2008 also contained full texts of chat messages (which themselves contained sensitive information such as e-mail addresses, passwords, and bank card numbers). Of
the eight TOM-Skype surveillance servers traced by Nart Villeneuve, one server hosted
a special version designed for use in Internet cafe ´s and contained log files and the
censored keyword list, while another contained logs for TOM Online’s wireless
services.
The TOM-Skype surveillance system was triggered when a TOM-Skype user sent or
received messages containing a banned keyword listed in a key file, and those messages
were then stored in log files on a TOM-Skype server. Within the content of these
messages stored in the file logs, when filtered out to eliminate English language
obscenities, almost 16 percent contained the word ‘‘communist,’’ 7 percent the word
‘‘Falun,’’ and 2.5 percent ‘‘Taiwan independence.’’ However, the logged messages also
made reference to other content outside the range of these long-sensitive topics, such
as earthquakes and milk powder. 167
Furthermore, the data also contained personal information of Skype users that interacted with TOM-Skype users. Users who attempt to access www.skype.com from China
are redirected to skype.tom.com. While Skype claimed that TOM fixed the security
breaches within 24 hours of the report’s publication, 168 the report issued a warning
for ‘‘groups engaging in political activism or promoting the use of censorship circumvention technology accessed through services provided by companies that have compromised on human rights.’’ From the information contained in the log files, it would
be possible to conduct politically motivated surveillance by using simple social networking tools to identify the relationships between users.
Like all other ICPs, most bulletin boards and chat rooms assign personnel to monitor
the content of messages. 169 Messages submitted by users are censored by human censors and filtering systems before appearing online. 170 In order to enhance the surveillance on bulletin board systems, since 2005 the users of campus bulletin boards have
been mandated to reregister with their real identifying information before posting messages online. 171
In recent years, serious concerns have been raised about the ability of the Chinese
government to spy on the country’s 624 million cell phone subscribers: in 2008, one
Chinese state-run cell phone company revealed that it had unlimited access to the
personal data of their customers and hands the data over to Chinese security officials
upon request. 172 Since 2004, the Chinese government has been drafting legislation to
regulate personal mobile phone communication, which would require all cell phone
subscribers to register for mobile phone service with their real name and identification
card. 173 In addition, Chinese police have installed filtering and surveillance systems for
mobile and SMS providers to block and monitor ‘‘harmful’’ short-message communications. 174 Anyone who distributes ‘‘harmful’’ messages or rumors using SMS on mobile
phones can be arrested and convicted. 175
466
China
the eight TOM-Skype surveillance servers traced by Nart Villeneuve, one server hosted
a special version designed for use in Internet cafe ´s and contained log files and the
censored keyword list, while another contained logs for TOM Online’s wireless
services.
The TOM-Skype surveillance system was triggered when a TOM-Skype user sent or
received messages containing a banned keyword listed in a key file, and those messages
were then stored in log files on a TOM-Skype server. Within the content of these
messages stored in the file logs, when filtered out to eliminate English language
obscenities, almost 16 percent contained the word ‘‘communist,’’ 7 percent the word
‘‘Falun,’’ and 2.5 percent ‘‘Taiwan independence.’’ However, the logged messages also
made reference to other content outside the range of these long-sensitive topics, such
as earthquakes and milk powder. 167
Furthermore, the data also contained personal information of Skype users that interacted with TOM-Skype users. Users who attempt to access www.skype.com from China
are redirected to skype.tom.com. While Skype claimed that TOM fixed the security
breaches within 24 hours of the report’s publication, 168 the report issued a warning
for ‘‘groups engaging in political activism or promoting the use of censorship circumvention technology accessed through services provided by companies that have compromised on human rights.’’ From the information contained in the log files, it would
be possible to conduct politically motivated surveillance by using simple social networking tools to identify the relationships between users.
Like all other ICPs, most bulletin boards and chat rooms assign personnel to monitor
the content of messages. 169 Messages submitted by users are censored by human censors and filtering systems before appearing online. 170 In order to enhance the surveillance on bulletin board systems, since 2005 the users of campus bulletin boards have
been mandated to reregister with their real identifying information before posting messages online. 171
In recent years, serious concerns have been raised about the ability of the Chinese
government to spy on the country’s 624 million cell phone subscribers: in 2008, one
Chinese state-run cell phone company revealed that it had unlimited access to the
personal data of their customers and hands the data over to Chinese security officials
upon request. 172 Since 2004, the Chinese government has been drafting legislation to
regulate personal mobile phone communication, which would require all cell phone
subscribers to register for mobile phone service with their real name and identification
card. 173 In addition, Chinese police have installed filtering and surveillance systems for
mobile and SMS providers to block and monitor ‘‘harmful’’ short-message communications. 174 Anyone who distributes ‘‘harmful’’ messages or rumors using SMS on mobile
phones can be arrested and convicted. 175
466
China