To one degree or another, the Gulf countries, Sudan, Tunisia, Gaza, Yemen, and Iran
censor pornography, nudity, gay and lesbian content, escort and dating services, and
Web sites displaying provocative attire. Also censored by most of these countries are
Web sites that present critical reviews of Islam and/or attempt to convert Muslims to
other religions. Some of these countries also filter Web sites related to alcohol, gambling, and drugs.
Generally, the countries that implement political or social filtering also target to
various degrees proxies and circumvention tools to prevent users from bypassing filters. Some of these countries also block online translation services and privacy tools,
apparently because they can also be used to access blocked content.
Testing by ONI revealed no evidence of technical filtering in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon,
and the West Bank between 2008 and 2009.
Regional Trends in Access Control
Internet censorship in the Middle East and North Africa is on the rise, and the scope
and depth of filtering are increasing. Previous ONI tests revealed that political filtering
was limited in some countries, but 2008–2009 results indicate that political censorship
is targeting more content and is becoming more consistent. For example, previous tests
found that Yemen temporarily blocked political Web sites in the run-up to the 2006
presidential elections, and Bahrain did the same ahead of parliamentary elections.
However, 2008–2009 testing revealed that filtering in these two countries has been
consistently extended to include several Web sites run by opposition groups or news
Web sites and forums that espouse oppositional political views.
In the meantime, countries that have been filtering political content continue to add
more Web sites to their political blacklists. For example, filtering in Syria was expanded
to include popular Web sites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Amazon, as well as more
Web sites affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Kurdish opposition groups. Another example is Tunisia, which added more political and oppositional content as well
as other apolitical Web sites such as the OpenNet Initiative and Global Voices Online.
Social filtering is also increasing and is catching up with the continuously growing
social Web. Testing revealed that most of the Arab countries have begun blocking
Arabic-language explicit content that was previously accessible. Interestingly, filtering
of Arabic-language explicit Web content in the Middle East and North Africa is usually
not as fast as that of other languages. The ONI investigation revealed that the U.S.based commercial filtering software used by most of the ISPs in the region (e.g., SmartFilter, Websense, and Bluecoat) do not pick up Arabic content as comprehensively as
content in other languages.
Increases in filtering are the norm in the Middle East and North Africa, and lifting
blocks is the exception. Among the few examples of the unblocking of Web sites are
530
MENA Overview
censor pornography, nudity, gay and lesbian content, escort and dating services, and
Web sites displaying provocative attire. Also censored by most of these countries are
Web sites that present critical reviews of Islam and/or attempt to convert Muslims to
other religions. Some of these countries also filter Web sites related to alcohol, gambling, and drugs.
Generally, the countries that implement political or social filtering also target to
various degrees proxies and circumvention tools to prevent users from bypassing filters. Some of these countries also block online translation services and privacy tools,
apparently because they can also be used to access blocked content.
Testing by ONI revealed no evidence of technical filtering in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon,
and the West Bank between 2008 and 2009.
Regional Trends in Access Control
Internet censorship in the Middle East and North Africa is on the rise, and the scope
and depth of filtering are increasing. Previous ONI tests revealed that political filtering
was limited in some countries, but 2008–2009 results indicate that political censorship
is targeting more content and is becoming more consistent. For example, previous tests
found that Yemen temporarily blocked political Web sites in the run-up to the 2006
presidential elections, and Bahrain did the same ahead of parliamentary elections.
However, 2008–2009 testing revealed that filtering in these two countries has been
consistently extended to include several Web sites run by opposition groups or news
Web sites and forums that espouse oppositional political views.
In the meantime, countries that have been filtering political content continue to add
more Web sites to their political blacklists. For example, filtering in Syria was expanded
to include popular Web sites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Amazon, as well as more
Web sites affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Kurdish opposition groups. Another example is Tunisia, which added more political and oppositional content as well
as other apolitical Web sites such as the OpenNet Initiative and Global Voices Online.
Social filtering is also increasing and is catching up with the continuously growing
social Web. Testing revealed that most of the Arab countries have begun blocking
Arabic-language explicit content that was previously accessible. Interestingly, filtering
of Arabic-language explicit Web content in the Middle East and North Africa is usually
not as fast as that of other languages. The ONI investigation revealed that the U.S.based commercial filtering software used by most of the ISPs in the region (e.g., SmartFilter, Websense, and Bluecoat) do not pick up Arabic content as comprehensively as
content in other languages.
Increases in filtering are the norm in the Middle East and North Africa, and lifting
blocks is the exception. Among the few examples of the unblocking of Web sites are
530
MENA Overview