a scandal over the illegal wiretapping of the cell phones of influential political figures
forced them to destroy their equipment, the National Intelligence Service asked for permission to resume the practice. 111 E-mails (after submission and receipt) are already
considered by law enforcement authorities to be ‘‘objects,’’ subject to ordinary search
and seizure requirements, rather than ‘‘means of communications’’ requiring wiretapping warrants and notification to parties within 30 days. 112
ONI Testing Results
OpenNet Initiative testing conducted in 2007 and 2008 confirmed that South Korea
filters political and social content, specifically targeting Web sites containing North
Korean propaganda or promoting the reunification of North and South Korea, as well
as a handful of Web sites devoted to gambling. These findings are consistent with
2006–2007 analysis, with one exception: in 2007 and 2008, Korean ISPs were also
shown to selectively filter the Korean-language pornography Web sites tested.
Testing was conducted on three of the largest South Korean ISPs—KT’s KorNet, LG
Dacom, and Hanaro Telecom’s Hananet—from May to August 2008 and in November
2008. On each ISP, ONI detected DNS tampering, which prevents Internet domain
names from resolving to their proper IP addresses. All Web sites blocked resolved to a
block page jointly hosted by the police and the KCSC.
The ONI determined that a significant number of pro–North Korea or pro-unification
Web sites on ONI’s testing list were blocked, along with a selected number of gambling-related Web sites. The blocking was extremely consistent across the three ISPs
tested, although KorNet and LG Dacom blocked more of the same Web sites as compared to Hananet.
The ONI testing suggests that the extent of filtering in South Korea is still not commensurate with other measures the government has taken to cleanse the Korean Web
of illegal or harmful social content. At the same time, the relatively low rate of filtering
is consistent with the government’s approach to regulating content, which is far more
reliant on ordering content and Web-hosting providers to police their own content
directly through deletions, suspensions, and takedowns.
Conclusion
Although South Korea is a world leader in Internet and broadband penetration, its
citizens do not have access to a free and unfiltered Internet. South Korea’s government maintains a wide-ranging approach toward the regulation of specific online
content and imposes a substantial level of censorship on elections-related discourse
and on a large number of Web sites that the government deems subversive or socially
harmful.
South Korea
513
forced them to destroy their equipment, the National Intelligence Service asked for permission to resume the practice. 111 E-mails (after submission and receipt) are already
considered by law enforcement authorities to be ‘‘objects,’’ subject to ordinary search
and seizure requirements, rather than ‘‘means of communications’’ requiring wiretapping warrants and notification to parties within 30 days. 112
ONI Testing Results
OpenNet Initiative testing conducted in 2007 and 2008 confirmed that South Korea
filters political and social content, specifically targeting Web sites containing North
Korean propaganda or promoting the reunification of North and South Korea, as well
as a handful of Web sites devoted to gambling. These findings are consistent with
2006–2007 analysis, with one exception: in 2007 and 2008, Korean ISPs were also
shown to selectively filter the Korean-language pornography Web sites tested.
Testing was conducted on three of the largest South Korean ISPs—KT’s KorNet, LG
Dacom, and Hanaro Telecom’s Hananet—from May to August 2008 and in November
2008. On each ISP, ONI detected DNS tampering, which prevents Internet domain
names from resolving to their proper IP addresses. All Web sites blocked resolved to a
block page jointly hosted by the police and the KCSC.
The ONI determined that a significant number of pro–North Korea or pro-unification
Web sites on ONI’s testing list were blocked, along with a selected number of gambling-related Web sites. The blocking was extremely consistent across the three ISPs
tested, although KorNet and LG Dacom blocked more of the same Web sites as compared to Hananet.
The ONI testing suggests that the extent of filtering in South Korea is still not commensurate with other measures the government has taken to cleanse the Korean Web
of illegal or harmful social content. At the same time, the relatively low rate of filtering
is consistent with the government’s approach to regulating content, which is far more
reliant on ordering content and Web-hosting providers to police their own content
directly through deletions, suspensions, and takedowns.
Conclusion
Although South Korea is a world leader in Internet and broadband penetration, its
citizens do not have access to a free and unfiltered Internet. South Korea’s government maintains a wide-ranging approach toward the regulation of specific online
content and imposes a substantial level of censorship on elections-related discourse
and on a large number of Web sites that the government deems subversive or socially
harmful.
South Korea
513