ing provocative attire are also consistently blocked. Esmail Radkani, of Iran’s quasiofficial Information Technology Company, claimed in an interview in September
2006 that 10 million Web sites were filtered at that time, 90 percent of which contained ‘‘immoral’’ content. 63 Another official was quoted in November 2008 saying
that 5 million Web sites were blocked in Iran. 64 Given the large number of Web sites
with sexual content blocked in Iran, neither of these estimates is implausible.
The filtering of material related to sexuality extends as well to Web sites offering content related to sexual education. Approximately half of the dating Web sites tested by
ONI were found to be blocked in Iran. OpenNet Initiative testing also found significant
blocking of content related to homosexuality, particularly if it had any connection to
Iran. A number of Web sites related to drugs, alcohol, and gambling are blocked in
Iran, although many remain unblocked.
Web sites that offer tools and techniques for circumventing filters are also heavily filtered. Just as new Web sites with options for circumventing Internet filters are regularly
offered by Internet users around the world, blocking lists in Iran are frequently updated
to include these new Web sites. A great majority of Web sites offering information
about and access to circumvention tools tested by ONI were blocked.
The proxy server filtering strategy also permits filtering by keyword. Web searches
that include the keyword ‘‘women’’ are still blocked in Iran. The word ‘‘sex’’ and a
broad range of words related to sexual activity both in English and Farsi are blocked.
The Farsi word for ‘‘photograph’’ is also blocked.
Conclusion
Iran continues to strengthen the legal, administrative, and technical aspects of its
Internet filtering systems. The Internet censorship system in Iran is one of the most
comprehensive and sophisticated in the world. Advances in domestic technical capacity have contributed to the implementation of a centralized filtering strategy and a
reduced reliance on Western technologies. Despite the deeply held commitment to
regulating Internet content, authorities continue to be challenged in their attempts to
control online speech. Political filtering related to the 2009 presidential campaign,
including the blocking of Facebook and several opposition party Web sites, brought
renewed attention to the role of filtering in Iran and shows a clear inclination toward
second-generation controls.
Notes
1. Peter Feuilherade, ‘‘Iran’s Banned Press Turns to the Net,’’ BBC News, August 9, 2002, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/2183573.stm.
2. Human Rights Watch Report, ‘‘False Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and North
Africa: Iran,’’ November 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/5.htm#_Toc119125727;
Iran
555
2006 that 10 million Web sites were filtered at that time, 90 percent of which contained ‘‘immoral’’ content. 63 Another official was quoted in November 2008 saying
that 5 million Web sites were blocked in Iran. 64 Given the large number of Web sites
with sexual content blocked in Iran, neither of these estimates is implausible.
The filtering of material related to sexuality extends as well to Web sites offering content related to sexual education. Approximately half of the dating Web sites tested by
ONI were found to be blocked in Iran. OpenNet Initiative testing also found significant
blocking of content related to homosexuality, particularly if it had any connection to
Iran. A number of Web sites related to drugs, alcohol, and gambling are blocked in
Iran, although many remain unblocked.
Web sites that offer tools and techniques for circumventing filters are also heavily filtered. Just as new Web sites with options for circumventing Internet filters are regularly
offered by Internet users around the world, blocking lists in Iran are frequently updated
to include these new Web sites. A great majority of Web sites offering information
about and access to circumvention tools tested by ONI were blocked.
The proxy server filtering strategy also permits filtering by keyword. Web searches
that include the keyword ‘‘women’’ are still blocked in Iran. The word ‘‘sex’’ and a
broad range of words related to sexual activity both in English and Farsi are blocked.
The Farsi word for ‘‘photograph’’ is also blocked.
Conclusion
Iran continues to strengthen the legal, administrative, and technical aspects of its
Internet filtering systems. The Internet censorship system in Iran is one of the most
comprehensive and sophisticated in the world. Advances in domestic technical capacity have contributed to the implementation of a centralized filtering strategy and a
reduced reliance on Western technologies. Despite the deeply held commitment to
regulating Internet content, authorities continue to be challenged in their attempts to
control online speech. Political filtering related to the 2009 presidential campaign,
including the blocking of Facebook and several opposition party Web sites, brought
renewed attention to the role of filtering in Iran and shows a clear inclination toward
second-generation controls.
Notes
1. Peter Feuilherade, ‘‘Iran’s Banned Press Turns to the Net,’’ BBC News, August 9, 2002, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/2183573.stm.
2. Human Rights Watch Report, ‘‘False Freedom: Online Censorship in the Middle East and North
Africa: Iran,’’ November 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/5.htm#_Toc119125727;
Iran
555