742
M. Wang
of international cooperation in climate governance, while the non-convention cooperative mechanisms should serve as a supplement that helps advance the negotiation
process. Such a governance mechanism can not only reflect the principle of fairness
in international cooperation (the maximum degree of participation), but ensure the
efficiency of international cooperation, thanks to the focus and legal binding power
of the Convention.
4 Evolution of the International Climate Governance
Responsibility System
A dip into the evolving international climate governance pattern reveals that the 1992
Convention described two major camps: Annex I and non-Annex I, or the north and
south camps. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol further divided Annex I countries into developed countries and economies in transition, thus giving rise to three camps, namely
developed countries, developing countries and economies in transition. Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol agreed on a second commitment period in 2007 and the Bali Road
Map committing to a “dual track” approach under the Convention. The 2009 Copenhagen Accord no longer distinguished between Annex I and non-Annex I countries,
and due to the eastward expansion of the EU, the definition of economies in transition was basically cancelled. The 2015 Paris Agreement emphasized the “nationally
determined contributions” consistent in legal expressions and regardless of where
a country is, and the self-positioning differences among countries can only be seen
through their varied contributions. So far, the global climate governance pattern basically blurs the division between the north and south camps, showing a continuous,
spectral evolution.
Basically, the evolution of the Convention from 1992 to 2015 was a process of
adding responsibilities and obligations to developing countries. At first, developing
countries gave priority to economic and social development, with virtually no responsibility or obligation to mitigate climate change. After the adoption of the Copenhagen Accord, the subsequent Cancun Agreements and a series of Doha resolutions,
many developing countries proposed control or reduction targets for greenhouse gas
emissions, based on certain amount of global cooperation, including financial and
technical support from developed countries and corresponding supportive measures.
Nevertheless, the targets of developed and developing countries are listed into two
documents with different methods of supervision and assessment. The 2015 Paris
Agreement required or encouraged developing countries to propose mitigation targets
or even donate money to the Convention’s financial mechanism. In fact, many developing countries put forward contribution targets (including mitigation, adaptation,
finance, and technology goals). The goals of all countries, including developed and
developing countries, are included in the same table with generally the same methods
M. Wang
of international cooperation in climate governance, while the non-convention cooperative mechanisms should serve as a supplement that helps advance the negotiation
process. Such a governance mechanism can not only reflect the principle of fairness
in international cooperation (the maximum degree of participation), but ensure the
efficiency of international cooperation, thanks to the focus and legal binding power
of the Convention.
4 Evolution of the International Climate Governance
Responsibility System
A dip into the evolving international climate governance pattern reveals that the 1992
Convention described two major camps: Annex I and non-Annex I, or the north and
south camps. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol further divided Annex I countries into developed countries and economies in transition, thus giving rise to three camps, namely
developed countries, developing countries and economies in transition. Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol agreed on a second commitment period in 2007 and the Bali Road
Map committing to a “dual track” approach under the Convention. The 2009 Copenhagen Accord no longer distinguished between Annex I and non-Annex I countries,
and due to the eastward expansion of the EU, the definition of economies in transition was basically cancelled. The 2015 Paris Agreement emphasized the “nationally
determined contributions” consistent in legal expressions and regardless of where
a country is, and the self-positioning differences among countries can only be seen
through their varied contributions. So far, the global climate governance pattern basically blurs the division between the north and south camps, showing a continuous,
spectral evolution.
Basically, the evolution of the Convention from 1992 to 2015 was a process of
adding responsibilities and obligations to developing countries. At first, developing
countries gave priority to economic and social development, with virtually no responsibility or obligation to mitigate climate change. After the adoption of the Copenhagen Accord, the subsequent Cancun Agreements and a series of Doha resolutions,
many developing countries proposed control or reduction targets for greenhouse gas
emissions, based on certain amount of global cooperation, including financial and
technical support from developed countries and corresponding supportive measures.
Nevertheless, the targets of developed and developing countries are listed into two
documents with different methods of supervision and assessment. The 2015 Paris
Agreement required or encouraged developing countries to propose mitigation targets
or even donate money to the Convention’s financial mechanism. In fact, many developing countries put forward contribution targets (including mitigation, adaptation,
finance, and technology goals). The goals of all countries, including developed and
developing countries, are included in the same table with generally the same methods