that is conducive to facilitating coordination in this semi-enclosed sea.
69 By denying
extended maritime zones to the small islands, the maritime boundary disputes are
arguably simplified and resolution of the competing claims may be more conducive.
However, the counter-view is that the outright denial of China’s position and its
concomitant rejection of the decision has diminished the likelihood of resolution of
the competing maritime claims in a cooperative manner. Reaching a conclusion that
lacked any compromise or face-saving for China may undercut the legitimacy of the
claims of the other border states that seek cooperation.
These states would all share urgency in wanting this issue resolved sooner rather
than later in the face of China’s increasing presence throughout the semi-enclosed
sea. Moreover, there would also be urgency in that each state has an interest in
ensuring their own access to the resources of the area for their own economic
development.
4.4 Stakeholders in the Decision: Non-State Parties
As a military and economic superpower, the United States, even as a non-party to
UNCLOS, is still a stakeholder in a dispute concerning the South China Sea because
of the interests it holds in supporting allies in the region, its own security interests,
and in ensuring the freedom of navigation for both military and commercial ships.
For a determination of the meaning of Article 121, the United States also had an
interest in gaining an understanding of how the language of this provision would
operate and thereby affect the United States’ islands. In particular, the United States
claims extended maritime zones around the small and isolated Johnston Atoll,
located between the Marshall Islands and Hawai’i.
70 Further, the United States
was highly engaged in the negotiations of UNCLOS, and continues to engage in
debates within the United States polity on the possible ratification of the treaty.
71
In terms of identifying the United States’ interests as a stakeholder in the
resolution of this issue, it can be observed that its military and economic status
indicates the coercive and utilitarian power it holds, similar to China. However, the
United States lacks normative power or legitimacy to the extent that these factors are
aligned with participation in UNCLOS as a party that has accepted both the rights
and obligations enshrined throughout that treaty. Arguably, the United States has
similar normative power to any other state asserting adherence to international law
but its position in this regard is undermined by its failure to ratify UNCLOS. For the
United States, there may be urgency in the resolution of the claims to the extent that
69 As required under Article 123 of UNCLOS, which reads in part: ‘States bordering an enclosed or
semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the
performance of their duties under this Convention.’
70 See Klein (2016), p. 28.
71 For recent discussion on the US position, see Smith (2017).
254
N. Klein
69 By denying
extended maritime zones to the small islands, the maritime boundary disputes are
arguably simplified and resolution of the competing claims may be more conducive.
However, the counter-view is that the outright denial of China’s position and its
concomitant rejection of the decision has diminished the likelihood of resolution of
the competing maritime claims in a cooperative manner. Reaching a conclusion that
lacked any compromise or face-saving for China may undercut the legitimacy of the
claims of the other border states that seek cooperation.
These states would all share urgency in wanting this issue resolved sooner rather
than later in the face of China’s increasing presence throughout the semi-enclosed
sea. Moreover, there would also be urgency in that each state has an interest in
ensuring their own access to the resources of the area for their own economic
development.
4.4 Stakeholders in the Decision: Non-State Parties
As a military and economic superpower, the United States, even as a non-party to
UNCLOS, is still a stakeholder in a dispute concerning the South China Sea because
of the interests it holds in supporting allies in the region, its own security interests,
and in ensuring the freedom of navigation for both military and commercial ships.
For a determination of the meaning of Article 121, the United States also had an
interest in gaining an understanding of how the language of this provision would
operate and thereby affect the United States’ islands. In particular, the United States
claims extended maritime zones around the small and isolated Johnston Atoll,
located between the Marshall Islands and Hawai’i.
70 Further, the United States
was highly engaged in the negotiations of UNCLOS, and continues to engage in
debates within the United States polity on the possible ratification of the treaty.
71
In terms of identifying the United States’ interests as a stakeholder in the
resolution of this issue, it can be observed that its military and economic status
indicates the coercive and utilitarian power it holds, similar to China. However, the
United States lacks normative power or legitimacy to the extent that these factors are
aligned with participation in UNCLOS as a party that has accepted both the rights
and obligations enshrined throughout that treaty. Arguably, the United States has
similar normative power to any other state asserting adherence to international law
but its position in this regard is undermined by its failure to ratify UNCLOS. For the
United States, there may be urgency in the resolution of the claims to the extent that
69 As required under Article 123 of UNCLOS, which reads in part: ‘States bordering an enclosed or
semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the
performance of their duties under this Convention.’
70 See Klein (2016), p. 28.
71 For recent discussion on the US position, see Smith (2017).
254
N. Klein