the Tibetan rights movement, and the Falun Gong spiritual organization (all of which
are methodically blocked), and includes independent media and dissenting voices, as
well as content on human rights, political reform, sovereignty issues, and circumvention tools.
Filtering during the 2008 Olympic Games
The OpenNet Initiative monitored a short list of prominent blogs, Chinese-language
and international news sites, advocacy organizations, and social media platforms continuously from late July to mid-September 2008. This period generally marked one of
the most significant openings in access to information since ONI began monitoring
Internet filtering in China in 2004, but the foundations of censorship based on control
over domestic media and civil society remained.
In 2001, China issued this decree in its official bid for the 2008 Olympic Games:
‘‘There will be no restrictions on journalists in reporting on the Olympic Games.’’ 178
This promise was significantly compromised, not only in China’s purported long-term
attempt to build a more open and transparent media system, 179 but also in the lack of
transparency over its policy on access to online information.
At a press conference on July 28, the media director of the Beijing Olympic Committee responded to a Wall Street Journal reporter who physically displayed the filtering of
certain Web sites on his laptop by denying anything was amiss. 180 This time, a Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson laid part of the blame with the Web sites themselves,
claiming they have problems making them ‘‘not easy to view in China.’’ 181 Yet, three
days later, on July 31, the IOC admitted to accepting a deal with the Chinese government in which sensitive Web sites that were ‘‘not considered Games-related’’ would be
blocked. 182
During the Olympics, access was partitioned between the Olympics Main Press Center (MPC) in the Olympic Green and the Beijing International Media Center, the main
press venue for non-IOC-accredited journalists. 183 The ONI compared data from the
Olympics MPC to that from other locations in Beijing, compiling a snapshot of Internet filtering in China leading up to the Olympics. Testing conducted by the ONI at the
Olympics MPC confirmed that filtering of Internet content continued even for members of the foreign press through TCP reset keyword blocking and IP address blocking,
the latter accounting for the vast majority of filtering at the MPC. For each test at the
MPC, the ONI tested at other locations in Beijing with broadband Internet access provided by China Netcom. Throughout this time period, filtering was nearly identical
between the MPC and consumer-level access on China Netcom and China Telecom,
indicating that the incrementally increased openness was implemented nationally.
Many sites that are routinely blocked by the Chinese government for containing politically sensitive content remained accessible from August 1 to at least mid-September
2008, including the Web sites of human rights organizations and foreign-hosted
468
China
are methodically blocked), and includes independent media and dissenting voices, as
well as content on human rights, political reform, sovereignty issues, and circumvention tools.
Filtering during the 2008 Olympic Games
The OpenNet Initiative monitored a short list of prominent blogs, Chinese-language
and international news sites, advocacy organizations, and social media platforms continuously from late July to mid-September 2008. This period generally marked one of
the most significant openings in access to information since ONI began monitoring
Internet filtering in China in 2004, but the foundations of censorship based on control
over domestic media and civil society remained.
In 2001, China issued this decree in its official bid for the 2008 Olympic Games:
‘‘There will be no restrictions on journalists in reporting on the Olympic Games.’’ 178
This promise was significantly compromised, not only in China’s purported long-term
attempt to build a more open and transparent media system, 179 but also in the lack of
transparency over its policy on access to online information.
At a press conference on July 28, the media director of the Beijing Olympic Committee responded to a Wall Street Journal reporter who physically displayed the filtering of
certain Web sites on his laptop by denying anything was amiss. 180 This time, a Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson laid part of the blame with the Web sites themselves,
claiming they have problems making them ‘‘not easy to view in China.’’ 181 Yet, three
days later, on July 31, the IOC admitted to accepting a deal with the Chinese government in which sensitive Web sites that were ‘‘not considered Games-related’’ would be
blocked. 182
During the Olympics, access was partitioned between the Olympics Main Press Center (MPC) in the Olympic Green and the Beijing International Media Center, the main
press venue for non-IOC-accredited journalists. 183 The ONI compared data from the
Olympics MPC to that from other locations in Beijing, compiling a snapshot of Internet filtering in China leading up to the Olympics. Testing conducted by the ONI at the
Olympics MPC confirmed that filtering of Internet content continued even for members of the foreign press through TCP reset keyword blocking and IP address blocking,
the latter accounting for the vast majority of filtering at the MPC. For each test at the
MPC, the ONI tested at other locations in Beijing with broadband Internet access provided by China Netcom. Throughout this time period, filtering was nearly identical
between the MPC and consumer-level access on China Netcom and China Telecom,
indicating that the incrementally increased openness was implemented nationally.
Many sites that are routinely blocked by the Chinese government for containing politically sensitive content remained accessible from August 1 to at least mid-September
2008, including the Web sites of human rights organizations and foreign-hosted
468
China