of two related organizations: while the Web site for the writers’ association PEN American Center hosted content on the jailed dissident and Charter 08 coauthor Liu
Xiaobo, it was accessible (www.pen.org) at the same time that the Chinese PEN Center
(www.chinesepen.org), a site with both English and Chinese content, was blocked
by both ISPs. The sites of watchdogs on Chinese rights defenders and labor rights continued to be blocked, as did a substantial number of rights organizations based in Hong
Kong.
Certain targets for blocking continued to cut across political and social lines of conflict in 2008. The consistent filtering of Web sites supporting greater autonomy and
rights protection for the Uyghur (www.uyghurcongress.org), Tibetan, and Mongolian
(www.innermongolia.org) ethnic minorities is not surprising, as these issues have already been excluded from official discourse inside China. Nearly all the overseas Tibetan organizations, which conduct activities ranging from news broadcasting for the
Tibetan community to the Tibetan Youth Congress, which lobbies for full independence for Tibet, have been blocked. China also continued to block a substantial number of sites on religion, including the International Coalition for Religious Freedom,
Catholic organizations, and sites on Islam in Arabic, including those presenting extremist viewpoints (www.alumah.com).
In 2008, China continued to filter a significant number of sites presenting alternative
or additional perspectives on its policies toward Taiwan and North Korea. For example,
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan (www.dpp.org.tw) is continually filtered. However, a number of sites with no political content but ending with the domain ‘‘.tw’’ were blocked, and Greenpeace Taiwan was the only country Web site of
the organization blocked by both ISPs.
As in 2006–2007, the major exceptions to the focus on politically sensitive topics
specific to China in 2008 were circumvention tools and pornography. A portion,
though not a majority, of proxy tools and anonymizers in both the Chinese (gardennetworks.com) and English (www.peacefire.org) languages were blocked. The circumvention tool Psiphon was also blocked, along with the Web sites of the Citizen Lab at
the University of Toronto and the Information Warfare Monitor, sister institutions
engaging in research on circumvention and surveillance. Both ISPs also blocked a substantial amount of pornographic content.
Although the scope of Internet filtering in China extends far beyond the highly
sensitive issues known as the ‘‘three Ts: Tibet, Tiananmen, and Taiwan,’’ the continued
potency of these subjects evidently prompted the Chinese government to step up
filtering of leading international Web sites and social media platforms in 2009. On
March 24, 2009, Google officially confirmed that YouTube was blocked in China; traffic
dropped steeply on the evening of March 23 to ‘‘near zero’’ by March 24. 185 The Web
site www.herdict.org also captured accounts providing evidence of a previous reported
China
471
Xiaobo, it was accessible (www.pen.org) at the same time that the Chinese PEN Center
(www.chinesepen.org), a site with both English and Chinese content, was blocked
by both ISPs. The sites of watchdogs on Chinese rights defenders and labor rights continued to be blocked, as did a substantial number of rights organizations based in Hong
Kong.
Certain targets for blocking continued to cut across political and social lines of conflict in 2008. The consistent filtering of Web sites supporting greater autonomy and
rights protection for the Uyghur (www.uyghurcongress.org), Tibetan, and Mongolian
(www.innermongolia.org) ethnic minorities is not surprising, as these issues have already been excluded from official discourse inside China. Nearly all the overseas Tibetan organizations, which conduct activities ranging from news broadcasting for the
Tibetan community to the Tibetan Youth Congress, which lobbies for full independence for Tibet, have been blocked. China also continued to block a substantial number of sites on religion, including the International Coalition for Religious Freedom,
Catholic organizations, and sites on Islam in Arabic, including those presenting extremist viewpoints (www.alumah.com).
In 2008, China continued to filter a significant number of sites presenting alternative
or additional perspectives on its policies toward Taiwan and North Korea. For example,
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan (www.dpp.org.tw) is continually filtered. However, a number of sites with no political content but ending with the domain ‘‘.tw’’ were blocked, and Greenpeace Taiwan was the only country Web site of
the organization blocked by both ISPs.
As in 2006–2007, the major exceptions to the focus on politically sensitive topics
specific to China in 2008 were circumvention tools and pornography. A portion,
though not a majority, of proxy tools and anonymizers in both the Chinese (gardennetworks.com) and English (www.peacefire.org) languages were blocked. The circumvention tool Psiphon was also blocked, along with the Web sites of the Citizen Lab at
the University of Toronto and the Information Warfare Monitor, sister institutions
engaging in research on circumvention and surveillance. Both ISPs also blocked a substantial amount of pornographic content.
Although the scope of Internet filtering in China extends far beyond the highly
sensitive issues known as the ‘‘three Ts: Tibet, Tiananmen, and Taiwan,’’ the continued
potency of these subjects evidently prompted the Chinese government to step up
filtering of leading international Web sites and social media platforms in 2009. On
March 24, 2009, Google officially confirmed that YouTube was blocked in China; traffic
dropped steeply on the evening of March 23 to ‘‘near zero’’ by March 24. 185 The Web
site www.herdict.org also captured accounts providing evidence of a previous reported
China
471