as a flag State, Indonesia shall ensure that its vessels do not engage in IUU fishing or
otherwise the EU third State’s engagement procedures could kick in.
The EU-IUU Regulation is one of the exemplary market-related measures capable of pressuring States to perform their duty in fighting IUU fishing. Even though it
does not directly bind Indonesia, it imports some of its provisions from the IPOAIUU and has referred to UNCLOS as the basis of its measures against third-party
states.
62 The European Commission had even identified Cambodia as a
non-cooperating country in 2012 on the basis of a customary character of a specific
UNCLOS provision.
63 Some authors had argued that the measures adopted in the
EU IUU Regulation are, at least on paper, generally consistent with international
fisheries instruments and RFMOs practices, except for the listing of non-cooperating
third countries and associated trade restrictions, which are considered as a progressive development of international responses to IUU fishing.
64
3.1 Identification of IUU Fishing Vessels
Developing a list of IUU fishing vessels can be a starting point to trigger other
market-related measures. It involves putting in place procedures for sighting, listing
and deletion of vessels presumably engaged in IUU fishing. This measure has been
practised by several RFMOs as it is consistent with the IPOA-IUU provision to
establish records of vessels engaged in IUU fishing through relevant RFMOs.
65 The
IPOA-IUU even makes numerous references to RFMOs, as they are arguably the
heart of the IPOA-IUU’s market-related measures.
66 It specifically calls for State
actions upon an identification stage by an RFMO. Paragraph 66 of the IPOA-IUU
provides:
States should take all steps necessary, consistent with international law, to prevent fish
caught by vessels identified by the relevant regional fisheries management organization to
have been engaged in IUU fishing being traded or imported into their territories. The
identification of the vessels by the regional fisheries management organization should be
made through agreed procedures in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.
[. . .]
67
Listing a vessel on IUU records would have trade consequences on the vessel, for
example, denial of fishing opportunities and port access or refusal of catch. Thus,
inclusion on the IUU vessel list will be a significant disincentive to the IUU vessels
because it will inevitably force the vessels to comply or to seek an alternative identity
62 Rosello (2017), pp. 306, 308.
63 Ibid.
64 Tsamenyi et al. (2010), p. 30.
65 IPOA-IUU, para. 81.4.
66 Palma et al. (2010), p. 193.
67 IPOA-IUU, para. 66.
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D. Liliansa
otherwise the EU third State’s engagement procedures could kick in.
The EU-IUU Regulation is one of the exemplary market-related measures capable of pressuring States to perform their duty in fighting IUU fishing. Even though it
does not directly bind Indonesia, it imports some of its provisions from the IPOAIUU and has referred to UNCLOS as the basis of its measures against third-party
states.
62 The European Commission had even identified Cambodia as a
non-cooperating country in 2012 on the basis of a customary character of a specific
UNCLOS provision.
63 Some authors had argued that the measures adopted in the
EU IUU Regulation are, at least on paper, generally consistent with international
fisheries instruments and RFMOs practices, except for the listing of non-cooperating
third countries and associated trade restrictions, which are considered as a progressive development of international responses to IUU fishing.
64
3.1 Identification of IUU Fishing Vessels
Developing a list of IUU fishing vessels can be a starting point to trigger other
market-related measures. It involves putting in place procedures for sighting, listing
and deletion of vessels presumably engaged in IUU fishing. This measure has been
practised by several RFMOs as it is consistent with the IPOA-IUU provision to
establish records of vessels engaged in IUU fishing through relevant RFMOs.
65 The
IPOA-IUU even makes numerous references to RFMOs, as they are arguably the
heart of the IPOA-IUU’s market-related measures.
66 It specifically calls for State
actions upon an identification stage by an RFMO. Paragraph 66 of the IPOA-IUU
provides:
States should take all steps necessary, consistent with international law, to prevent fish
caught by vessels identified by the relevant regional fisheries management organization to
have been engaged in IUU fishing being traded or imported into their territories. The
identification of the vessels by the regional fisheries management organization should be
made through agreed procedures in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.
[. . .]
67
Listing a vessel on IUU records would have trade consequences on the vessel, for
example, denial of fishing opportunities and port access or refusal of catch. Thus,
inclusion on the IUU vessel list will be a significant disincentive to the IUU vessels
because it will inevitably force the vessels to comply or to seek an alternative identity
62 Rosello (2017), pp. 306, 308.
63 Ibid.
64 Tsamenyi et al. (2010), p. 30.
65 IPOA-IUU, para. 81.4.
66 Palma et al. (2010), p. 193.
67 IPOA-IUU, para. 66.
130
D. Liliansa