5 Intermediary Censorship
Ethan Zuckerman
Introduction
When academics, journalists, or Internet users discuss ‘‘Internet censorship,’’ they are
usually referring to the inability of users in a given country to access a specific piece of
online content. For instance, when Internet policymakers from around the world came
to Tunisia for the 2005 World Summit on the Information Society, they discovered
that the Tunisian government was blocking access to several sites, including Yezzi.org,
an online freedom of speech campaign. 1
This model of Internet filtering, where Internet service providers (ISPs) implement
directives issued by government authorities and block connections to selected
Web addresses, has been extensively documented by the OpenNet Initiative using incountry testing. Identifying potential cases of filtering by ISPs is likely to be easier in
the future with the advent of tools like Herdict (www.herdict.org), which invite end
users to be involved with in-country testing on a continuing basis.
Given aggressive national filtering policies implemented in countries like Saudi
Arabia, China, and Vietnam, state-sponsored ISP-level Web filtering has been an appropriate locus for academic study. However, ISPs are only one possible choke point in a
global Internet. As the Internet increases in popularity around the world, we are beginning to see evidence of Internet filtering at other points in the network. Of particular
interest are online service providers (OSPs) that host social networking services, blogs,
and Web sites. Because so many Internet users are dependent on OSPs to publish content, censorship by these entities has the potential to be a powerful control on online
speech.
In this chapter, I look at recent developments in intermediary censorship in China,
where unclear government directives mandate censorship by blogging hosts, but provide little guidance for what content must be filtered. Confusion over U.S. trade restrictions is having a chilling effect on speech in the United States, where some OSPs are
removing the accounts of users from sanctioned nations, including sensitive human
rights Web sites. I examine the incentives and costs OSPs face surrounding removal of
Ethan Zuckerman
Introduction
When academics, journalists, or Internet users discuss ‘‘Internet censorship,’’ they are
usually referring to the inability of users in a given country to access a specific piece of
online content. For instance, when Internet policymakers from around the world came
to Tunisia for the 2005 World Summit on the Information Society, they discovered
that the Tunisian government was blocking access to several sites, including Yezzi.org,
an online freedom of speech campaign. 1
This model of Internet filtering, where Internet service providers (ISPs) implement
directives issued by government authorities and block connections to selected
Web addresses, has been extensively documented by the OpenNet Initiative using incountry testing. Identifying potential cases of filtering by ISPs is likely to be easier in
the future with the advent of tools like Herdict (www.herdict.org), which invite end
users to be involved with in-country testing on a continuing basis.
Given aggressive national filtering policies implemented in countries like Saudi
Arabia, China, and Vietnam, state-sponsored ISP-level Web filtering has been an appropriate locus for academic study. However, ISPs are only one possible choke point in a
global Internet. As the Internet increases in popularity around the world, we are beginning to see evidence of Internet filtering at other points in the network. Of particular
interest are online service providers (OSPs) that host social networking services, blogs,
and Web sites. Because so many Internet users are dependent on OSPs to publish content, censorship by these entities has the potential to be a powerful control on online
speech.
In this chapter, I look at recent developments in intermediary censorship in China,
where unclear government directives mandate censorship by blogging hosts, but provide little guidance for what content must be filtered. Confusion over U.S. trade restrictions is having a chilling effect on speech in the United States, where some OSPs are
removing the accounts of users from sanctioned nations, including sensitive human
rights Web sites. I examine the incentives and costs OSPs face surrounding removal of