well as reporting and commentary relating to fast-breaking social events.’’ 87 All Web
sites that are nongovernmental entities, or otherwise not licensed news agencies, are
restricted from performing any journalistic function, limiting them to reprinting
content from central news outlets or media under the direct control of provincial
governments. 88 In practice, major portals are not permitted to repost many articles
published by print media online.
To discipline media, government ministries and Communist Party organs use both
formal controls, such as policies and instructions and defamation liability, and informal mechanisms, including editorial responsibility for content, economic incentives,
intimidation, and other forms of pressure. 89 Generally, authorities prefer to issue
instructions advising on topics to be censored informally by means of short message
service (SMS), chat, or e-mail, or at regular meetings with editors. Coverage of politically sensitive events is zealously managed at every stage in order to reduce the risk of
exposure to the smallest possible degree. 90 This management includes prior bans on
publication and time limits for obeying instructions, as well as ‘‘guidance’’ that serves
a more propagandistic function, including instructions on whether to place news,
when to place news, where to place it, and in what form it should be publicized.
When ‘‘mass incidents’’ or major events such as the 2008 Olympic Games reach their
conclusion, the grasp loosens over time, but it remains an unrelenting presence.
Despite the challenges and intense resources required to effectively police online
media, many of these formal and informal controls have nevertheless been extended
to Chinese cyberspace. China’s legal framework for Internet access and usage is
achieved by the participation of state and nonstate actors at all institutional levels. 91
Control over Internet expression and content is multilayered and achieved by distributing criminal and financial liability, licensing and registration requirements,
and self-monitoring instructions to nonstate actors at every stage of access, from the
ISP to the content provider and the end user. Some of these blunt and frequently
applied methods include job dismissals; the closure of Web sites, often by their Web
hosting service, for a broad array of infractions 92 ; and the detention of journalists,
writers, and activists. In 2008, 49 individuals were known to be imprisoned for online
activities, 93 including several (such as Huang Qi and Du Daobin) serving their second
period of detention for Internet-related crimes. 94 Internet users have also been targeted
for posting photographs and other multimedia online. 95 For example, journalist
Qi Chonghuai was questioned by police about an article he cowrote about a corrupt
local official and photographs of a luxurious government office building on the anticorruption online forum of the Xinhua News Agency, before being sentenced to
four years imprisonment on fraud and extortion charges. 96 Schoolteacher Liu
Shaokun was detained on June 25, 2008, and sentenced to one year of ‘‘reeducation
through labor’’ for posting pictures of school buildings that collapsed in the Sichuan
earthquake. 97
458
China
sites that are nongovernmental entities, or otherwise not licensed news agencies, are
restricted from performing any journalistic function, limiting them to reprinting
content from central news outlets or media under the direct control of provincial
governments. 88 In practice, major portals are not permitted to repost many articles
published by print media online.
To discipline media, government ministries and Communist Party organs use both
formal controls, such as policies and instructions and defamation liability, and informal mechanisms, including editorial responsibility for content, economic incentives,
intimidation, and other forms of pressure. 89 Generally, authorities prefer to issue
instructions advising on topics to be censored informally by means of short message
service (SMS), chat, or e-mail, or at regular meetings with editors. Coverage of politically sensitive events is zealously managed at every stage in order to reduce the risk of
exposure to the smallest possible degree. 90 This management includes prior bans on
publication and time limits for obeying instructions, as well as ‘‘guidance’’ that serves
a more propagandistic function, including instructions on whether to place news,
when to place news, where to place it, and in what form it should be publicized.
When ‘‘mass incidents’’ or major events such as the 2008 Olympic Games reach their
conclusion, the grasp loosens over time, but it remains an unrelenting presence.
Despite the challenges and intense resources required to effectively police online
media, many of these formal and informal controls have nevertheless been extended
to Chinese cyberspace. China’s legal framework for Internet access and usage is
achieved by the participation of state and nonstate actors at all institutional levels. 91
Control over Internet expression and content is multilayered and achieved by distributing criminal and financial liability, licensing and registration requirements,
and self-monitoring instructions to nonstate actors at every stage of access, from the
ISP to the content provider and the end user. Some of these blunt and frequently
applied methods include job dismissals; the closure of Web sites, often by their Web
hosting service, for a broad array of infractions 92 ; and the detention of journalists,
writers, and activists. In 2008, 49 individuals were known to be imprisoned for online
activities, 93 including several (such as Huang Qi and Du Daobin) serving their second
period of detention for Internet-related crimes. 94 Internet users have also been targeted
for posting photographs and other multimedia online. 95 For example, journalist
Qi Chonghuai was questioned by police about an article he cowrote about a corrupt
local official and photographs of a luxurious government office building on the anticorruption online forum of the Xinhua News Agency, before being sentenced to
four years imprisonment on fraud and extortion charges. 96 Schoolteacher Liu
Shaokun was detained on June 25, 2008, and sentenced to one year of ‘‘reeducation
through labor’’ for posting pictures of school buildings that collapsed in the Sichuan
earthquake. 97
458
China