2006, local governments have been developing ‘‘Safe City’’ surveillance and communications networks that connect police stations, through IP video surveillance, security
cameras, and back-end data management facilities, to specific locations including
Internet cafe ´s, financial centers, and entertainment areas. 149 Private firms known as
‘‘censorship entrepreneurs’’ have also jumped into the fray, providing advanced textmining solutions to enable censors to monitor, forecast, and ‘‘manage’’ online public
opinion, thereby avoiding scandalous and damaging revelations such as the Internet
post in June 2007 that exposed how children were kidnapped and forced into
slave labor at illegal brick kilns in Shanxi province. 150 One company featured by
international media, TRS Information Technology, claims to be the ‘‘leading search
and content management technology and software provider in China,’’ serving over
90 percent of the State Council ministries, 50 percent of newspaper press groups, and
300 universities and colleges. 151 Although TRS disclosed that its high-end surveillance
systems had been generally adopted by police—specifically that the company had
installed data-mining systems at eight Shanghai police stations so that one Internet
police officer could now do the work of ten—TRS does not list the Ministry of Public
Security as one of its customers. 152
Chinese law offers few viable protections for individual privacy, although clauses in
most Internet laws and regulations technically provide for the confidentiality of user
information. The exceptions, however, are more important. For example, regulations
on the management of e-mail services provide that e-mail service providers are dutybound to keep personal information and e-mail addresses of users confidential, and
may not disclose them except with user consent or when authorized for national security reasons or criminal investigations according to procedures stipulated by law. 153
Most Internet regulations allow for disclosure of user information when required by
law, for reasons involving national security, and for criminal investigations, but do
not specify what formal procedures are required or what evidentiary standards must
be met for the disclosure of information. In practice, as has been demonstrated in a
number of cases, 154 all ISPs and ICPs not only must capitulate to Chinese government
demands for censoring content, but also are required to assist the government in monitoring Internet users and recording their online activities. Requests to turn over personal data are often informal or provide little detail, and providers have no discretion
to refuse turning over information to public security officials. 155
Real-Name Registration
Registration requirements are often the first step to monitoring citizens’ online activities. Although this rule is not enforced, new subscribers to ISPs have been expected to
register with their local police bureaus since 1996. 156 In March 2005, as part of a CCP
campaign to exercise tighter control over culture, education, and media, all university
BBSs were ordered to block off-campus users and require users to reregister with their
464
China
cameras, and back-end data management facilities, to specific locations including
Internet cafe ´s, financial centers, and entertainment areas. 149 Private firms known as
‘‘censorship entrepreneurs’’ have also jumped into the fray, providing advanced textmining solutions to enable censors to monitor, forecast, and ‘‘manage’’ online public
opinion, thereby avoiding scandalous and damaging revelations such as the Internet
post in June 2007 that exposed how children were kidnapped and forced into
slave labor at illegal brick kilns in Shanxi province. 150 One company featured by
international media, TRS Information Technology, claims to be the ‘‘leading search
and content management technology and software provider in China,’’ serving over
90 percent of the State Council ministries, 50 percent of newspaper press groups, and
300 universities and colleges. 151 Although TRS disclosed that its high-end surveillance
systems had been generally adopted by police—specifically that the company had
installed data-mining systems at eight Shanghai police stations so that one Internet
police officer could now do the work of ten—TRS does not list the Ministry of Public
Security as one of its customers. 152
Chinese law offers few viable protections for individual privacy, although clauses in
most Internet laws and regulations technically provide for the confidentiality of user
information. The exceptions, however, are more important. For example, regulations
on the management of e-mail services provide that e-mail service providers are dutybound to keep personal information and e-mail addresses of users confidential, and
may not disclose them except with user consent or when authorized for national security reasons or criminal investigations according to procedures stipulated by law. 153
Most Internet regulations allow for disclosure of user information when required by
law, for reasons involving national security, and for criminal investigations, but do
not specify what formal procedures are required or what evidentiary standards must
be met for the disclosure of information. In practice, as has been demonstrated in a
number of cases, 154 all ISPs and ICPs not only must capitulate to Chinese government
demands for censoring content, but also are required to assist the government in monitoring Internet users and recording their online activities. Requests to turn over personal data are often informal or provide little detail, and providers have no discretion
to refuse turning over information to public security officials. 155
Real-Name Registration
Registration requirements are often the first step to monitoring citizens’ online activities. Although this rule is not enforced, new subscribers to ISPs have been expected to
register with their local police bureaus since 1996. 156 In March 2005, as part of a CCP
campaign to exercise tighter control over culture, education, and media, all university
BBSs were ordered to block off-campus users and require users to reregister with their
464
China