himself. 22 After Choi’s suicide, the Cyber Terror Response Center of the National Police
Agency launched a one-month probe into ‘‘false rumors and malicious postings’’ on
the Internet, mobilizing its 900 investigators to crack down on ‘‘malpractice’’ conducted over the Internet as well as cell phones. 23 The police reported more than
10,000 cases of online libel in 2007. 24
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
Despite Korea’s democratic credentials, its free speech protections are weak relative to
many other democracies. Article 21 of the Korean constitution guarantees that ‘‘all citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press,’’ but also contains the qualification
that ‘‘neither speech nor the press shall violate the honor or rights of other persons nor
undermine public morals or social ethics.’’ 25 This caveat empowers the government to
impose restrictions on a broad range of expression.
Laying the foundation for all digital and analog content regulation, Article 53(1) of
the Telecommunications Business Act (1991) states ‘‘a person in use of telecommunications shall not make communications with contents that harm the public peace and
order or social morals and good customs.’’ 26 Harmful communications were to be determined by presidential decree, 27 and under the original formulation constituted contents that ‘‘aim at or abet a criminal act, aim at committing antistate activities, and
impede good customs and other social orders.’’ 28 Further, harmful communications
could be refused, suspended, or restricted by order of the minister of the Ministry of
Information and Communication (MIC), which delegated this authority to the Information and Communication Ethics Committee (ICEC). 29 The ICEC was established
under an amended Telecommunications Business Act (1995) to regulate the content
of communications and inform state policy aimed at suppressing subversive communications and ‘‘promoting active and healthy information.’’ 30
In June 2002, the Supreme Court struck down the provisions of the Telecommunications Business Act defining ‘‘harmful’’ content and granting the government unlimited
authority to regulate it. 31 It held Article 53(1) to be insufficiently specific and clear, and
Article 53(2) to violate the rule against blanket delegation. 32 A student at Hankook
Aviation University had posted a message in June 1999 entitled, ‘‘Exchange of Gunfire
in the West Sea, Sloppy Kim Dae-jung!’’ on the ‘‘urgent message board’’ of the online
community Chanwoomul, which a systems administrator deleted before suspending
the student’s use of the service for one month in accordance with an order from the
MIC. 33 In August 1999, the student filed a constitutional complaint, arguing that
the provisions infringed on his freedoms of expression, science, and arts, and violated
due process and the principle against excessive restriction. However, the Supreme
Court found that MIC orders to refuse, suspend, or restrict communications violated
neither the principle of proportionality nor due process of law, and did not infringe
506
South Korea
Agency launched a one-month probe into ‘‘false rumors and malicious postings’’ on
the Internet, mobilizing its 900 investigators to crack down on ‘‘malpractice’’ conducted over the Internet as well as cell phones. 23 The police reported more than
10,000 cases of online libel in 2007. 24
Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
Despite Korea’s democratic credentials, its free speech protections are weak relative to
many other democracies. Article 21 of the Korean constitution guarantees that ‘‘all citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press,’’ but also contains the qualification
that ‘‘neither speech nor the press shall violate the honor or rights of other persons nor
undermine public morals or social ethics.’’ 25 This caveat empowers the government to
impose restrictions on a broad range of expression.
Laying the foundation for all digital and analog content regulation, Article 53(1) of
the Telecommunications Business Act (1991) states ‘‘a person in use of telecommunications shall not make communications with contents that harm the public peace and
order or social morals and good customs.’’ 26 Harmful communications were to be determined by presidential decree, 27 and under the original formulation constituted contents that ‘‘aim at or abet a criminal act, aim at committing antistate activities, and
impede good customs and other social orders.’’ 28 Further, harmful communications
could be refused, suspended, or restricted by order of the minister of the Ministry of
Information and Communication (MIC), which delegated this authority to the Information and Communication Ethics Committee (ICEC). 29 The ICEC was established
under an amended Telecommunications Business Act (1995) to regulate the content
of communications and inform state policy aimed at suppressing subversive communications and ‘‘promoting active and healthy information.’’ 30
In June 2002, the Supreme Court struck down the provisions of the Telecommunications Business Act defining ‘‘harmful’’ content and granting the government unlimited
authority to regulate it. 31 It held Article 53(1) to be insufficiently specific and clear, and
Article 53(2) to violate the rule against blanket delegation. 32 A student at Hankook
Aviation University had posted a message in June 1999 entitled, ‘‘Exchange of Gunfire
in the West Sea, Sloppy Kim Dae-jung!’’ on the ‘‘urgent message board’’ of the online
community Chanwoomul, which a systems administrator deleted before suspending
the student’s use of the service for one month in accordance with an order from the
MIC. 33 In August 1999, the student filed a constitutional complaint, arguing that
the provisions infringed on his freedoms of expression, science, and arts, and violated
due process and the principle against excessive restriction. However, the Supreme
Court found that MIC orders to refuse, suspend, or restrict communications violated
neither the principle of proportionality nor due process of law, and did not infringe
506
South Korea