Learning from the EU, Indonesia could make use of any available IUU vessels list
as a basis of the refusal of catch or even port access.
95 The lists could include
Indonesia’s listing, ASEAN RFVR, FAO Global Record, RPOA-IUU’s and
RFMO’s lists. The absence of valid catch certificates should also give the signal
that the vessel might be an IUU vessel; though, identification of an IUU vessel would
require more investigation and factual evidence rather than a mere absence of a
certificate. Unfortunately, the more specific ministerial regulation on catch certificates does not establish any sanction for non-compliance.
96 Based on its ministerial
regulation, Indonesia would only ban future imports from a vessel when the vessel
does not utilise its import permit according to its purpose
97 and fails to provide a
report on its import and export activity to the competent authority.
98
In the end, vessels are mere instruments. They move according to those who fund
and operate them. Thus, traceability is critical to identify parties involved in
harvesting, transhipping, and marketing IUU catches. It often depends on the
willingness of States involved to have an information-sharing system that can verify
the origin of the catch and indicate whether the catch was legally captured.
The enforceability of multilateral catch documentation schemes is more comprehensive and stronger than unilateral schemes.
99 Therefore, the establishment of an
electronic information-sharing system of catch certificates among relevant States is
encouraged to enhance effectiveness. After the enactment of the ASEAN Guidelines
on IUU fishing in 2015, ASEAN Catch Documentation Schemes [ACDS] was
introduced in 2017. Like the ASEAN Guidelines on IUU fishing, ACDS also refers
to the EU-IUU Regulation. ACDS recognises the influence of market-based measures by the EU on Southeast Asian seafood trade and answers the member States’
need for a certification scheme that meets the importing countries’ standards but in a
simplified fashion.
100 Considering Indonesia may have difficulties in articulating
and implementing its catch certificate schemes, this ASEAN initiative could be a
way to enhance its capacity as well as other ASEAN member States.
101
95 See EC Regulation No. 1005/2008, Art. 18(1).
96 See Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries’ Regulation No. PER/13/MEN/2012 on the Catch
Certificate.
97 Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries’ Regulation No 74/PERMEN-KP/2016 on the Quality
and Security Control of Fisheries Products entering Indonesian Territories, Art. 20 paras.
(1) and (3).
98 Id., Art. 29 and Art. 30(1).
99 Hosch and Blaha (2017), p. 6.
100 ASEAN Catch Documentation Scheme for Marine Capture Fisheries.
101 The ASEAN member States’ shortcomings in implementing EU-IUU Regulation was seen
during Fisheries Consultative Group of the ASEAN-SEAFDEC Strategic Partnership in December
2010. SEAFDEC, therefore, was asked to take a lead role in enhancing ASEAN member States’
capacity to comply with EU-IUU Regulation.
7 Market-Based Measures Against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in. . .
135
as a basis of the refusal of catch or even port access.
95 The lists could include
Indonesia’s listing, ASEAN RFVR, FAO Global Record, RPOA-IUU’s and
RFMO’s lists. The absence of valid catch certificates should also give the signal
that the vessel might be an IUU vessel; though, identification of an IUU vessel would
require more investigation and factual evidence rather than a mere absence of a
certificate. Unfortunately, the more specific ministerial regulation on catch certificates does not establish any sanction for non-compliance.
96 Based on its ministerial
regulation, Indonesia would only ban future imports from a vessel when the vessel
does not utilise its import permit according to its purpose
97 and fails to provide a
report on its import and export activity to the competent authority.
98
In the end, vessels are mere instruments. They move according to those who fund
and operate them. Thus, traceability is critical to identify parties involved in
harvesting, transhipping, and marketing IUU catches. It often depends on the
willingness of States involved to have an information-sharing system that can verify
the origin of the catch and indicate whether the catch was legally captured.
The enforceability of multilateral catch documentation schemes is more comprehensive and stronger than unilateral schemes.
99 Therefore, the establishment of an
electronic information-sharing system of catch certificates among relevant States is
encouraged to enhance effectiveness. After the enactment of the ASEAN Guidelines
on IUU fishing in 2015, ASEAN Catch Documentation Schemes [ACDS] was
introduced in 2017. Like the ASEAN Guidelines on IUU fishing, ACDS also refers
to the EU-IUU Regulation. ACDS recognises the influence of market-based measures by the EU on Southeast Asian seafood trade and answers the member States’
need for a certification scheme that meets the importing countries’ standards but in a
simplified fashion.
100 Considering Indonesia may have difficulties in articulating
and implementing its catch certificate schemes, this ASEAN initiative could be a
way to enhance its capacity as well as other ASEAN member States.
101
95 See EC Regulation No. 1005/2008, Art. 18(1).
96 See Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries’ Regulation No. PER/13/MEN/2012 on the Catch
Certificate.
97 Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries’ Regulation No 74/PERMEN-KP/2016 on the Quality
and Security Control of Fisheries Products entering Indonesian Territories, Art. 20 paras.
(1) and (3).
98 Id., Art. 29 and Art. 30(1).
99 Hosch and Blaha (2017), p. 6.
100 ASEAN Catch Documentation Scheme for Marine Capture Fisheries.
101 The ASEAN member States’ shortcomings in implementing EU-IUU Regulation was seen
during Fisheries Consultative Group of the ASEAN-SEAFDEC Strategic Partnership in December
2010. SEAFDEC, therefore, was asked to take a lead role in enhancing ASEAN member States’
capacity to comply with EU-IUU Regulation.
7 Market-Based Measures Against Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in. . .
135