instance, France claims
extended maritime spaces around the Clipperton Island, an uninhabited 6 km
2 atoll
in the Pacific, 1250 km southwest of Mexico.
27 Japan also claims such zones in
relation to the Okinotorishima Island (and other smaller formations), of 8 km
2 and
uninhabited, to the point of directing considerable funds to marine conservation
measures on the island—to the discontent of South Korea and China. The latter has
similar practice in the South China Sea and other places, yet in larger and more
impressive magnitudes.
28 One of the few exceptions to such craving for greater
jurisdiction seaward is offered by the United Kingdom which, since ratifying
UNCLOS, no longer claims an EEZ nor a continental shelf of the Rockall and
Shag rocks, located within the EEZ of the Falkland Islands.
29
However, to claim does not necessarily mean to have the right to. The next
section of the chapter scrutinizes whether, in theory, the ability of the São Pedro and
São Paulo Archipelago to generate an EEZ and a continental shelf of its own could
be legally challenged internationally, and what could Brazil’s course of action be in
order to maintain extended functional jurisdiction around the Archipelago.
24 Viana et al. (2009), pp. 22–23.
25 Several States have made features allegedly not capable of sustaining human habitation or
economic life of their own subject of claims to an EEZ and (outer) continental shelf. Examples
include: France, and the islands in French Polynesia, Kerguelen Islands and Crozet Islands,
Clipperton Island, and Amsterdam Island. Australia and the Heard Island and McDonald islands.
Fiji and the Ceva-i-Ra. Kiribati and the McKean Island. Mexico and the Clarion Island. Venezuela
and the Aves Island. Norway and the Bouvet Island. Portugal and the Selvagens islands. United
States and the Maro Reef, Palmyra Atoll, Kingman Reef, and Howland and Baker Islands.
26 On the school of rational choice applied to International Law, see Goldsmith and Posner (2005),
p. 10.
27 The French Maritime Zone Delimitation Instrument containing the coordinates of the Clipperton
Island and its EEZ can be found online at http://www.un.org/depts/los.
28 Song (2010), p. 663.
29 See the UK statements reprinted in British Year Book of International Law 68 (1997): 599–600.
In addition, see Jayakumar et al. (2014), p. 108. To that measure, one could contrast the UK’s claim
to exaggerated continental shelf outer limits, beyond 200 nm, around the Ascension Island, which
prompted the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to recommend otherwise. See
Recommendations prepared by the Subcommission established for the consideration of the Submission made by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in respect of Ascension
Island, 31 March 2010, para. 53. Available at:
15 The Legal Status of the São Pedro and São Paulo Archipelago in Light of Article. . .
271
in various segments of society; (iv) and the development and concrete use of
technological know-how on system-building in inhospitable areas, as well as on
clean energy production and logistic support capacity for long distances.
24
Brazilian practice, in this sense, is not much different from that of other countries.
25 Due to islands’ general economic and geopolitical relevance, it can be
inferred that States, as rational actors,
26 are invariably expected to claim an EEZ
and continental shelves as a result of every offshore rocky formation under national
sovereignty which is uncovered during high tide. For instance, France claims
extended maritime spaces around the Clipperton Island, an uninhabited 6 km
2 atoll
in the Pacific, 1250 km southwest of Mexico.
27 Japan also claims such zones in
relation to the Okinotorishima Island (and other smaller formations), of 8 km
2 and
uninhabited, to the point of directing considerable funds to marine conservation
measures on the island—to the discontent of South Korea and China. The latter has
similar practice in the South China Sea and other places, yet in larger and more
impressive magnitudes.
28 One of the few exceptions to such craving for greater
jurisdiction seaward is offered by the United Kingdom which, since ratifying
UNCLOS, no longer claims an EEZ nor a continental shelf of the Rockall and
Shag rocks, located within the EEZ of the Falkland Islands.
29
However, to claim does not necessarily mean to have the right to. The next
section of the chapter scrutinizes whether, in theory, the ability of the São Pedro and
São Paulo Archipelago to generate an EEZ and a continental shelf of its own could
be legally challenged internationally, and what could Brazil’s course of action be in
order to maintain extended functional jurisdiction around the Archipelago.
24 Viana et al. (2009), pp. 22–23.
25 Several States have made features allegedly not capable of sustaining human habitation or
economic life of their own subject of claims to an EEZ and (outer) continental shelf. Examples
include: France, and the islands in French Polynesia, Kerguelen Islands and Crozet Islands,
Clipperton Island, and Amsterdam Island. Australia and the Heard Island and McDonald islands.
Fiji and the Ceva-i-Ra. Kiribati and the McKean Island. Mexico and the Clarion Island. Venezuela
and the Aves Island. Norway and the Bouvet Island. Portugal and the Selvagens islands. United
States and the Maro Reef, Palmyra Atoll, Kingman Reef, and Howland and Baker Islands.
26 On the school of rational choice applied to International Law, see Goldsmith and Posner (2005),
p. 10.
27 The French Maritime Zone Delimitation Instrument containing the coordinates of the Clipperton
Island and its EEZ can be found online at http://www.un.org/depts/los.
28 Song (2010), p. 663.
29 See the UK statements reprinted in British Year Book of International Law 68 (1997): 599–600.
In addition, see Jayakumar et al. (2014), p. 108. To that measure, one could contrast the UK’s claim
to exaggerated continental shelf outer limits, beyond 200 nm, around the Ascension Island, which
prompted the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to recommend otherwise. See
Recommendations prepared by the Subcommission established for the consideration of the Submission made by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in respect of Ascension
Island, 31 March 2010, para. 53. Available at:
15 The Legal Status of the São Pedro and São Paulo Archipelago in Light of Article. . .
271