The monopoly status granted to Jinhui is unprecedented, representing the first
instance where a government mandated a specific filtering software product for use at
a national level instead of performance standards that encourage consumer choice,
security, and product quality. The mandated procurement and preinstallation of Green
Dam also adds a new and powerful control mechanism to the existing filtering system,
in addition to blocking already done at the international backbones and by individual
online content providers. Distributing control mechanisms to end users at the periphery allows the government to partially offload the burden of monitoring and blocking
content to individual machines on the network, amounting to a ‘‘huge distributed
super computer dedicated to controlling online content.’’ 194
In addition to interfering with the performance of personal computers in an unpredictable way, the poor design of Green Dam also presents security risks that allow any
Web site the user visits to take control of the user’s computer, with the potential for
malicious sites to steal private data and commit other illegal acts, or even turn every
Chinese computer running Green Dam into a member of a botnet. 195 The Stop Badware Project at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society confirmed that the application violates its Badware guidelines for software, as it does not disclose the filtering of
political speech or the unexpected behavior of completely killing processes that contain such speech. 196
Conclusion
The Chinese government has maintained a strict and vigorous approach toward Internet censorship, interfering with public knowledge and discourse through pervasive filtering practices and a multitude of nontechnical methods. In 2008, China led the
world with 300 million Internet users, and the sheer scale and expanding scope of online content presented a significant challenge for a government intent on maintaining
social stability and order in China’s networked spheres. China continues to fine-tune
its system of information control, including attempts to promote a public relations
approach to online commentary and news reporting. The foundation of China’s information-control framework continues to be built on ensuring that domestic providers
are responsible for filtering and monitoring hosted content. The government has also
taken measures to distribute control mechanisms to end users through the procurement of filtering software on home computers. The 2008 Olympic Games held in Beijing had a net positive impact on access to information, but this has abated without
continued international pressure for greater openness and transparency.
Notes
1. Jim Yardley, ‘‘Monk Protests in Tibet Draw Chinese Security,’’ New York Times, March 14, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/14/world/asia/14china.html.
China
473
instance where a government mandated a specific filtering software product for use at
a national level instead of performance standards that encourage consumer choice,
security, and product quality. The mandated procurement and preinstallation of Green
Dam also adds a new and powerful control mechanism to the existing filtering system,
in addition to blocking already done at the international backbones and by individual
online content providers. Distributing control mechanisms to end users at the periphery allows the government to partially offload the burden of monitoring and blocking
content to individual machines on the network, amounting to a ‘‘huge distributed
super computer dedicated to controlling online content.’’ 194
In addition to interfering with the performance of personal computers in an unpredictable way, the poor design of Green Dam also presents security risks that allow any
Web site the user visits to take control of the user’s computer, with the potential for
malicious sites to steal private data and commit other illegal acts, or even turn every
Chinese computer running Green Dam into a member of a botnet. 195 The Stop Badware Project at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society confirmed that the application violates its Badware guidelines for software, as it does not disclose the filtering of
political speech or the unexpected behavior of completely killing processes that contain such speech. 196
Conclusion
The Chinese government has maintained a strict and vigorous approach toward Internet censorship, interfering with public knowledge and discourse through pervasive filtering practices and a multitude of nontechnical methods. In 2008, China led the
world with 300 million Internet users, and the sheer scale and expanding scope of online content presented a significant challenge for a government intent on maintaining
social stability and order in China’s networked spheres. China continues to fine-tune
its system of information control, including attempts to promote a public relations
approach to online commentary and news reporting. The foundation of China’s information-control framework continues to be built on ensuring that domestic providers
are responsible for filtering and monitoring hosted content. The government has also
taken measures to distribute control mechanisms to end users through the procurement of filtering software on home computers. The 2008 Olympic Games held in Beijing had a net positive impact on access to information, but this has abated without
continued international pressure for greater openness and transparency.
Notes
1. Jim Yardley, ‘‘Monk Protests in Tibet Draw Chinese Security,’’ New York Times, March 14, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/14/world/asia/14china.html.
China
473