investigations as straightforward as looking for missing relatives, but sometimes stray
into questionable acts of vigilantism involving threats and harassment. In the years
since, the human flesh search engines have scored a series of successes in identifying
corrupt officials who have acted shamefully or abused their office (and are often subsequently punished), as well as attacking private individuals engaging in perceived
distasteful behavior. 56 These loosely networked efforts are capable of launching campaigns against people like Grace Wang, a Chinese student at Duke University who
was filmed in April 2008 attempting to referee between two opposing groups of protesters at a ‘‘Free Tibet’’ action on campus. 57 After the video was posted on YouTube
and other Web sites, the online reaction was swift: she was lambasted in Chineselanguage discussion forums and portals for being ‘‘brainwashed’’ and a ‘‘race traitor,’’
among other things, and her parents living in China went into hiding after threats
were painted on their apartment. 58
At times, online activity has tested this relationship between citizens and government on a range of sensitive issues. Signed by more than 300 Chinese activists,
scholars, lawyers, and others, Charter 08 was issued online on December 9, 2008, as
a manifesto inspired by the founding of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia in 1977. 59
It called for the protection of human rights, an independent judiciary, a republican
system of ‘‘one person, one vote,’’ and other comprehensive reforms. 60 Charter 08
provoked a clear response from authorities, who questioned or detained more
than 100 of the original signatories, including Liu Xiaobo, a well-known dissident
who was detained without process on December 8 and continued (as of May 13,
2009) to be held at an unknown location. 61 However, through circulation by
e-mail and other means, Charter 08 had garnered more than 7,000 signatures by early
2009. 62
Beyond the hot-button incidents that carry news cycles, 63 the interaction between
top-down media supervisory structures and a more porous and unpredictable online
sphere have also contributed to the rise of a number of phenomena unique to the
Chinese cybersphere. The so-called Fifty Cent Party, a term referring to an estimated
280,000 Web commentators nationwide who zealously support the CCP and were initially rumored to net 50 cents per post, are directly organized by the government to
‘‘guide’’ online public opinion. 64 It had its origins at Nanjing University in 2005,
where students were recruited with work-study funds to advocate the party line on an
online student forum, and it has been institutionalized to the extent that the Ministry
of Culture developed Web commentator trainings (complete with exams and job certification) and major Web sites are required to have in-house teams of these government-trained commentators. 65 Thus, while the government continues to aggressively
intervene in news media coverage, these Fifty Cent Party members are proliferating
because the CCP also has come to recognize the potential benefits of a public relations
approach to online discourse.
China
455
into questionable acts of vigilantism involving threats and harassment. In the years
since, the human flesh search engines have scored a series of successes in identifying
corrupt officials who have acted shamefully or abused their office (and are often subsequently punished), as well as attacking private individuals engaging in perceived
distasteful behavior. 56 These loosely networked efforts are capable of launching campaigns against people like Grace Wang, a Chinese student at Duke University who
was filmed in April 2008 attempting to referee between two opposing groups of protesters at a ‘‘Free Tibet’’ action on campus. 57 After the video was posted on YouTube
and other Web sites, the online reaction was swift: she was lambasted in Chineselanguage discussion forums and portals for being ‘‘brainwashed’’ and a ‘‘race traitor,’’
among other things, and her parents living in China went into hiding after threats
were painted on their apartment. 58
At times, online activity has tested this relationship between citizens and government on a range of sensitive issues. Signed by more than 300 Chinese activists,
scholars, lawyers, and others, Charter 08 was issued online on December 9, 2008, as
a manifesto inspired by the founding of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia in 1977. 59
It called for the protection of human rights, an independent judiciary, a republican
system of ‘‘one person, one vote,’’ and other comprehensive reforms. 60 Charter 08
provoked a clear response from authorities, who questioned or detained more
than 100 of the original signatories, including Liu Xiaobo, a well-known dissident
who was detained without process on December 8 and continued (as of May 13,
2009) to be held at an unknown location. 61 However, through circulation by
e-mail and other means, Charter 08 had garnered more than 7,000 signatures by early
2009. 62
Beyond the hot-button incidents that carry news cycles, 63 the interaction between
top-down media supervisory structures and a more porous and unpredictable online
sphere have also contributed to the rise of a number of phenomena unique to the
Chinese cybersphere. The so-called Fifty Cent Party, a term referring to an estimated
280,000 Web commentators nationwide who zealously support the CCP and were initially rumored to net 50 cents per post, are directly organized by the government to
‘‘guide’’ online public opinion. 64 It had its origins at Nanjing University in 2005,
where students were recruited with work-study funds to advocate the party line on an
online student forum, and it has been institutionalized to the extent that the Ministry
of Culture developed Web commentator trainings (complete with exams and job certification) and major Web sites are required to have in-house teams of these government-trained commentators. 65 Thus, while the government continues to aggressively
intervene in news media coverage, these Fifty Cent Party members are proliferating
because the CCP also has come to recognize the potential benefits of a public relations
approach to online discourse.
China
455