In recent years, the United Nations Security Council has utilized a variety of
maritime sanctions in attempts to pressure states such as the Islamic Republic of Iran
(Iran) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) to abandon
illicit weapons programmes. These sanctions have included regulating commercial
shipping by blacklisting vessels, prohibiting import and export of certain cargo,
authorizing vessel inspections and interdiction, and even outlawing vessel bunkering
and marine insurance coverage. The threat of sanctions has been a disincentive for
states to violate international norms, and the possibility of their reversal serves as an
incentive for diplomatic engagement. Meanwhile, impacted commercial actors have
been caught in the middle, forced to adapt as the regulations evolve.
With contemporary geopolitical challenges as the backdrop, this chapter explores
the interplay between multilateral economic sanctions and shipping practice. It first
examines UN Security Council authority to impose measures of economic coercion
in accordance with the UN Charter. It then explores recent strategies used by the
Security Council to target shipping activities. The chapter then turns to responses
within the shipping industry, by considering industry attempts to comply with and
adapt to these sanctions. For illustrative purposes, the chapter focuses primarily on
contemporary sanctions implemented by UN Security Council Resolutions from the
turn of the century to the present. Consequently, it focuses predominantly on Iran
and North Korea, which have been two of the most heavily sanctioned states during
this period that have not been simultaneously subject to conventional military
intervention. In an effort to concentrate on multilateral sanctions, this chapter avoids
a detailed analysis of supplementary sanctions implemented by other supranational
or national entities, including the European Union and the United States.
2 The UN Security Council and Its Power to Impose
Economic Sanctions
Chapter V of the UN Charter grants the Security Council a central role in
maintaining international peace and security.
1 The Security Council is made up of
fifteen members, including the five permanent members of China, France, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The other ten non-permanent members
rotate for two-year terms. While Article 2(7) of the UN Charter commits UN organs
not to ‘intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state’, the same document gives substantial power to the Security Council.
Despite the limited representation of this exclusive group, under Article 25, ‘[t]he
1 Charter of the United Nations And the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Chapter V,
http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html. Article 24 reads, ‘In order to ensure
prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf’.
160
R. L. Kilpatrick
maritime sanctions in attempts to pressure states such as the Islamic Republic of Iran
(Iran) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) to abandon
illicit weapons programmes. These sanctions have included regulating commercial
shipping by blacklisting vessels, prohibiting import and export of certain cargo,
authorizing vessel inspections and interdiction, and even outlawing vessel bunkering
and marine insurance coverage. The threat of sanctions has been a disincentive for
states to violate international norms, and the possibility of their reversal serves as an
incentive for diplomatic engagement. Meanwhile, impacted commercial actors have
been caught in the middle, forced to adapt as the regulations evolve.
With contemporary geopolitical challenges as the backdrop, this chapter explores
the interplay between multilateral economic sanctions and shipping practice. It first
examines UN Security Council authority to impose measures of economic coercion
in accordance with the UN Charter. It then explores recent strategies used by the
Security Council to target shipping activities. The chapter then turns to responses
within the shipping industry, by considering industry attempts to comply with and
adapt to these sanctions. For illustrative purposes, the chapter focuses primarily on
contemporary sanctions implemented by UN Security Council Resolutions from the
turn of the century to the present. Consequently, it focuses predominantly on Iran
and North Korea, which have been two of the most heavily sanctioned states during
this period that have not been simultaneously subject to conventional military
intervention. In an effort to concentrate on multilateral sanctions, this chapter avoids
a detailed analysis of supplementary sanctions implemented by other supranational
or national entities, including the European Union and the United States.
2 The UN Security Council and Its Power to Impose
Economic Sanctions
Chapter V of the UN Charter grants the Security Council a central role in
maintaining international peace and security.
1 The Security Council is made up of
fifteen members, including the five permanent members of China, France, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The other ten non-permanent members
rotate for two-year terms. While Article 2(7) of the UN Charter commits UN organs
not to ‘intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state’, the same document gives substantial power to the Security Council.
Despite the limited representation of this exclusive group, under Article 25, ‘[t]he
1 Charter of the United Nations And the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Chapter V,
http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html. Article 24 reads, ‘In order to ensure
prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf’.
160
R. L. Kilpatrick