ing 719 hours after being reported. 53 While the IWF has been successful within the
United Kingdom, their own jurisdiction, they acknowledge that there are Web sites
that have been reported to relevant national authorities outside the United Kingdom
that continue to remain active.
One site, for example, has been reported to us 224 times since 2002; another has been reported to
us 54 times since 2000 and in that time has been found on seven different servers in different
countries; yet another has been reported by us to the relevant authorities 32 times since 2005.
Some of the most prolific of these commercial child abuse websites have remained ‘‘live’’ for
long periods of time, despite our concerted efforts to the contrary. 94 of these websites reported
by us to relevant authorities in 2006 are known to have been actively selling child abuse images
in 2005. Indeed, 33 were ‘‘live’’ in 2004 and 32 were ‘‘live’’ prior to that.
We regularly pass details of the websites and other intelligence to Interpol via our own police
agency links, to international hotlines and the apparent host countries’ own police services to enable them to launch a united assault on the organised criminals selling images of child abuse.
However, the ever-changing jurisdictions, the differing laws, priorities and police responses as
well as the varying cooperation of internet service providers around the world, mean that some
countries face challenges to remove content. 54
The factors that the IWF highlights as barriers to removing images of child sexual exploitation online illustrate the conception of cooperation as domestic implementation.
Once the report has been handed off to the relevant domestic authorities, no further
action is taken. After analyzing takedown regimes in a variety of different circumstances, including defamation, copyright violation, phishing, and child pornography,
Moore and Clayton argue that incentives rather than differences in law, penalties, and
other factors influence the rate at which takedown successfully occurs. In cases of
phishing, banks have a high level of incentive to have the offending content removed
and work with a variety of actors to achieve the takedown of such sites almost always
without the use of courts or official channels. In contrast, the responsibility for the removal of child abuse images is delegated to the relevant national authorities and is subject to delay and neglect despite strong legal regimes. 55 Moore and Clayton argue:
The Internet is multi-national. Almost everyone who wants content removed issues requests to
ISPs or website owners throughout the world, believing—not always correctly—that the material
must be just as illegal ‘‘there’’ as ‘‘here.’’ Unexpectedly, in the one case where the material is
undoubtedly illegal everywhere, the removal of child sexual abuse image websites is dealt with in
a rather different manner. The responsibility for removing material has been divided up on a national basis, and this appears to lead directly to very long website lifetimes. 56
Not only do the domestic organizations charged with compiling lists of offending child
pornography Web sites lack the willingness (or ability) to reach out to relevant nonstate actors across national boundaries, but they also have a reduced incentive to do
so because their own population is ‘‘protected’’ from the offending foreign content
through the use of filtering.
Barriers to Cooperation
65
United Kingdom, their own jurisdiction, they acknowledge that there are Web sites
that have been reported to relevant national authorities outside the United Kingdom
that continue to remain active.
One site, for example, has been reported to us 224 times since 2002; another has been reported to
us 54 times since 2000 and in that time has been found on seven different servers in different
countries; yet another has been reported by us to the relevant authorities 32 times since 2005.
Some of the most prolific of these commercial child abuse websites have remained ‘‘live’’ for
long periods of time, despite our concerted efforts to the contrary. 94 of these websites reported
by us to relevant authorities in 2006 are known to have been actively selling child abuse images
in 2005. Indeed, 33 were ‘‘live’’ in 2004 and 32 were ‘‘live’’ prior to that.
We regularly pass details of the websites and other intelligence to Interpol via our own police
agency links, to international hotlines and the apparent host countries’ own police services to enable them to launch a united assault on the organised criminals selling images of child abuse.
However, the ever-changing jurisdictions, the differing laws, priorities and police responses as
well as the varying cooperation of internet service providers around the world, mean that some
countries face challenges to remove content. 54
The factors that the IWF highlights as barriers to removing images of child sexual exploitation online illustrate the conception of cooperation as domestic implementation.
Once the report has been handed off to the relevant domestic authorities, no further
action is taken. After analyzing takedown regimes in a variety of different circumstances, including defamation, copyright violation, phishing, and child pornography,
Moore and Clayton argue that incentives rather than differences in law, penalties, and
other factors influence the rate at which takedown successfully occurs. In cases of
phishing, banks have a high level of incentive to have the offending content removed
and work with a variety of actors to achieve the takedown of such sites almost always
without the use of courts or official channels. In contrast, the responsibility for the removal of child abuse images is delegated to the relevant national authorities and is subject to delay and neglect despite strong legal regimes. 55 Moore and Clayton argue:
The Internet is multi-national. Almost everyone who wants content removed issues requests to
ISPs or website owners throughout the world, believing—not always correctly—that the material
must be just as illegal ‘‘there’’ as ‘‘here.’’ Unexpectedly, in the one case where the material is
undoubtedly illegal everywhere, the removal of child sexual abuse image websites is dealt with in
a rather different manner. The responsibility for removing material has been divided up on a national basis, and this appears to lead directly to very long website lifetimes. 56
Not only do the domestic organizations charged with compiling lists of offending child
pornography Web sites lack the willingness (or ability) to reach out to relevant nonstate actors across national boundaries, but they also have a reduced incentive to do
so because their own population is ‘‘protected’’ from the offending foreign content
through the use of filtering.
Barriers to Cooperation
65