programmes. At the height of the threatening exchange between President Trump
and Chairman Kim in 2017, then United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
argued for measures approaching a maritime blockade, remarking ‘in addition to
implementing all UN sanctions, the international community must take additional
measures to enhance maritime security, including the right to interdict maritime
traffic’ to North Korea.
74 While diplomacy has for the moment put an end to such
proposals, current United States Secretary of State Michael Pompeo has nonetheless
recently categorized North Korea and Iran together as ‘outlaw regimes—rogue states
that defy international norms’.
75
As the diplomatic community explores coercive options for peaceful resolution of
these issues, the economic pressure in the maritime sector will be executed not only
by nation states or international organizations but by compliance from the shipping
industry. Despite the awkward position of being used as a tool of international law
enforcement, shipping industry participants, like other commercial actors, will be
careful to react. To do so, they must strategically respond to sometimes disjointed
geopolitical discourse by adapting their commercial dealings to the realities of
modern sanctions risk.
References
Allen C (2019) The peacetime right of approach and visit and effective security council sanctions
enforcement at sea. Int Law Stud 95:400–429
Anderson HE (1996) III, The nationality of ships and flags of convenience: economics, politics, and
alternatives. Tulane Marit Law J 21:139–170
Blackwill RD, Harris JM (2017) War by other means. Geoeconomics and statecraft. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge
Early BR (2015) Busted sanctions: explaining why economic sanctions fail. Stanford University
Press
Fink MD (2013) Maritime embargo operations: naval implementation of UN sanctions at sea under
Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. Neth Int Law Rev:73–92
Friedman U (2012) Smart sanctions: a short history. Foreign Policy:1–7
Huish R (2017) How to sink the hermit kingdom: improving maritime sanctions against North
Korea. Can Nav Rev 13(2):5–10
Joyner CC (2003) United Nations sanctions after Iraq: looking back to see ahead. Chic J Int Law
4:329–354
Kanji L (2017) Moving targets: the evolution and future of smart sanctions. Harv Int Rev:1–13
Klein N (2011) Maritime security and the law of the sea. Oxford University Press
Kraska J (2019) Maritime interdiction of North Korean ships under UN sanctions. Berkeley J Int
Law 37:369–392
Ma Y (2016) Enforcing the United Nations Security Council’s Arms Embargo on the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea: a case study of the legal consequences of the Cong Chon Gan
Incident. Chin (Taiwan) Yearb Int Law Aff 34:104–140
74 Reuters, US Top Diplomat Urges New Steps to Press North Korea on Weapons Program,
November 28, 2017.
75 Pompeo (2018).
9 The Impact of UN Sanctions on Commercial Shipping Activities
173
and Chairman Kim in 2017, then United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
argued for measures approaching a maritime blockade, remarking ‘in addition to
implementing all UN sanctions, the international community must take additional
measures to enhance maritime security, including the right to interdict maritime
traffic’ to North Korea.
74 While diplomacy has for the moment put an end to such
proposals, current United States Secretary of State Michael Pompeo has nonetheless
recently categorized North Korea and Iran together as ‘outlaw regimes—rogue states
that defy international norms’.
75
As the diplomatic community explores coercive options for peaceful resolution of
these issues, the economic pressure in the maritime sector will be executed not only
by nation states or international organizations but by compliance from the shipping
industry. Despite the awkward position of being used as a tool of international law
enforcement, shipping industry participants, like other commercial actors, will be
careful to react. To do so, they must strategically respond to sometimes disjointed
geopolitical discourse by adapting their commercial dealings to the realities of
modern sanctions risk.
References
Allen C (2019) The peacetime right of approach and visit and effective security council sanctions
enforcement at sea. Int Law Stud 95:400–429
Anderson HE (1996) III, The nationality of ships and flags of convenience: economics, politics, and
alternatives. Tulane Marit Law J 21:139–170
Blackwill RD, Harris JM (2017) War by other means. Geoeconomics and statecraft. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge
Early BR (2015) Busted sanctions: explaining why economic sanctions fail. Stanford University
Press
Fink MD (2013) Maritime embargo operations: naval implementation of UN sanctions at sea under
Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter. Neth Int Law Rev:73–92
Friedman U (2012) Smart sanctions: a short history. Foreign Policy:1–7
Huish R (2017) How to sink the hermit kingdom: improving maritime sanctions against North
Korea. Can Nav Rev 13(2):5–10
Joyner CC (2003) United Nations sanctions after Iraq: looking back to see ahead. Chic J Int Law
4:329–354
Kanji L (2017) Moving targets: the evolution and future of smart sanctions. Harv Int Rev:1–13
Klein N (2011) Maritime security and the law of the sea. Oxford University Press
Kraska J (2019) Maritime interdiction of North Korean ships under UN sanctions. Berkeley J Int
Law 37:369–392
Ma Y (2016) Enforcing the United Nations Security Council’s Arms Embargo on the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea: a case study of the legal consequences of the Cong Chon Gan
Incident. Chin (Taiwan) Yearb Int Law Aff 34:104–140
74 Reuters, US Top Diplomat Urges New Steps to Press North Korea on Weapons Program,
November 28, 2017.
75 Pompeo (2018).
9 The Impact of UN Sanctions on Commercial Shipping Activities
173