preliminary evidence indicates that the introduction of Internet filtering, to prevent
accidental access to child pornography, correlates with decreasing efforts to have images
of child abuse removed at the source. As a result, child pornography identified and filtered by one country remains available on the Internet and is accessible in other countries. This situation occurs among countries that participate in institutions designed to
facilitate cooperation targeting the source of the child pornography. Thus, countries
that participate in the institutions dedicated to removing child pornography—such as
international law enforcement task forces, including the Virtual Global Task Force and
the Innocent Images International Task Force, as well as the INHOPE association of
‘‘hot line’’ providers—filter Internet content located within each other’s territorial
boundaries.
This evidence suggests that traditional cooperative mechanisms may have unintended consequences that conflict with rather than complement dynamic cooperation. This potential conflict raises the concern that contemporary cooperative
institutions do not have the capacity to meet the global challenges posed by the proliferation of ICTs. This chapter argues that the dominant conception of cooperation, the
domestic implementation of the results of bargaining, obscures potentially new forms
of dynamic cooperation at the international level. A conceptual shift in the understanding of what constitutes cooperation is required to capture this emergent practice.
In this chapter, I present an analysis of the widespread adoption of filtering as the
primary solution to combating the proliferation of child pornography on the Internet.
While international agreements concerning the protection of children played a role in
spurring state action, the emphasis on domestic implementation over dynamic cooperation facilitated the preference for filtering as the solution to the problem of Internet
child pornography. Internet filtering is a solution that states can implement domestically irrespective of international agreements, and it does not require sustained cooperation. The goal of filtering is to block domestic access to Internet content located in
another country. Dynamic cooperation—in contrast to blocking domestic access
to foreign-hosted child pornography—refers to the continual cooperation necessary to
have foreign-hosted content removed at its source.
Within this context, I trace how filtering has been constituted as a solution to the
problem of Internet child pornography and how its implementation was made possible
by delinking the issue from three key factors: the interpretation of filtering mandated
by the state as a form of censorship, the effect of filtering on freedom of expression as
a result of technical deficiencies, and the overall effectiveness of filtering technology
itself in combating Internet child pornography. I present a preliminary analysis of the
ways in which the continued emphasis on domestic implementation may be affecting
attempts to move toward dynamic cooperation on this issue. Finally, I suggest areas for
further research that result from treating cooperation as a dynamic practice rather than
an instance of bargaining and domestic implementation.
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Nart Villeneuve
accidental access to child pornography, correlates with decreasing efforts to have images
of child abuse removed at the source. As a result, child pornography identified and filtered by one country remains available on the Internet and is accessible in other countries. This situation occurs among countries that participate in institutions designed to
facilitate cooperation targeting the source of the child pornography. Thus, countries
that participate in the institutions dedicated to removing child pornography—such as
international law enforcement task forces, including the Virtual Global Task Force and
the Innocent Images International Task Force, as well as the INHOPE association of
‘‘hot line’’ providers—filter Internet content located within each other’s territorial
boundaries.
This evidence suggests that traditional cooperative mechanisms may have unintended consequences that conflict with rather than complement dynamic cooperation. This potential conflict raises the concern that contemporary cooperative
institutions do not have the capacity to meet the global challenges posed by the proliferation of ICTs. This chapter argues that the dominant conception of cooperation, the
domestic implementation of the results of bargaining, obscures potentially new forms
of dynamic cooperation at the international level. A conceptual shift in the understanding of what constitutes cooperation is required to capture this emergent practice.
In this chapter, I present an analysis of the widespread adoption of filtering as the
primary solution to combating the proliferation of child pornography on the Internet.
While international agreements concerning the protection of children played a role in
spurring state action, the emphasis on domestic implementation over dynamic cooperation facilitated the preference for filtering as the solution to the problem of Internet
child pornography. Internet filtering is a solution that states can implement domestically irrespective of international agreements, and it does not require sustained cooperation. The goal of filtering is to block domestic access to Internet content located in
another country. Dynamic cooperation—in contrast to blocking domestic access
to foreign-hosted child pornography—refers to the continual cooperation necessary to
have foreign-hosted content removed at its source.
Within this context, I trace how filtering has been constituted as a solution to the
problem of Internet child pornography and how its implementation was made possible
by delinking the issue from three key factors: the interpretation of filtering mandated
by the state as a form of censorship, the effect of filtering on freedom of expression as
a result of technical deficiencies, and the overall effectiveness of filtering technology
itself in combating Internet child pornography. I present a preliminary analysis of the
ways in which the continued emphasis on domestic implementation may be affecting
attempts to move toward dynamic cooperation on this issue. Finally, I suggest areas for
further research that result from treating cooperation as a dynamic practice rather than
an instance of bargaining and domestic implementation.
56
Nart Villeneuve