The indefinite meaning to the term genuine link has also given the beneficial
owners of the IUU vessels the ability to circumvent the law while remaining hidden.
The lack of an economic connection between the flag State and the vessels has
significantly worked in favour of the IUU fishing networks. IUU fishing vessels are
very adaptive in the sense that they can change name, ownership, and even registration rapidly to avoid detection. For instance, CCAMLR listed Andrey Dolgov as
an IUU fishing vessel in October 2016; but since then, Andrey Dolgov has used three
names and flags.
27 Some authors argued that the effective strategy would be a
combination of law enforcement at sea and information gathering of the ultimate
beneficiaries on shore.
28
Operating both IUU and legitimate vessels could lower the costs of IUU fishing
than operating legitimate vessels only.
29 By owning and controlling both types of
vessels, companies can mix their illegally captured fish with their legally obtained
fish through transhipment at sea. Laundering IUU catch along with legitimately
obtained catch will allow the price of IUU fish to be higher than it should be.
There is also an indication that the owner of the seized IUU vessel will sacrifice
the vessel and abandon its crew rather than jeopardising their whole IUU network.
30
In other IUU fishing cases, the OECD report sniffed that some old and inefficient
IUU vessels may be intentionally sacrificed as decoys to distract the coastal State’s
authorities so that there will be a period for the other IUU vessels to have
uninterrupted fishing.
31 Otherwise, some companies have access to sophisticated
communications and early warning systems to avoid being caught.
32 Considering
that, Indonesian patrol vessels may not be the fastest vessels around, more modern
and faster IUU fishing vessels may easily get away from pursuit.
Even though chasing the brains of IUU fishing vessels is already challenging,
corruption is also another cost to IUU vessels operating in Indonesia that enables
their operations to remain undetected. After the arrest of the Director General of
Marine Transportation for corruption,
33 Indonesia Corruption Watch claimed that
officials in the Indonesian port authority have also received bribes in exchange of
negligence to the seaworthiness of a ship.
34 Meanwhile, the previous Director was
also arrested for corruption.
35 In other instances, Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication
Commission also found indications of corruption in the issuance of permits at the
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries.
36
27 Stop Illegal Fishing (2018).
28 Utermohlen and Kittock (2017).
29 Agnew and Barnes (2004), pp. 1–33.
30 High Seas Task Force (2006), p. 25.
31 Agnew and Barnes, Id.
32 Ibid.
33 Kompas (2017), Suap Rp 20,74 Miliar untuk Dirjen Hubla Termasuk OTT Besar KPK.
34 BBC (2017).
35 Tirto.id (2017).
36 CNN Indonesia (2017).
126
D. Liliansa
owners of the IUU vessels the ability to circumvent the law while remaining hidden.
The lack of an economic connection between the flag State and the vessels has
significantly worked in favour of the IUU fishing networks. IUU fishing vessels are
very adaptive in the sense that they can change name, ownership, and even registration rapidly to avoid detection. For instance, CCAMLR listed Andrey Dolgov as
an IUU fishing vessel in October 2016; but since then, Andrey Dolgov has used three
names and flags.
27 Some authors argued that the effective strategy would be a
combination of law enforcement at sea and information gathering of the ultimate
beneficiaries on shore.
28
Operating both IUU and legitimate vessels could lower the costs of IUU fishing
than operating legitimate vessels only.
29 By owning and controlling both types of
vessels, companies can mix their illegally captured fish with their legally obtained
fish through transhipment at sea. Laundering IUU catch along with legitimately
obtained catch will allow the price of IUU fish to be higher than it should be.
There is also an indication that the owner of the seized IUU vessel will sacrifice
the vessel and abandon its crew rather than jeopardising their whole IUU network.
30
In other IUU fishing cases, the OECD report sniffed that some old and inefficient
IUU vessels may be intentionally sacrificed as decoys to distract the coastal State’s
authorities so that there will be a period for the other IUU vessels to have
uninterrupted fishing.
31 Otherwise, some companies have access to sophisticated
communications and early warning systems to avoid being caught.
32 Considering
that, Indonesian patrol vessels may not be the fastest vessels around, more modern
and faster IUU fishing vessels may easily get away from pursuit.
Even though chasing the brains of IUU fishing vessels is already challenging,
corruption is also another cost to IUU vessels operating in Indonesia that enables
their operations to remain undetected. After the arrest of the Director General of
Marine Transportation for corruption,
33 Indonesia Corruption Watch claimed that
officials in the Indonesian port authority have also received bribes in exchange of
negligence to the seaworthiness of a ship.
34 Meanwhile, the previous Director was
also arrested for corruption.
35 In other instances, Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication
Commission also found indications of corruption in the issuance of permits at the
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries.
36
27 Stop Illegal Fishing (2018).
28 Utermohlen and Kittock (2017).
29 Agnew and Barnes (2004), pp. 1–33.
30 High Seas Task Force (2006), p. 25.
31 Agnew and Barnes, Id.
32 Ibid.
33 Kompas (2017), Suap Rp 20,74 Miliar untuk Dirjen Hubla Termasuk OTT Besar KPK.
34 BBC (2017).
35 Tirto.id (2017).
36 CNN Indonesia (2017).
126
D. Liliansa