Another key distinction concerns their institutional setting. Most RFMO/As are
entirely separate, autonomous or ‘stand-alone’ bodies that have been negotiated and
established outside the scope of an overarching intergovernmental body. This
general rule is subject to a few exceptions. The first is CCAMLR, which is part of
the Antarctic Treaty System. Its constitutive instrument—the CAMLR Convention—was largely negotiated by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties in the
context of the Second Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting. For various
reasons, however, its final text was adopted by a stand-alone diplomatic conference.
27 However, CCAMLR is by no means a ‘typical’ RFMO and Sect. 3.4.4
examines how it should be qualified. The second exception is formed by RFMOs
established under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution.
28 At present these are the
General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) and the Indian Ocean
Tuna Commission (IOTC). WECAFC could possibly become the third.
29
While RFMO/As are largely autonomous bodies, it should nevertheless be
assumed that any recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA), FAO’s Committee on Fisheries (COFI), the informal consultations of
States Parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement (ICSPs), or the (Resumed) Fish Stocks
Agreement Review Conferences specifically directed at participants of RFMO/As
will be given serious consideration by them. The UNGA’s recommendations relating
to high seas bottom-fishing were a case in point.
30 Moreover, participants of RFMO/
As with competence over straddling or highly migratory fish stocks that are also
parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement are bound by the objectives of the Agreement
as well as the features, functions and other guidance for RFMO/As set out in Articles
8–14 of the Agreement.
RFMO/As can also be distinguished on account of their species coverage. Some
only deal with one specific species (e.g. IPHC and the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)), others with specific groups of species
(e.g. the four other ‘tuna RFMOs’ that deal with various tuna and tuna-like species;
see Table 5.1 below), and yet others with all ‘residual species’ in a specific
geographical area, for instance NAFO and NEAFC.
27 See Barnes (1982).
28 Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Quebec City.
Opened for signature and entered into force on 16 October 1945, as amended. Consolidated version
available at www.fao.org/Legal.
29 See note 13 supra. The Report of the 2016 WECAFC Meeting, at para. 59, refers to the
“challenges and experiences with RFMOs established under FAO’s Constitution”. See also ‘Discussion Paper in Support of the WECAFC Strategic Reorientation Process’, 8 October 2018 (on file
with author), at Section 10. While the Regional Commission for Fisheries (RECOFI) has, pursuant
to Art. III of the Agreement for the Establishment of the Regional Commission for Fisheries
(approved by the FAO Council in November 1999; in force 26 February 2001; http://www.fao.
org/legal), the mandate to adopt legally binding conservation and management measures, it does not
seem to have used this mandate to date.
30 The most well-known are those in paras 66–71 of UNGA Res. 59/25, of 17 November 2004. See,
for instance, the pro-active approach pursued by NEAFC pursuant to these UNGA Recommendations as described in Molenaar (2005), pp. 538–539.
5 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
87
entirely separate, autonomous or ‘stand-alone’ bodies that have been negotiated and
established outside the scope of an overarching intergovernmental body. This
general rule is subject to a few exceptions. The first is CCAMLR, which is part of
the Antarctic Treaty System. Its constitutive instrument—the CAMLR Convention—was largely negotiated by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties in the
context of the Second Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting. For various
reasons, however, its final text was adopted by a stand-alone diplomatic conference.
27 However, CCAMLR is by no means a ‘typical’ RFMO and Sect. 3.4.4
examines how it should be qualified. The second exception is formed by RFMOs
established under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution.
28 At present these are the
General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) and the Indian Ocean
Tuna Commission (IOTC). WECAFC could possibly become the third.
29
While RFMO/As are largely autonomous bodies, it should nevertheless be
assumed that any recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA), FAO’s Committee on Fisheries (COFI), the informal consultations of
States Parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement (ICSPs), or the (Resumed) Fish Stocks
Agreement Review Conferences specifically directed at participants of RFMO/As
will be given serious consideration by them. The UNGA’s recommendations relating
to high seas bottom-fishing were a case in point.
30 Moreover, participants of RFMO/
As with competence over straddling or highly migratory fish stocks that are also
parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement are bound by the objectives of the Agreement
as well as the features, functions and other guidance for RFMO/As set out in Articles
8–14 of the Agreement.
RFMO/As can also be distinguished on account of their species coverage. Some
only deal with one specific species (e.g. IPHC and the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)), others with specific groups of species
(e.g. the four other ‘tuna RFMOs’ that deal with various tuna and tuna-like species;
see Table 5.1 below), and yet others with all ‘residual species’ in a specific
geographical area, for instance NAFO and NEAFC.
27 See Barnes (1982).
28 Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Quebec City.
Opened for signature and entered into force on 16 October 1945, as amended. Consolidated version
available at www.fao.org/Legal.
29 See note 13 supra. The Report of the 2016 WECAFC Meeting, at para. 59, refers to the
“challenges and experiences with RFMOs established under FAO’s Constitution”. See also ‘Discussion Paper in Support of the WECAFC Strategic Reorientation Process’, 8 October 2018 (on file
with author), at Section 10. While the Regional Commission for Fisheries (RECOFI) has, pursuant
to Art. III of the Agreement for the Establishment of the Regional Commission for Fisheries
(approved by the FAO Council in November 1999; in force 26 February 2001; http://www.fao.
org/legal), the mandate to adopt legally binding conservation and management measures, it does not
seem to have used this mandate to date.
30 The most well-known are those in paras 66–71 of UNGA Res. 59/25, of 17 November 2004. See,
for instance, the pro-active approach pursued by NEAFC pursuant to these UNGA Recommendations as described in Molenaar (2005), pp. 538–539.
5 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
87